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7Preface
The present volume inaugurates the series Ca’ Foscari Japanese Studies, 
which aims to provide an open-access venue for peer-reviewed research 
in this field. The collection will cover Ancient to Contemporary Japan with 
a multidisciplinary approach and is divided into the following four sub-
series: Arts and Literature, History and Society, Religion and Thought, 
Linguistics and Language Education. This organisation mirrors the cur-
rent diversity of research interests at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, 
a lagoon city boasting a long tradition as one of the oldest centres for 
Japanese Studies in Italy as well as home to medieval traveller Marco 
Polo, the very first to introduce the exotic image of Zipangu (or Japan) to 
European imagery.
The first direct contacts between Venice and Japan date to 1585, when 
Jesuit missionary Alessandro Valignano sent a Japanese embassy to Eu-
rope, but it was in 1873, when the Iwakura Mission reached the city, that 
the first Japanese Language course was held at Ca’ Foscari, or, as it was 
known at the time, the Royal School for Advanced Studies on Trade. Teach-
ing and research on Japan became permanent since the 1960s thanks 
to Rector Italo Siciliano (1895-1980), who introduced a Course in East 
Asian Languages and Literatures in the academic year 1964-1965 (Boscaro 
2004)1 which was attended by thirteen freshmen. Since then, a wide range 
of Japan-related courses offered at Ca’ Foscari University have gradually 
attracted more and more students, establishing Venice as the most impor-
tant centre for Japanese Studies in Italy, with  more than 1800 B.A. and 
M.A. students in Japanese Language and Culture in the A.Y. 2012-2013. 
Thanks to such records, the Department for Asian and North African Stud-
ies of Ca’ Foscari has received research funds from the Japan Foundation 
for international conferences, professor exchanges and staff expansion 
since the mid-Seventies, and has become one of the Japan Foundation’s 
Centres of Excellence in Europe since 2008.
The present volume owes most of its contributions to the debates in 
which many of its authors were engaged during and after the international 
conference Rethinking nature in contemporary Japan: Science, economics, 
politics held in 2013 at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, as part of the three 
year research project Rethinking nature: Facing the crisis in contemporary 
Japan (2012-2014) funded by the Japan Foundation, to whom the editors are 
very grateful. It is no secret that the underlying premise of the broader 
1 Boscaro, Adriana (2004). «Gli studi giapponesi a Venezia» (Japanese Studies in Venice). 
In: Tamburello, Adolfo (ed.), Italia-Giappone: 450 anni (Italy-Japan: 450 years), vol. 2. Roma; 
Napoli: Istituto Italiano per l’A frica e l’Oriente; Università degli Studi di Napoli «L’Orientale», 
pp. 674-678.
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research project has been the deeply felt sense of urgency provoked by the 
tragic events of 3/11 in Japan. In the immediate aftermath of the triple dis-
aster this led to a spontaneous response of solidarity, shared by all teachers 
and students of Japanese Studies at Ca’ Foscari, who jointly organised the 
first charity event ever held in the courtyard of the university, attended by 
thousands of Venetian residents (10 April 2011); but it also stimulated many 
questions from those wishing to understand what happened, how and why 
it happened, as well as its present and future implications, resulting in 
two conferences (2011, 2012) which brought together scholars, journalists, 
students and volunteers.2 
2 For more detailed information, photos and media coverage about the charity events and 
conferences ‘Ca Foscari per il Giappone’ organised in Venice (April 2011 and 2012) to col-
lect funding for the victims of Fukushima prefecture, please refer to the website: http://
cafoscariperilgiappone.stud.unive.it/documenti-10-aprile-2011.
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On 11 March 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake occurred off the Pacific 
coast of Japan, triggering a tsunami that hit the Northeast of the country 
with devastating effects. Official reports would later assess the toll at over 
18 thousand victims, including dead and missing; damage to buildings and 
infrastructures was extensive, with the almost complete destruction of 
several coastal towns. Waves were so high as to roll over the seawalls of 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, causing a failure of its cooling systems 
that led to explosions and the eventual meltdown of three reactors. Accord-
ing to government sources, about 154,000 people were evacuated from 
the areas surrounding the plant after the release into the atmosphere of 
radioactive elements as a direct consequence of the accident.1 The melt-
down, however, also caused a radioactive leak underground and into the 
ocean – a problem that still awaits a definitive solution.
Although both earthquake and tsunami were events far beyond human 
control, the nuclear accident can hardly be regarded as a ‘natural’ disas-
ter. Investigations soon brought to light severe deficiencies in the secu-
rity system of Fukushima Daiichi; these faults, moreover, did not simply 
depend on a lack of technical preparedness, but rather on prolonged and 
reiterated negligence. It also emerged that the latter was rooted in col-
lusion between the operating company and regulatory authorities, who 
purportedly downplayed the standing risks. Furthermore, investigations 
revealed that these problems, far from being specific to the site affected by 
the accident, were deeply embedded in the nuclear industry countrywide.2
The facts of March 2011 have since spurred an intense debate, both 
within Japan and internationally, on issues related to emergency preven-
tion and management. Discussion on the former aspect has focused on 
the accident in Fukushima, which was entirely man-made and avoidable. 
On the side of disaster response, however, criticism has encompassed all 
dimensions of the 3/11 aftermath: first, concerning the perceived incom-
petence of the government in dealing with the crisis in its initial phase; 
second, with respect to the long-term tasks of post-tsunami reconstruction 
and nuclear decontamination. Although it is impossible to quantify the rela-
tive weight of these problems compared to other national issues, it is gen-
erally acknowledged that widespread discontent for disaster management 
1 See the website of the Reconstruction Agency https://www.reconstruction.go.jp/
english/topics/2013/03/the-status-in-fukushima.html.
2 See The National Diet of Japan (ed. 2012), The Official Report of The Fukushima Nuclear 
Accident Independent Investigation Commission https://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_
report.pdf.
Rethinking nature in contemporary Japan: Science, economics, politics
10 Introduction
contributed to the crushing defeat of the Democratic Party administration 
at the general election of December 2012. In a broader perspective, 3/11 
has had a major impact on public debates on a wide range of national poli-
cies; some are immediately related to the three-fold catastrophe, such as 
nuclear energy policy or economic recovery in the Northeast; others have 
a less immediate though logical link to those events, such as food security 
or environmental policy. In all these fields, the Great Eastern Japan Earth-
quake and its consequences will likely represent an unavoidable frame of 
reference for a long time to come.
Because of its scale and gravity, the 3/11 disaster has commanded the 
attention of public opinion worldwide. Although press coverage is not as 
frequent now as in the early weeks, the issues that tsunami and nuclear 
accident have raised domestically are also of great significance on the 
international scene. Over the last few decades, Japan had increasingly 
gained a reputation as a country attentive to sustainable development, 
where technological innovation supported economic growth by ensuring 
an efficient use of natural resources in a way that was respectful of the 
environment; Japan had also won recognition for its high standards in 
terms of emergency prevention, as exemplified by anti-seismic technology 
in civil engineering. The waves that laid waste the shores of the North-
east on 3/11, not only induced a nuclear meltdown, but also shattered the 
myth of Japan as a safe, responsible country. The loopholes in the security 
systems of Fukushima Daiichi and other plants, together with evident dif-
ficulties in the handling of diverse aspects of the post-disaster crisis, have 
shown to the world that both the prevention and response capacity of the 
institutions involved had been dramatically overestimated. It follows that 
there is a need to reflect upon the causes of this failure, which, as has 
already been pointed out, cannot be simply reduced to technical matters. 
A comprehensive analysis of the social, economic and political conditions 
leading to the present situation is necessary.
Moving from the above premises, an international conference was held 
in Venice on 25-26 February 2013 on the theme Rethinking nature in con-
temporary Japan: Science, economics and politics. The aim of the Depart-
ment of Asian and North A frican Studies of Ca’ Foscari University, which 
organised this event with the generous support of the Japan Foundation, 
was to create an opportunity for the discussion of the 3/11 aftermath in a 
broad, interdisciplinary perspective. The conference explored the back-
ground and ongoing effects of the crisis by addressing two main questions: 
on the one hand, how society and institutions interact in shaping the per-
ception of disaster risk; on the other, how energy policy, particularly with 
respect to nuclear energy, is influenced by domestic and international 
factors. Although the overall focus was chiefly on relatively recent develop-
ments, several presentations included a historical outline that embraced 
the entire postwar period. A fter the conference, selected papers were 
Rethinking nature in contemporary Japan: Science, economics, politics
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further enlarged and edited so as to form the present volume, which is 
structured as follows.
The first essay, by Ichinose Tomohiro, introduces the theme of emer-
gency management by discussing Sustainable reconstruction in rural ar-
eas of Japan after the disaster on 11 March 2011. It focuses on gensai (the 
mitigation of damage after a disaster) in the areas along the Sanriku coast 
affected by the tsunami, underlining the necessity to adopt a backcasting 
approach, so as to predict future population and aging trends, thus taking 
the issue of depopulation into account in order to devise a sustainable 
reconstruction plan.  
The next five chapters deal with the production of nuclear energy in 
terms of its perception by Japanese society. In Atoms for a dream: Holding 
the American umbrella in the driving atomic rain, Yoshimi Shun’ya reviews 
the changing Japanese attitude towards the peaceful use of nuclear ener-
gy throughout the post-war period and up to the fallout of the Fukushima 
accident; he deals with the issue in connection with the Japan-US bilat-
eral relationship and, particularly, Japan’s position under the American 
‘Nuclear Umbrella’. Utsumi Hirofumi’s essay, titled Rethinking purposive 
consciousness: An analysis of sceptical fanaticism after Fukushima, deals 
with ‘the self-fulfilling system’ of nuclear development in post-war Japan, 
stressing how the ‘system of irresponsibility’, with Japan’s infatuation 
with itself as a cyborg nation, has promoted the establishment of nuclear 
power plants. The chapter by Hasegawa Kōichi, titled Rethinking civil 
society in Japan: Before and after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, dis-
cusses the differences of civil society issues and anti-nuclear activism in 
Japan before and after the Fukushima nuclear accident, using the author’s 
«triangular model of social movement analysis» of three major factors 
(political opportunity structure; resources, actors and major support base; 
and framing based on culture and attitudes). Next, Toshio Miyake’s essay, 
titled Popularising the nuclear: ‘Mangaesque’ convergence in post-war 
Japan, explores how contested meanings of the nuclear have been domes-
ticated, naturalised, and ultimately reproduced from ‘below’ within the 
mangaesque transmedial constellation of popular cultures, addressing 
some of its most influential representations: from the market-oriented 
sphere to the state-sponsored educational cute characters and the subcul-
tural parody appropriation. Katarzyna J. Cwiertka, in From malnutrition 
to radiation: Reviewing food security and food safety in Japan (1945-2013), 
provides an overview of the role played by food security and food safety 
in public debate in Japan since the 1940s; the essay underlines how the 
Tōhoku Earthquake has been a watershed in terms of food security and 
food safety, reviving, even if temporarily, a long-forgotten experience of 
food shortage and, more importantly, bringing a completely new dimen-
sion to the issue of food safety in Japan – the anxiety about radioactive 
contamination of food.
Rethinking nature in contemporary Japan: Science, economics, politics
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The latter section of the volume shifts the focus of discussion on poli-
cy making at institutional level. In Japan at the summit: Energy, climate 
change and a ‘Gaggle of Gs’, Hugo Dobson analyses the role of the Group 
of 8 (G8) and Group of 20 (G20), alongside a number of other alphanumeric 
configurations collectively known as GX summitry or a ‘Gaggle of Gs’, in 
shaping and promoting multilateral approaches to the challenges posed 
by energy issues and climate change, exploring Japan’s role and contribu-
tion, in particular. Daniel P. Aldrich’s essay, titled Top down versus bottom 
up: Post-crisis Japanese nuclear policy, focuses on the role of the Japanese 
central government in creating and modifying policy instruments designed 
to alter preferences at the local and regional levels; in this context, it deals 
with three distinct groups within Japanese civil society (host communities 
which have nuclear power plants in their immediate back yards, localities 
which are slightly further away from a nearby nuclear power plant, and 
civil society in general) and their reactions to the accident at Fukushima 
and subsequent altered ways of interaction with the central government. 
The final chapter by Andrew DeWit, titled Can Japan build resilience in the 
face of climate change?, explains how and why the 10.3 trillion yen reces-
sion countermeasures of Japanese PM Abe Shinzō’s government should 
centre on ambitious goals for energy efficiency, targeting, in particular, 
building stock, smart grids and DHC, electric motors, and other very im-
portant areas where Japan can be considered to be behind.
As a whole, the aim of this volume is to offer a multi-faceted vision of 
policy issues relevant to the current debate on 3/11 and its consequences. 
It is our hope that these  essays may stimulate further research and serve 
as reference for the dissemination of accurate data on problems that rep-
resent a major challenge not only for Japan, but also for our globalised 
society.
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Sustainable reconstruction in rural areas  
of Japan after the disaster on 11 March 2011 
Tomohiro Ichinose (Keio University, Tokyo, Japan)
Abstract On 11 March 2011, a great earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 destroyed most of the 
rural areas along the Pacific Coast in eastern Japan, which suffered from depopulation and ag-
ing problems since before the earthquake. In this paper I will discuss the reconstruction plan of 
depopulated rural areas from the viewpoints of transportation infrastructures, residential areas, 
agriculture, forestry, fisheries, consensus building, and nature restoration. We have to take a 
‘backcasting’ approach for a sustainable development, which is the planning strategy that will 
lead to successful outcomes. An organisation and a platform to support the planning process is 
necessary to build a consensus within the area. 
1 Introduction
On 11 March 2011, a massive, 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck the north-
west Pacific off northeastern Japan, triggering tsunami damage in the 
coastal areas of the Tōhoku and Kantō regions (Mori et al. 2012) and 
severely damaging the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Notably, 
many small settlements along the Sanriku Coast were totally destroyed by 
the tsunami. Most local governments in the Sanriku coastal area, ranging 
from the central-eastern part of Miyagi Prefecture to the southeastern 
part of Aomori Prefecture, were already suffering from depopulation and 
aging populations. Ishinomaki City is the biggest in the area, with approxi-
mately 150 thousand people. The second biggest city is Kesennuma, which 
had over 73 thousand people before the earthquake. However, because 
Kesennuma City had merged with Karakuwa Town in 2006 and Motoyoshi 
Town in 2009, its population density was approximately 220 people per 
square kilometre. The population density of all other local governments 
in the area other than Ishinomaki City was under 200 people per square 
kilometre. 
Most areas in Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures that were damaged by the tsu-
nami also suffered from huge tsunamis in 1896 and 1933 (Yamaguchi 1943). 
Many people died from these disasters, but the population recovered with 
the rapid increase of the total population of Japan. The population of Ja-
pan is said to have begun decreasing this decade. In 2010, a Long-term 
Perspective Committee, of which I was a member, was established under 
the National Land Council of Japan’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism (MLIT). In late February 2011, the committee an-
Rethinking nature in contemporary Japan: Science, economics, politics
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nounced its midterm report on the outlook of Japan for the year 2050. 
Based on last year’s statistics, we estimate that if trends continue at their 
current pace about 20 per cent of the currently inhabited land will lose all 
its population by 2050, and an additional 20 per cent or so of Japan’s land 
will have fewer than 10 residents per square kilometre. In other words, 
we project that about 40 per cent of the currently inhabited areas will be 
virtually uninhabited by 2050. The Sanriku coastal area is no exception. 
The population of the most damaged local governments decreased 5 
per cent or more from 2005 to 2010, and the percentage of the population 
aged 65 and over was approximately 30 per cent or more in 2010, accord-
ing to the national censuses in 2005 and 2010. Comparing the population 
density per square kilometre in Kesennuma City for 2005 and the density 
estimated for 2050 by the committee (fig. 1), it is clear that the population 
of the city will decrease. The percentage of the elderly is not included in 
the figure but will exceed 50 per cent in most areas. The recent earthquake 
is likely to accelerate the tendency toward depopulation and aging in the 
Sanriku coastal area. 
Japan now faces a serious financial crisis. When a huge earthquake 
struck central Japan in 2004, the Japanese government responded by in-
vesting over 100 billion yen in Yamakoshi Village (population 2,000), which 
subsequently merged into Nagaoka City. This was possible because the 
scope of the damaged area was limited. But can the government now sup-
port local governments affected by the recent earthquake in the same 
way? The affected areas span the Kantō and Tōhoku regions, with over 270 
thousand buildings and houses destroyed. How can we reconstruct these 
rural areas? 
I review the damage situation in rural areas, especially along the Sanriku 
Coast. Then I discuss what we must do to reconstruct rural areas given 
the issues of rapid depopulation and aging. Finally, I focus on consensus 
building and partnership in local reconstruction planning. This report was 
modified from Ichinose (2012). 
2 Reconstruction of settlements in rural area
Many people took refuge in schools, community centers, or other public 
facilities just after the earthquake. The local governments of Iwate, Miyagi 
and Fukushima Prefectures had closed all such facilities by the end of 
December, because most people had moved into temporary housing. The 
government had constructed 52,120 temporary houses (according to an 
MLIT announcement at the beginning of December 2011). 328,903 people 
had lost their homes and had moved to temporary housing or other loca-
tions, such as apartments or relatives’ homes (according to a government 
announcement on 24 November 2011). Many settlements were totally de-
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stroyed by the tsunami, while the earthquake caused land subsidence of 
as much as 0.7 metres that makes it impossible to reconstruct houses and 
buildings on their original sites. The government has suggested relocating 
such settlements to higher ground. The third supplementary budget for 
this fiscal year passed the National Diet on 21 November, 2011, and reloca-
tion to higher ground will be totally supported by the government. Relo-
cation plans have been designed at many settlements, especially in small 
fishing villages. If more than five households want to move together to 
higher ground, the cost of constructing a residential site is fully supported. 
Relocation to higher ground is not a new solution. Some relocations took 
place after the huge tsunamis in 1896 and 1933. Yamaguchi reports exam-
ples of relocation after the tsunami of 1933 (Yamaguchi 1943). Some set-
tlements that relocated after these tsunamis were destroyed again, either 
because the height of relocation was inadequate or because the settlement 
had sprawled into the lowland in subsequent decades. The damaged rural 
areas can be divided into four types (tab. 1). The first concerns areas with 
little damage to the settlement due to an effective previous relocation, 
such as the Yoshihama District of Ōfunato City. The second involves areas 
Figure 1. Population density in 2005 (and estimate for 2050) for central Kesennuma City, by A. Ohba 
(Keio University) using data from MILT
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where relocated settlements suffered little damage, but sprawl areas were 
heavily destroyed, such as the Ryōri District of Ōfunato City. The third is 
areas damaged because their relocations were not high enough, such as 
the Ōya District of Kesennuma City. The fourth is areas that were totally 
destroyed, because they were not relocated after previous tsunamis, such 
as the Tarō District of Miyako City. Tarō was famous for having the highest 
breakwaters in Japan. In the 1933 tsunami, 911 people perished in Tarō 
Village, which merged with Miyako City in 2005. Tarō decided to construct 
ten-metre breakwaters around the central settlement to prepare for the 
next tsunami. There was a big tsunami in 1960 along the Sanriku Coast 
caused by a massive earthquake in Chile, but Tarō was unscathed owing 
to its high breakwaters. The tsunami caused by the recent earthquake, 
however, destroyed the breakwaters and caused serious damage to the 
settlement (Miura et al. 2011). 
3 Restoration of agriculture, forestry and fisheries
The government announced on 24 June 2011 that the amount of damage 
caused by the recent earthquake totalled 16.9 trillion yen, excluding dam-
age caused by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident. The 
amount of damage in primary industries was 1.9 trillion yen, only 11% of to-
tal damage. However, there are many small fishing ports along the Pacific 
Coast that were totally destroyed by the tsunami. There are a total of 253 
ports in Miyagi and Iwate prefectures, with small fishing ports especially 
concentrated along the Sanriku Coast. The Sanriku Coast is famous as one 
of the best fisheries in the world, but has recently suffered from aging and 
a shortage of fishery resources. There are many types of fisheries, includ-
ing pelagic fisheries using large fishing boats, coastal fisheries using small 
boats, fixed net fisheries, cultured fisheries, etc. Although many people 
in fishing villages have fishing rights, most work in the city and fish only 
several days a year. 2,667 people worked primarily at the fishery in Kesen-
numa City in 2005, only 7.4% of total employees. Many food processing 
factories concentrated in Ishinomaki, Kesennuma and Ōfunato were totally 
destroyed. Some have already decided to relocate to other areas of Japan 
or overseas. A local bank estimated that Kesennuma City lost half of its 
GRP and one-third of its employment from the earthquake. Even if settle-
ments and fishing ports are reconstructed, therefore, most people cannot 
live there without a job. Most food processing factories were located on 
reclaimed land in Kesennuma City. The reconstruction of factories there 
is now prohibited because of land subsidence. Kesennuma City plans to 
raise the land a few metres, but this will take years. 
The ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) estimated 
on 16 August 2011 that the total amount of damage to agricultural land and 
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facilities was 790 billion yen, an amount smaller than for fisheries (1.2 tril-
lion yen). 24,000 ha of arable land were flooded by the tsunami in Miyagi, 
Fukushima, and Ibaraki Prefectures. The land has been damaged by salt 
water, and irrigation facilities were destroyed. An irrigation reservoir in 
Fukushima collapsed from the earthquake. The nuclear power plant acci-
dent seems to be having a greater effect on Japanese agriculture than the 
earthquake. 8,300 ha of arable land must be decontaminated in Fukushima, 
which is not a large area compared to the total area of Japan. Radiation is 
still being detected, however, in many foods from areas throughout East 
Japan, in some cases requiring that their distribution be suspended. 
4 Reconstruction of transportation infrastructure and public 
transportation systems
It has been noted that major national roads and the Tōhoku Shinkansen 
were quickly restored after the earthquake, unlike after the Great Hanshin 
Awaji Earthquake in 1995, and that the Sanriku Expressway played a ma-
jor role as a detour around damaged national roads. However, many rural 
areas that had limited public transportation services before the earth-
Figure 2. Ferries carried into the port of O¯shima, Kesennuma City. Photo by the author, 18 May 2011 
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quake, remained isolated for a long time, because major roads and local 
trains and buses were destroyed by the tsunami. Focusing on Kesennuma 
City, the East Japan Railway Company’s Ōfunato Line from Ichinoseki to 
Kesennuma sustained no damage and resumed operations on 1 April 2011, 
while the line from Kesennuma to Ōfunato along the Sanriku Coast was 
heavily damaged with no prospect of restoration. The Kesennuma line 
leading to the southern part of the Sanriku area was also totally destroyed, 
and although deliberations have only just begun, it will probably not be 
restored but instead shifted to alternative transportation modes or routes. 
Ferries were unable to use Kesennuma port to reach Ōshima (fig. 2), a 
small island in Kesennuma Bay. Although a small boat began to transport 
people two days after the earthquake, vehicles and machines for delivery 
and restoration could not be transported until a month and a half later 
when Edashima City in Hiroshima Prefecture donated a ferry boat. Initially, 
therefore, the US Navy landed using amphibious assault ships to assist 
in restoration. Local bus services connecting rural areas were also struck 
hard by the tsunami. Miyako Bus Company, which operates local buses in 
Kesennuma, lost 31 buses and a bus terminal to the tsunami and to fire. 
According to the reconstruction plan for Kesennuma City, all public trans-
portation services must be restored. Most companies, however, were in the 
red even before the earthquake due to declining ridership. Rapid depopu-
Figure 3. Flooded farmland in rural Kesennuma CIty. Photo by the author, 14 November 2011
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lation means the number of passengers will not return to pre-earthquake 
levels. Some routes, therefore, will be abandoned as companies are forced 
to scale back their operations. 
All local governments in Iwate and Miyagi had announced reconstruction 
plans by the end of December 2011. Few local governments, however, have 
seriously discussed their public transportation systems. If governments 
restore public transportation services to pre-earthquake levels, the system 
will be unsustainable. It is absolutely necessary that each local govern-
ment consider its future public transportation systems using a ‘backcast-
ing’ approach to ensure that services remain sustainable decades later. 
Backcasting has been used to evaluate sustainable development around 
the world since the end of the last century. Doi (et al. 2011) pointed out that 
an integrated approach is necessary to promote the dynamic co-evolution 
of transportation, land use, and infrastructure. They suggested that small, 
low-speed electric vehicles for one or two persons would be suitable for 
the super-aged cities of the future. The Reconstruction Design Council in 
Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/
fukkou/english/pdf/report20110625.pdf), in its report, suggested the 
introduction of cutting-edge, independent, decentralised energy systems 
in «smart villages» constructed in rural areas. Such systems would com-
prehensively combine efficient utilisation of energy-saving systems, the use 
of diverse energy sources including renewable energy, a solution to output 
instability based on the introduction of storage batteries, and utilisation 
of cogeneration (combined heat and power) using gas and other fuels. In 
such smart villages, electric vehicles could be easily charged anywhere, 
and their batteries could be used as an emergency source of electricity. 
We have to develop a transportation system that serves the elderly in all 
rural areas of Japan, so introducing and testing new transportation systems 
in disaster areas before they are spread throughout the country is a good 
idea. A rural area might be suitable for field tests of automatic vehicle 
operation systems owing to its light volume of traffic. If smart villages and 
new transportation systems are introduced together, it will contribute to 
the reduction of greenhouse gases. People will not need to own electric 
vehicles. There are already some car sharing services at temporary hous-
ing complexes. A small electric vehicle sharing service can ensure low-cost 
mobility for the elderly while creating employment for local people. 
5 Nature restoration on damaged land
Many rural settlements were destroyed by the tsunami. The government 
fully supports the relocation of these settlements. A fter relocation, the 
former residential sites can be used for factories, commercial facilities, 
or agriculture but not for housing. Many local governments have plans to 
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provide a public park or build a monument to the disaster. The tsunami 
damaged many natural coasts (Udo et al. 2012), but they have begun to 
recover on their own, with much of the damaged land transforming into 
halophytic marsh (Kanaya et al. 2012). Most of Japan’s natural coastline 
has been lost or developed for agricultural and urban land use. Breakwa-
ters have usually been built on the remaining natural coast. The govern-
ment has considered how high to build breakwaters in disaster areas. 
Iwate Prefecture has presented Rikuzentakata City with a scheme for 12.5 
and 12.8-metres breakwaters. The residents want breakwaters of 15 metres 
high, because the recent tsunami, which destroyed the central areas of the 
city, reached 13.8 metres. On the other hand, some people in Kesennuma 
City strongly oppose a Miyagi Prefecture scheme to erect breakwaters 
ranging from 5.0 to 11.8 metres high even though their city was ravaged 
by a 12-metres tsunami. Kesennuma was once a famous sightseeing spot 
owing to the beauty of its coastal landscape. 
One settlement has a plan to restore halophytic marsh on damaged land 
where all but five houses were swept away or destroyed by the tsunami. 
The residents are designing a plan to relocate to higher ground. The set-
tlement is located in two small valleys, whose lowlands are always flooded 
(fig. 3). Some residents intend to keep the water and restore a marsh there 
even though a high breakwater would be built. The result, of course, will 
depend on what agreement is reached with other residents, but a group 
of scientists I belong to has begun to research the environment, flora, and 
fauna in the marsh. 
6 Consensus building for local reconstruction planning
Consensus building between local residents is definitely important for local 
planning, but the involvement of many kinds of actors in reconstruction 
plans and action is also necessary, including NGOs and local businesses. 
For various reasons, some local residents live temporarily outside of their 
home-towns. They may wish to take part in discussions about reconstruc-
tion but face difficulty in attending multiple sessions. In addition, many 
people who are originally from a disaster area but now live in metropolitan 
areas also want to do something for their home-towns. Many people went 
to the disaster areas as volunteers to help those affected during the months 
following the earthquake. Many would like to continue to help, but cannot 
visit frequently. Thus, a platform is necessary, one through which many 
kinds of actors, including local residents, can discuss reconstruction and 
the future. Social network services (SNS) are well suited to this purpose. 
Students at Keio University built a Facebook group (http://www.facebook.
com/groups/wakuwaku.kesennuma/) (fig. 4) in June 2011 that had 1,211 mem-
bers by the end of February 2014. Ten per cent of members are residents of 
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Kesennuma City, while the rest live outside. Some members, most of them 
originally from Kesennuma, live in foreign countries. They met through 
the Facebook group and then set up an English-language Facebook page 
to appeal to the world for help (http://www.facebook.com/kesennuma). The 
Facebook group has played a major role in real projects. It was decided 
in June that the summer festival in central Kesennuma would not be held 
in 2011, because the area was flooded by spring tides and had not been 
restored. Just after this decision, some citizens started to plan another 
event in place of the festival. They asked for help through Facebook. Many 
members helped them to prepare the event, including some students from 
my campus. The event was held from 11 to 13 August 2011 in several loca-
tions in Kesennuma City. 
SNS is also a useful platform for providing information to residents 
outside of their home-towns. However, SNS is not popular among older 
people and may be difficult for them to use. Still, a broadcast of local meet-
ings using free systems like Skype or Ustream would certainly be useful. 
The important role played after the earthquake by information volunteers 
in shelters who helped the affected gather information from the Internet 
has been noted. Information volunteers can support the dissemination of 
information within disasters areas and help former residents outside. 
7 Conclusion
The earthquake on 11 March 2011 was the greatest in Japanese history, 
although there have been many other great natural disasters since the 
dawn of history. We will certainly face great disasters in the future. The 
tsunami caused by the earthquake totally destroyed the 10-metres break-
waters in Tarō District, which had been described as a walled fortress. 
Tarō’s local residents believed that no tsunami could ever reach their set-
Figure 4. Facebook group for discussing the reconstruction and future of Kesennuma City
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tlement beyond the breakwaters; the main reason why roughly 200 people 
died there. This teaches us that we cannot completely protect ourselves 
against natural disasters, and must be prepared for the unexpected. Since 
the earthquake, many experts have begun to talk about gensai, meaning 
the mitigation of damage from a disaster, also related to ecosystem-based 
disaster risk reduction (Eco-DRR) (Renaud et al. 2013). However, Iwate 
and Miyagi Prefecture plan to construct breakwaters over 10 metres high 
around rural settlements. Many residents oppose the plan, because they 
will be unable to watch the sea when an earthquake strikes. In addition, 
if local residents move to higher ground in accordance with the relocation 
plan and no longer use the lowlands, a breakwater seems unnecessary. In 
this case, the natural coastline and wetlands must be restored. 
The cities and rural areas of the Sanriku Coast were restored and rebuilt 
after the disasters in 1896 and 1933. Many newcomers came to the affected 
areas because the population of Japan was increasing at that time. However, 
Japan faces rapid depopulation during this century. Although we must design 
reconstruction plans that consider the issues of future depopulation and ag-
ing, only a few local governments mention these issues in their reconstruction 
plans. Minamisanriku Town has predicted a decreasing population for ten 
years after the disaster in their reconstruction plan. Most of the local govern-
ments affected want to restore everything just as it was before the disaster, 
and as soon as possible. This might lead to many areas that are unsustainable 
due to depopulation. In order to build cities and regions that are sustainable 
for decades, we have to design reconstruction plans using a backcasting ap-
proach that predicts future population and aging trends. 
Most local governments have announced reconstruction plans, with the 
exception of those in Fukushima Prefecture that remain strongly affected 
by residual radiation. They have to develop local plans with local residents. 
Although consensus building among local residents is the most important 
issue, they suffer from a lack of expertise and an inadequate budget. On 
the other hand, many NGOs, universities and private companies continue 
to support local residents. Local governments must form partnerships with 
such organisations. Organisations acting in the same area rarely share 
information with each other, so we must build a platform for the sharing of 
ideas and problems. SNS can be a powerful tool for this purpose, enabling 
local residents to find not only experts but also co-workers to help them 
face new challenges. However, we must hold workshops in real spaces 
because there are some residents, especially the elderly, who cannot ac-
cess SNS. The government must implement a scheme to support such an 
organisation.
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Table 1. Four types of district as damaged by the tsunami on 11 March 2011, in relation to previous 
relocations after past tsunamis
District City Tsunami 
damage
Old 
relocation
Damaged area
Yoshihama O¯funato Slight Yes Agricultural land use
Ryo¯ri O¯funato Heavy Yes Sprawl area
O¯ya Kesnnuma Heavy Yes Relocated area
Taro¯ Miyako Heavy No Surrounded by breakwaters
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Atoms for a dream 
Holding the American umbrella in the driving  
atomic rain
Shun’ya Yoshimi (University of Tokyo, Japan)
Translated by Shi-Lin Loh
Abstract In postwar Japan, nuclear energy was transformed from fear into an object of hope, 
and received as a symbol of dreams and peace. Nuclear power in Fukushima goes back to 1960, 
the year of the massive protests against the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In that same year, 
Fukushima Prefecture announced its intention to solicit nuclear facilities. Most nuclear power sta-
tions constructed in Japan commenced operation in the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, by the mid-
1990s the four initial reactors of 1971 had burgeoned to fifty-four, making Japan the country with 
the third highest number of nuclear reactors in the world. In the context of the public’s everyday 
life and sense of society, how was this spectacle of a bright future desired and accepted? Taking 
as its subject postwar Japan’s embrace of nuclear energy, this work will investigate the transition 
from the ‘Nuclear-Powered Sunshine’ of the Cold War period to the ‘Radioactive Rain’ of the post 
Cold War period.
1 The end of the ‘affluent postwar’
With the earthquake of 11 March 2011 and the expanding nuclear disaster 
that followed, our ‘affluent postwar’ has finally reached a decisive end. 
Indeed, this closure had been clearly augured since the 1990s. The collapse 
of the bubble economy, the close of an era of single-party rule by the Lib-
eral Democratic Party, and the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and Aum 
Shinrikyō sarin gas attacks that came in rapid succession in 1995 – these 
events forced upon us the reality that the ‘affluent postwar’ was over. 
On 17 January, sixteen years ago, a huge earthquake centred in the 
northern part of Awajishima wrought massive devastation on the Han-
shin area and the city of Kōbe. The dead and missing numbered 6,434; 
the wounded 43,792; those requiring shelter, 30,000; houses destroyed 
or damaged, 25,000. It was the most severe quake since the Great Kantō 
Earthquake of 1923. The region’s lifelines were severed. The Hanshin Ex-
pressway collapsed in over a dozen places, the San’yō Shinkansen rail line 
was broken, and subway tunnels collapsed. Many buildings in city centres 
lay in ruins. The relentless footage of fallen highways and burning streets 
stunned television viewers across the country (Yoshimi 2009, pp. 158-161).
Then on 20 March 1995, while Japan was still reeling from the blow of 
the Hanshin Earthquake, members of the religious group Aum Shinrikyō 
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launched sarin gas attacks on subways in the heart of Tokyo. Twelve pas-
sengers and station staff died; another 5,510 were wounded. Two days 
after the incident, the Metropolitan Police Department searched the Aum 
headquarters in Kamikuishiki Village in Yamanashi Prefecture. They dis-
covered that the building contained facilities for manufacturing sarin and 
other chemical weapons. From the confessions of arrested Aum mem-
bers, it became clear that the group had perpetrated several crimes, from 
a 1994 sarin gas attack in Matsumoto to the Tokyo sarin attack. Until the 
capture of Aum’s leader, Asahara Shōkō, about two months later, Japanese 
society showed an abnormal fascination with this strange religious group 
(Yoshimi 2009, pp. 162-165).
It is highly symbolic that the two earthquakes of 1995 and 2011 were 
accompanied by a chemical-weapon terrorist attack and radiation pollu-
tion from nuclear reactor meltdowns, respectively – in short, manmade 
disasters linked to contemporary science and technology. The days follow-
ing 11 March 2011, witnessed a constant stream of television footage of 
representatives from the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the 
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency in press conferences on the burgeon-
ing nuclear crisis. Their expressionless visages, so disconnected from real-
ity, recalled the Aum Shinrikyō members on television sixteen years before. 
Moreover, the media images of the reactor buildings of the Fukushima Dai-
ichi nuclear plant bore a disturbing outward resemblance to the ‘Satyam’, 
Aum’s former headquarters, which we had often seen on television back 
then. The main difference was that several of the reactor buildings had been 
so badly damaged by explosions that they retained nothing of their original 
form. Nonetheless, there are similarities in the way the public reacted to 
these two incidents. Both revealed the strong distrust people feel towards 
science, technology, and experts today (Kurihara et al. 2012, pp. 115-158).
Our hearts constricted in helplessness as we watched scenes of the 
tsunami devastating the Tōhoku coast, leaving a rubble-strewn wasteland 
in its wake. Over twenty thousand people without time to flee, lives swal-
lowed by the waves and lost; all those countless souls – what on earth could 
we do for them, we who survived? Such thoughts coursed through the 
islands of Japan, and are likely to remain etched into the national psyche 
for a long time to come. The souls taken by this earthquake need repose. 
Earnest efforts are needed on their behalf and for the revival of the Tōhoku 
region. Even so, the tsunami and the nuclear crisis are different. The latter 
is a manmade disaster, the consequence of a situation created by postwar 
Japan’s economic growth. It is a catastrophe that requires thorough inves-
tigation more than rites for the repose of lost souls. Yet as we look back 
in search of the origin of the incident, we find ourselves facing Japan’s 
‘postwar’ itself. 
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2 America’s two ‘nuclear umbrellas’
Nuclear power in Fukushima goes back to 1960, the year of the massive 
protests against the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. That same year, 
Fukushima Prefecture announced its intention to solicit nuclear facilities; 
the next year, in 1961, the town councils of Ōkuma and Futaba passed reso-
lutions that approved building a plant. At the time, Fukushima’s attempts 
to attract industry and kick-start economic growth were failing. With the 
shift in energy policy from coal to oil, the Jōban coal mine, formerly the 
largest industrial base in the Prefecture, had begun to decline, and the 
Prefecture was seeking a third source of electrical power to replace hy-
dropower and thermal power. As luck would have it, the site of a former 
Imperial Japanese Air Force base was located along the coast facing the 
bluffs in Ōkuma. A fter the war, it had become salt fields, and the use rights 
to this vast piece of land were easily purchased. The acquisition process 
was completed in 1964, the year of the Tokyo Olympics. Construction of 
the first reactor began in 1967 and was completed in 1970, the year of the 
Osaka Exposition; the plant began operating in 1971. The process of solic-
iting, constructing and operating the Fukushima Daiichi plant thus over-
lapped exactly with the era of Japan’s high economic growth in the 1960s 
(Kainuma 2011, pp. 188-193).
Most nuclear power stations constructed in Japan commenced operation 
in the 1960s and 1970s. The first reactor at the Tsuruga plant, constructed 
slightly earlier than Fukushima Daiichi, as well as the Mihama one, both be-
gan operating in 1970. They were followed by the first reactor of the Taka-
hama plant (1974), the Genkai plant in Kyūshū (1975), and the Hamaoka 
plant in Shizuoka Prefecture (1976). Generally it took about ten years from 
initial plan to operation in each case. Since many of these plants added 
second, third and more new reactors, the buildup of nuclear power actu-
ally continued into the mid-1990s. As a result, what began as four reactors 
in 1971, when Fukushima Daiichi commenced operating, had burgeoned 
to fifty-four by the mid-1990s, giving Japan the third highest number of 
nuclear reactors in the world, after the United States and France. 
But why were so many nuclear reactors planned concomitantly across 
Japan during the 1960s? A hint may be found almost a decade before local 
Governments in Japan began soliciting nuclear complexes in two policies 
that emerged in 1953-54 as part of the US Cold War nuclear strategy: 
namely, the Eisenhower administration’s New Look and Atoms for Peace 
policies. In spite of the fact that Truman had ordered the atomic bombings 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki – or perhaps precisely because of it – once the 
massive devastation of those cities became clear, his administration de-
clared the atomic bomb to be a last resort, something completely different 
from conventional weapons. In contrast, the Eisenhower administration’s 
New Look policy equipped American bases all over the world with nuclear 
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weapons, on the assumption that they had a practical function in warfare. 
It transferred nuclear weapon regulation from the Atomic Energy Com-
mission to the military to prepare for a strategy of ‘massive retaliation’ 
against the communist bloc. As a result, the NATO countries underwent 
intense nuclearisation, acquiring a total of seven thousand warheads. In 
Asia, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines experienced a similar nu-
clearisation. Kadena and other bases on Okinawa are said to have held 
close to eight hundred warheads. By the time Eisenhower stepped down, 
the US nuclear arsenal had soared to over twenty thousand warheads (Os-
good 2006, pp. 46-103).
The other face of Eisenhower’s nuclear strategy was Atoms for Peace, 
which was designed to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy world-
wide. Addressing the UN in 1953, Eisenhower promised that America would 
cooperate with other countries on research into peaceful uses of nuclear 
power and the construction of nuclear reactors. By emphasising the atom’s 
‘peaceful uses’ and by announcing a willingness to share nuclear power’s 
benefits with other countries, the United States softened its image as a 
military menace responsible for dropping atomic bombs and promoting the 
global expansion of nuclear weaponry, with the effect of making the atom 
palatable for the world’s nations. 
The Soviet hydrogen bomb tests of 1953 had shaken American primacy 
in offensive nuclear capabilities. The United States thus eagerly supplied 
the Third World with nuclear power technology and carried out joint de-
velopment projects in order to draw them into its camp. The Soviet Union 
competed by the same means in the countries on its periphery. As a result, 
countries in the neutral space between the spheres of influence of the two 
superpowers became the targets of a ‘nuclear sales campaign’. The United 
States itself promoted the introduction of nuclear power to countries like 
Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan – countries that eventually became large impedi-
ments to American world strategy (Osgood 2006, pp. 104-150).
Initially, the direct targets of the Atoms for Peace program were Third 
World nations of Asia that bordered on the communist sphere and not the 
former Axis Powers of Japan and Germany, which were already among the 
ranks of US allies. However, in the eyes of Japanese conservatives, the 
technology offered by the program was an attractive possibility for Japan 
too. During the 1950s, future prime minister Nakasone Yasuhirō and the 
first president of the Atomic Energy Council, Shōriki Matsutarō (who was 
also the owner of the Yomiuri newspaper), in particular, were enthusiastic 
promoters of Eisenhower’s nuclear strategy. 
Even after Fukushima, the same Nakasone has continued to proclaim 
that «the world trend is undeniably toward nuclear power for the purposes 
of peace and energy provision». He recently recalled that, back in 1953, 
«when I learned that Eisenhower had switched to a policy of using nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes, I thought to myself, “Japan can’t fall be-
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hind. Nuclear energy is going to define the next era”» (Asahi Shimbun, 26 
April 2011). Many conservatives had supported him on this point, allowing 
him to get the first nuclear budget through the diet, to set up a multi-party 
joint council on nuclear energy, and to play a key role in drafting the Basic 
Act on Atomic Energy, which became the foundation of Japan’s national 
nuclear policies. Meanwhile, Shōriki played a key role alongside Nakasone 
by manipulating the mass media. The Yomiuri newspaper and Japan Tel-
evision, both in his media conglomerate, initiated a campaign to promote 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As detailed by Arima Tetsuo, Shōriki 
was obsessed with the idea of building a microwave telecommunications 
network in the Far East, and developed close ties to the CIA, as well as to 
electronics companies like GE and RCA; these companies were also key 
players in the nuclear power industry. Shōriki invited a group of Ameri-
cans promoting nuclear energy to Japan, used the Yomiuri to campaign for 
nuclear energy development, organised exhibitions on the theme of the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and even entered politics under the ban-
ner of nuclear power, finally landing the roles of the first president of the 
Japan Atomic Energy Council and the director of the Agency for Science 
and Technology (Arima 2008, pp. 31-90).
From the standpoint of the Eisenhower administration, both the New 
Look and Atoms for Peace were founded on the same economic principle. 
In the view of the administration, it seemed likely that the Cold War would 
drag on for an extended period; for American society to sustain a pro-
tracted military standoff with the communist bloc, the American Govern-
ment would need to walk the tightrope of maintaining adequate monetary 
reserves by controlling military spending while simultaneously beefing up 
military infrastructure. The Korean War had already left the United States 
with a ballooning deficit, making it difficult to increase conventional arma-
ments or land forces. In this situation, nuclear weapons were an attractive 
technology that was cheaper in relative terms, yet possessed far greater 
destructive capability. This was exactly the same rationale that drew elec-
tric power companies to nuclear reactors: compared to hydroelectricity, 
which required massive investment in dam construction for lower yield, 
or to thermal power, which was subject to the vicissitudes of the oil mar-
ket, nuclear power was considered relatively inexpensive for the results 
it promised. 
3 The Lucky Dragon (Daigo Fukuryu¯ Maru) and ‘Nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes’
Atoms for Peace implied more than an affordable new form of energy to 
sustain affluent lifestyles. It also had a particular political connotation: the 
forgetting of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If nuclear energy surged ahead in 
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various parts of the world, people would gradually become less aware of 
the connection between nuclear technology and nuclear war. Anti-nuclear 
sentiments were particularly strong in Japan. Shōriki Matsutarō’s confi-
dant, Shibata Hidetoshi, who played a decisive role in the importation of 
nuclear power to Japan, commented in the early fifties that the «best way 
to crush the anti-nuclear opposition is by singing the praises of the peace-
ful use of nuclear power, thereby providing hope for a great industrial 
revolution» (Shibata 1985, p. 301; Arima, pp. 58-72) Through emphasis-
ing «peace», which in turn meant «affluence», ‘nuclear power’ became 
a symbolic device to help Japanese people forget their memories of the 
atomic bombs and compel them to accept the shelter of the American 
‘nuclear umbrella’. 
Yet, as Shōriki, Nakasone, the CIA and their allies were engaged in 
these machinations, the Daigo Fukuryū Maru (Lucky Dragon N. 5) inci-
dent occurred. On 1 March 1954, the United States exploded a hydrogen 
bomb in the Bikini Atoll that was a thousand times more powerful than the 
Hiroshima bomb. Radioactive fallout fell over an area of several hundred 
kilometres. This ‘experiment’ exposed many residents living on the Mar-
shall Islands to serious radiation, leading to deaths and long-term debili-
tating after-effects. Several hundred fishing vessels sailing far outside the 
cordoned-off danger zone of the bomb test were also affected. One hundred 
fifty kilometres from the epicentre of the explosion, the Japanese trawler 
Lucky Dragon was especially badly hit: the boat was covered in radioac-
tive ash and, though it hastened back to its home port of Yaizu, its crew 
was diagnosed with radiation poisoning. One died. The remaining crew 
members survived only to continue struggling with the effects of radia-
tion exposure. In due course it became clear that not only had the Lucky 
Dragon’s crew been directly exposed, fish already in markets around Japan 
was also contaminated by radiation. Radiation from the Pacific had been 
blown close to Japan, releasing a shower of radioactive rain. Strawberries 
and vegetables, tea and milk were all found to be radioactive, creating a 
large-scale problem. 
Nuclear testing drew strong international criticism, but the United 
States insisted that the illness of the Japanese sufferers was not due to 
radiation but rather to the «chemical effect of substances in coral». US 
officials asserted that the Lucky Dragon had been operating within the 
US-designated no-fishing zone, although it was eventually determined 
that the boat had in fact been sailing outside that demarcated zone. Lewis 
Strauss, chairman of the American Atomic Energy Commission, further 
asserted that the denizens of the Marshall Islands were healthy and happy, 
that the crew of the Lucky Dragon might have been communist spies, and 
that their captain was in the employ of the Russians – and requested a CIA 
investigation into the matter. Members of the Eisenhower administration 
reported to the president that Japanese emotions towards nuclear weapons 
Yoshimi. Atoms for a dream  31
Rethinking nature in contemporary Japan: Science, economics, politics
were abnormally sensitive and that the Japanese mindset was that they had 
been chosen to be martyrs. Even in joint US-Japan talks held eight months 
after the hydrogen bomb testing, the American Government consistently 
stressed that there had been no dangerous radiation exposure and unveiled 
a set of new standards that set the levels of safe radiation exposure a thou-
sand times higher than before. Yet American import companies banned the 
shipment of canned Japanese tuna, requesting that they first be subjected 
to a thorough scanning with Geiger counters.
A fter the radiation exposure of the Lucky Dragon and the damage to 
Japan’s fishing industries became widely known, opposition to nuclear test-
ing became a national issue in Japan. Started by a group of housewives in 
Tokyo’s Suginami ward, the anti-testing movement rapidly expanded, gar-
nering some 32,000,000 signatures, one-third of the Japanese population 
at that time. The scale of this movement far exceeded movements based on 
existing political organisations. Public opinion surveys also showed over-
whelming opposition to nuclear weapons. Although the Japanese Govern-
ment supported the view that the Bikini test had been essential for Ameri-
can security, this official interpretation only resulted in a public backlash, 
with anti-nuclear sentiments spreading even among conservatives. 
Before long, the Bikini Atoll affair spawned a commemorative film: 
Godzilla. The monster’s mutated form metaphorically referenced the ‘ball 
of fire’ (the H-bomb explosion) that had attacked the Lucky Dragon. Godzil-
la expressed the mass fear of the atom by tying the American H-bomb test, 
which evoked the war of the future, with Japanese memory of the war of the 
recent past, represented by the monster’s destruction of Tokyo, an image 
that mirrored the Tokyo firebombing (Takeda 2002; Yoshimi 2012). 
4 The nuclear energy for peaceful use exhibition and Astro Boy
Given the intense fears of radiation within Japanese society, one might 
surmise that it would have been difficult for Japan to be brought under 
the shelter of America’s ‘nuclear umbrella’. No matter what the US State 
Department or the Japanese Government claimed, after Japanese society 
had experienced the trauma of radiation exposure a third time, it was im-
possible to eliminate nuclear fears simply by touting the grand ideals of the 
Cold War and anti-communism. On this front, the idea of nuclear energy 
for ‘peaceful use’ and the image of the ‘affluent lifestyle’ it promised came 
to be seen as a powerful trump card that might reverse the situation. Ac-
cording to Peter Kuznick, members of the US National Security Council 
recommended that experimental-use nuclear reactors be constructed in 
Japan to develop a «strong offensive concerning their non-military use». 
Thomas Murray of the Atomic Energy Commission asserted that the con-
struction of nuclear power facilities in a Japan that had experienced the 
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atomic bombings would become a «dramatic and Christian gesture» that 
would decisively «lift all of us far above the recollection of the carnage 
[of Hiroshima and Nagasaki]». The Washington Post even commented 
Murray’s idea as an ideal method to «dispel the impression in Asia that 
the United States regards Orientals merely as nuclear cannon fodder!» 
(Kuznick 2011; Kusnick & Tanaka 2011). 
In other words, the strategic vision of the National Security Council 
and the Atomic Energy Commission dovetailed neatly with the vision of 
conservative forces in Japan (with Shōriki at their core) on this particular 
point: both factions saw the construction of nuclear power plants as an ef-
fective way to bring about ‘liberation’ from memories of the atomic bomb-
ings. The culmination of this series of campaigns was an exhibition on the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy held in Hibiya Park, with the cooperation 
of the CIA, from November to December of 1955. The exhibition grounds 
displayed nuclear-powered trains and passenger planes, all exhibits that 
heralded the bright future of nuclear power (Sano 1994, pp. 495-536). In 
fact, the exhibition was an expanded version of a previous event called 
Nuclear Power Everyone Understands held by the Yomiuri Shimbun in Au-
gust 1954 at the Isetan department store in Shinjuku. The biggest draw at 
the 1954 exhibition had been a display of various components of the Lucky 
Dragon’s irradiated vessel. In this way, even a symbol of the movement 
against atomic and hydrogen weapons was used to sell the American ide-
ology of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It was a trick truly worthy 
of a showman like Shōriki. 
From the late 1940s, various locales in Japan jostled to hold exhibitions 
on reconstruction, trade and industry, seeing these events as devices to 
spur postwar recovery (Yoshimi 2005); many were sponsored by newspaper 
companies, either solely or jointly. For instance, the Asahi Shimbun had 
held an America Exhibition in Nishinomiya, a large-scale affair that drew 
two million visitors. The grounds included an information tower shaped 
like the Empire State Building, a statue of Lincoln, panoramas of all the 
states and the American West, the White House, a hall of agriculture and 
a hall of religion. The Yomiuri exhibit on the peaceful use of nuclear power 
was thus an ‘atomic iteration’ of these sorts of exhibitions, whose topics 
ranged from ‘holy war’ to ‘America’. 
For Japan before the 1960s, nuclear power was a dream far from reality. 
When Shōriki and Nakasone created the path to lead the Japanese under 
America’s ‘nuclear umbrella’, nuclear power was spoken of as an ideal that 
would be realised some day in the future. For this very reason, an idealised 
version of usable nuclear power had to be envisioned in a separate dimen-
sion, apart from the reality of the damage caused by atomic and hydrogen 
bombs. From the 1950s to the 1960s, this imagined vision of usable nuclear 
power was embodied in a figure intensely loved by children: the robot 
named Astro Boy (lit. «Iron Armed Atom») who carried a reactor in his 
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body and whose computer brain was powered by energy from nuclear fu-
sion. Atom’s younger sister, Uranium, and his older brother, Cobalt, were 
both named after fissionable elements. Viewers and readers of Astro Boy 
saw in the robot’s ‘love for humanity’ the potential for the peaceful use of 
nuclear power for ‘justice’ (Yoshimi 2012).
5 Closed coal mines and the ‘America’ of General Electric village
Kainuma Hiroshi’s detailed study of the area around the Fukushima power 
plants examines the process by which local society became dependent on 
nuclear power infrastructure (Kainuma 2011, pp. 270-291). Futaba Dis-
trict, where the Fukushima plants are located, was formerly the poorest 
municipality in Fukushima Prefecture. Until the mid-twentieth century, 
the biggest industrial base in this region had been the Jōban coal mine, 
which stretched from near the site of the current Fukushima Daini plant 
all the way to the northern part of Ibaraki Prefecture. It rode the wave of 
increased coal production during the war and enjoyed continued demand 
in the immediate postwar reconstruction period.
Starting in the mid-1950s the situation changed drastically. With the 
mediation of American oil capital, Japan began to import large volumes 
of cheap, efficient oil from the Middle East, leading to the ‘energy revo-
lution’ based on a shift from coal to oil. Eventually the demand for coal 
irreversibly declined, and the economic base of the Futaba District, long 
supported by the Jōban mine, began to crumble. The decline of its largest 
industry forced Fukushima Prefecture to find a new industrial lifeline of 
equal economic capacity.
At this point the Prefecture decided to become an energy provider for 
the Tokyo metropolitan region, adopting a two-front plan to construct a 
dam (developed in Okutadami) and a nuclear power facility. Even though 
the energy shift that had driven the closure of the Jōban mine in the first 
place was deeply entwined with the profits of American oil capital, to es-
cape the hardship this imposed, Fukushima was compelled to follow the 
American lead by developing a giant dam in the style of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority and by constructing nuclear power facilities premised on 
the American ideology of nuclear energy for peaceful use. The Prefecture 
even built a resort centre modelled on Hawaii. Ironically, the cure involved 
implanting ‘America’ more deeply within the region in every respect.
Kainuma’s thesis introduces some intriguing testimony about how tech-
nicians from General Electric (GE) were received in the region during 
construction of the Fukushima Daiichi plant with technology provided by 
GE. When the construction of the plant first began, a ‘GE village’ was set 
up on the grounds of the plant site, with houses newly built for GE employ-
ees and their families. This ‘village’ also acquired facilities like a school, 
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a church and a tennis court. A former Japanese employee who worked at 
this GE village reports that «they frequently held American-style parties, 
which deepened relations with the TEPCO staff and local residents who 
were invited». Another informant recalled: «I have great memories of 
home parties held during holidays like Christmas and Halloween. At the 
time I actually couldn’t eat meat, but influenced by the parties held at the 
GE village I began to» (Kainuma 2011, pp. 284-286). This village was just 
like the housing complexes built for American troops and their families 
during the Occupation. As the mine headed towards closure, these facili-
ties for the ‘peaceful use of nuclear power’ built in a remote, industry-less 
part of northeastern Japan formed another site of the US-Japan alliance, 
connected to the military bases in Okinawa, Iwakuni and Yokosuka.
6 Carrying an American umbrella in the radioactive rain
TEPCO’s response to the nuclear disaster following 11 March 2011, can 
only be deemed poor. The prompt response of the American armed forces 
and the imperial household stand out compared to the confusion of the 
company and the Japanese Government. Seeing the US military and the 
imperial house taking the lead in responding to a crisis takes us for an 
instant back more than sixty years, as if history were repeating itself. 
Immediately after the quake occurred, president Obama announced that 
any assistance necessary would be given and swiftly launched Operation 
Tomodachi. By mid-March, the United States had dispatched nineteen na-
val vessels, eighteen thousand soldiers and 140 planes for relief activities. 
The motivation for the American Government’s decision to render such 
swift, large-scale assistance may well have been linked to the continued 
intractability of the problem of moving the Futenma base in Okinawa. 
Matters had deteriorated after the former Japan chief at the State Depart-
ment, Kevin Maher, had offended Japanese feelings by commenting that 
Okinawans were «masters of manipulation and extortion». There was likely 
the hope that generous disaster relief would encourage the Japanese public 
to view the American military as a necessary presence in Japan after all. 
Since the United States needs Okinawa as a key component of its strategy 
to maintain military dominance in East Asia, it is easy to see that it would 
want to treat the disaster as a ‘national emergency’ requiring military in-
tervention and make it an opportunity to appeal generally for the utility of 
the US-Japan alliance. However, the Americans must have been extremely 
irritated at the unexpectedly fragile nature of the crisis control systems of 
both the Japanese Government and TEPCO and may have feared that the 
chaos might lead them to squander this rare opportunity for their alliance. 
In any case, the US Government must have doubted whether the Japanese 
Government had the capacity for crisis management. 
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The citizens of Japan welcomed the rapid response of the American 
troops, in contrast to the bumbling Japanese Government, and admired 
American military technology, in contrast to Japan’s useless ‘technology 
power’. Seeing the contrast of responses, many Japanese people now have 
a deep-seated distrust of ‘authoritative’ experts in the Government and 
institutions like the University of Tokyo. By comparison the Americans ap-
pear far more trustworthy.
How could this have happened? As I mentioned earlier, ‘America’ was 
the driving factor in the establishment of Fukushima and other nuclear 
power plants in over fifty locations across the archipelago. The occupa-
tion of Japan did not end with the San Francisco Peace Treaty. It continued 
throughout Japan’s postwar history, becoming ever stronger, and penetrat-
ing ever deeper into Japanese society. The high-growth era of the 1960s and 
the celebration of its pinnacle in the Osaka Expo of 1970 were two instances 
of this system of power reaching criticality within the container vessel of 
the postwar Japanese nation-state.
Thus it was no mere coincidence that the electricity used at the Osaka 
Expo came from reactor number one at the Tsuruga nuclear plant. Japanese 
nuclear-powered electricity, born from Shōriki Matsutarō’s visions, began 
operating in tandem with the Expo’s grand opening. As GE also built the 
Tsuruga reactor, its construction must also have featured a GE village like 
the one built in Fukushima. Using the electric power generated by this GE 
reactor, the grounds of the Expo were lit up by the dazzling glow of count-
less lights; moving sidewalks and robots sprang into action, embodying the 
fair’s motto, «human progress and harmony». About a year after the Expo’s 
opening, Fukushima Daiichi began operations. Two years after that the 
OPEC oil shock occurred, and Japan began leaning more than ever on nu-
clear power in order to free itself from reliance on the unstable supply of oil.
I have already mentioned how this deepening reliance on nuclear power 
went hand in hand with the implementation of a cunning strategy to alter 
the Japanese aversion to all things nuclear and to push the triple exposures 
of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Lucky Dragon into the background. At the 
end of the 1950s, in order to soften anti-American sentiment in Japan, the 
United States moved several of its bases from the mainland to Okinawa, 
inaugurating a dual policy of demilitarising the former while fortifying 
the latter. As a result pro-American consciousness strengthened on the 
mainland from the 1960s onward while aversion to nuclear power was 
progressively weakened. A 1956 survey by the United States Information 
Service found that 60 per cent of Japanese considered nuclear power a 
curse to humankind; by 1958, that figure had plunged to about 30 per cent 
(Kuznick 2011). In the throes of high economic growth, people gradually 
consigned Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the Lucky Dragon, to the 
realm of memories past.
Nevertheless, the movement calling for the abolition of atomic and hy-
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drogen weapons did continue through the 1960s. The struggle reached 
new heights in 1968 with opposition to the arrival of a nuclear-powered 
aircraft carrier in Sasebo, Nagasaki. Okinawa, formerly occupied by the 
US, reverted to Japan in 1972. This simultaneously highlighted the issue 
of the large nuclear arsenal stationed on the US bases there. On the US 
side, awareness of the need for a strategy that would further weaken the 
Japanese ‘nuclear allergy’ remained acute in this period. From the 1960s to 
the 1970s, the enthusiastic marketing of American nuclear energy technol-
ogy to Japan was not solely for the benefit of corporations such as General 
Electric, but also for American military strategy.
As authors including Mark Gayn, Douglas Lummis, Katō Norihiro and 
Takeda Tōru have all observed, we began the ‘postwar era’ basking in the 
‘sunshine’ of nuclear energy. Now that the postwar era has ended, we are 
walking in a rain of radiation carrying an American umbrella. The source of 
the ‘sunshine’ was American nuclear technology, used for the dual purposes 
of military and peaceful pursuits. This nuclear sunshine shone throughout 
the Cold War and lit up the ‘postwar’ – but eventually the sunlight turned 
to a black rain that poured down onto the earth of our history.1
Fukushima, Kashiwazaki and Tsuruga are all remote areas where the 
survival of local society depends on this radioactive rain. But now that we 
have experienced a fourth serious radiation incident, we sense that there is 
something more dangerous than nuclear sunshine contained in the radioac-
tive rain – and in order to avoid that danger, we are once again holding up 
the American umbrella. On the one hand, the nuclear sunshine produced 
any number of illusions: television and the suburban single-family home, 
the Osaka Expo, even Tokyo Disneyland. On the other hand, even the um-
brella we are holding up to ward off the radioactive rain is of American 
manufacture. Its inner mechanisms are the technologies of surveillance 
and certification and the structures of crisis management, along with the 
high technology that global capitalism demands.
Just as the electric power generated by the reactor at the Tsuruga plant 
bolstered the Osaka Expo, so the energy flowing from the reactors at the 
Fukushima complexes surely powered the consumer culture of Tokyo from 
the 1970s onward – a culture that culminated in the bubble economy of the 
late 1980s. Flowing from the blinding lights of the Osaka fairgrounds to 
the neon glow of Tokyo’s consumer capital, the flood of ‘nuclear-powered 
sunshine’ washed the memory of three incidents of radiation exposure into 
the past.
1 Translator’s note: «Black rain» refers to rainfall after the bombings in which radioactive 
soot had dissolved (Dower 1955, p. 288).
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An analysis of sceptical fanaticism after Fukushima
Hirofumi Utsumi (Otemon Gakuin University, Ibaraki, Japan)
Abstract This paper looks into clashes between social forces for and against nuclear technol-
ogy in Japan after the To¯hoku earthquake. It analyses the social constructs, in which ‘pure sci-
ence’ is embedded, and the conditions that enable society's current avoidance of a truly scientific 
understanding of the situation. Finally, it points out the limitations of purposive consciousness. 
1 Sceptical fanaticism after Fukushima
In 2008, I became a member of an international research project on the 
transnational history of popular images of nuclear power, with the role of 
looking into the popular images of nuclear power in Japan after the World 
War II. In my paper, I made the point that what Japan half consciously 
wanted was to repaint the memory of defeat in the war and the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with a new sort of self-portrait – a 
self-portrait of a ‘technological super power’, symbolised by a ‘peaceful 
use of nuclear energy’ developed by the most technologically advanced 
nations at the time. I concluded my paper by stating that this promotion of 
a ‘peaceful’ usage of nuclear power would persist as long as the majority of 
Japanese people continued holding this dream of Japan as a technological 
superpower, a dream of being what I called a «cyborg nation». 
My chapter was practically finished, when the Tōhoku earthquake and 
the nuclear disaster in Fukushima happened on 11 March 2011. For a while 
I wondered whether or not I should change the conclusion of my paper, 
because I thought that after a nuclear disaster on such an unprecedented 
scale the popular images of and the policies on nuclear power may well 
change. In the end, I left my conclusion unaltered, since I decided that the 
dream of being a technological superpower is so deeply rooted in the minds 
of the people, and in society at large, that even this catastrophe would not 
be enough to change how people see and treat nuclear power. The book 
was published last year (Lente 2012). 
The omnipresent chorus of ‘scientific thought’ that sounded out loud 
and proud in Japan dealing with the disaster in Fukushima was one of the 
reasons why I thought that the meaning of nuclear power would not change 
dramatically. It is true that after the disaster, a movement of unprecedented 
scale voicing anti-nuclear sentiments surged in Japan. According to the 
public opinion polls, after the earthquake and the nuclear disaster, the 
percentage of people in favour of nuclear power dropped dramatically, al-
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though since the first poll of 1968, the percentage of people with a positive 
attitude towards the ‘peaceful’ use of nuclear power had always been in the 
seventy to eighty per cent range. But before long a pro-nuclear discourse 
raises its head again – even in everyday conversations and on the Internet. 
According to this counter discourse, people who insist that nuclear power 
has to be abandoned or excessively emphasise the dangers of radiation 
are ‘emotional’ and ‘unrealistic’ because they lack both the correct ‘scien-
tific knowledge’ and ‘realistic world view’ that would enable them to take 
into account the ‘inevitability’ of the use of nuclear energy in a country 
plagued with a shortage of energy resources. Conversely, those criticising 
anti-nuclear movements naturally maintain that their own opinions were 
‘scientific’ and ‘realistic’. In fact, the controversy over nuclear power gen-
eration in contemporary Japan is often perceived as this binary opposition 
between ‘scientific thinking’ and ‘emotional arguments’.1 
The House of Representatives elections held in December 2012 con-
firmed the existence of this dichotomy towards nuclear power generation. 
Given that they were the first national elections to be held after the dis-
aster, candidates naturally addressed the issue of nuclear technologies. 
While almost all of the parties framed policies either decreasing depend-
ence on nuclear power plants or abandoning nuclear power altogether, the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had always stood for development 
of nuclear energy, criticised the other parties’ policies, labelling them 
‘thoughtless’ and expressing the intention of re-evaluating the opportune-
ness of restarting nuclear power generation in three years’ time. In the 
elections, the LDP scored a landslide. Immediately after the victory, the 
new prime minister, Shinzō Abe, appeared on a TV show and remarked 
that the Government intended to establish new nuclear power plants in the 
near future. He also said that the results of the elections clearly showed 
that the Japanese people distrust parties wanting to decrease reliance on 
nuclear power or abandon it altogether because they realise that anti-
nuclear advocates are merely playing a shallow ‘word game’ that ignores 
reality with its shortage of electricity, rising power rates, and the damage 
to economic activities that would surely result from any kind of decrease 
of reliance on nuclear power. 
I do not think that the apparent predominance of ‘scientific thinking’ 
views on nuclear technology appearing in everyday life, various media 
and the Internet and criticising the anti-nuclear ‘emotional argument’ is 
representative of public opinion in Japan. In fact, almost all of the public 
opinion polls after the earthquake show that most of the public would pre-
fer to decommission or abandon nuclear power plants. Additionally, many 
1 This binary opposition is by no means new. It has characterised the ‘peaceful’ nuclear de-
velopment in Japan from its earliest stages right after the war. See Lente 2011, p. 196. 
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anti-nuclear demonstrations are held in various parts of Japan. Neverthe-
less, the Japanese Government concluded agreements for cooperation on 
nuclear technology with the United Arab Emirates and the Republic of 
Turkey in 2013, and the LDP also pledged to restart nuclear power genera-
tion before the next House of Representatives election. The members of the 
Atomic Energy Society of Japan, who, after the incident, rather regretted 
their meek attitude in the so-called ‘nuclear power village’ – a network of 
politicians, bureaucrats, industries, and academics promoting the develop-
ment of nuclear power in Japan – have also seemingly somewhat recovered 
their confidence in nuclear power plants – and in themselves. 
Living in Japan after Fukushima, I became increasingly curious as to 
what conditions enabled the ‘strength’ of all things scientific – the strength 
that was boldly apparent in all of the critique directed at the anti-nuclear 
movements, the strength that enabled the Japanese Government to con-
clude agreements with the UAE and Turkey on nuclear cooperation while 
the country supplying the technology was still suffering the drastic con-
sequences of a devastating nuclear disaster. Is this unruffled composure 
something science really should have? Shouldn’t it wake up to rationality 
and change its course when faced with a disaster on such a scale? How is 
it possible that, in the name of science, people can ignore rational criti-
cism and enthusiastically go ahead with what has been empirically proven 
to be so unreliable? What does it mean if science changes into something 
else, into something that resembles religion surrounded by unquestioning 
enthusiasm? 
While I was trying to find answers to these and similar questions, I 
stumbled by chance on the expression «sceptical fanaticism» coined by 
Michael Polanyi. 
Polanyi, a Hungarian polymath, started his masterpiece The Tacit Dimen-
sion in response to his encounter with Nikolai Bukharin, a Russian revolu-
tionary and politician, in the Soviet Union in 1936. During their meeting, 
Bukharin said that there is no such thing as ‘pure science’. According to 
him, the assertion of independency of scientific thought, or science for sci-
ence’s sake, was a «morbid symptom of class society», and in socialist soci-
eties, science should serve the needs of the society as a whole. In concrete 
terms, what that meant was that in the USSR, science would, as a matter 
of course, obey the goals set in the Five-Year Plans, a series of centralised 
economic plans developed in the Soviet Union at the time. 
Bukharin’s remark was a shocking revelation to Polanyi because he saw 
in it a highly instrumental view on science, a perfect fusion of modern sci-
entific scepticism with its pursuit of freedom of thought, on the one hand, 
and modern utopianism with its desire for a classless society, on the other. 
Polanyi coined a term for this subordination of science to society’s utopian-
ism: «sceptical fanaticism». The paradox he saw in this sceptical fanaticism 
was that although modernity should ideally be driven by independent sci-
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entific thought and freedom of conscience, with both condemning religious 
dogmas and secular political and traditional authority, in actuality, the 
modern state turned – without anyone noticing the transformation – to a 
complete denial of independence of scientific thought, a denial of freedom 
of ideas. At the time, Polanyi merely wondered what the consequences of 
this other modernity would be. But a few years later he found out that this 
denial of freedom of thought would result in millions of people, including 
Bukharin himself, falling victim to Stalin’s Great Purge. 
This conversation and the conclusions that Polanyi drew from it eventu-
ally led him to abandon physical science to engage in research in the phi-
losophy of science. With this new pursuit, he aimed to rescue independent 
scientific thought or freedom of thought in general, from the shackles of 
sceptical fanaticism, from this purely instrumental view of science that 
denies freedom of thought. What Polanyi called the «tacit dimension» of 
knowledge was an expression of human freedom that can never be con-
trolled by society as a whole. 
Retrospectively speaking, the phenomenon Polanyi called ‘sceptical fa-
naticism’, or instrumental view of science, may not be peculiar to socialist 
societies. A similar convergence of modern scepticism and modern utopian-
ism has been present in many of the 20th century’s ‘advanced’ capitalist 
societies, one example instantly springing to mind being the Manhattan 
Project in the United States. Japan may well be one of the most representa-
tive examples of a capitalist society operating with ‘sceptical fanaticism’ 
at the very core of its existence, fuelled by the fact that the country’s self-
portrait in the latter part of 20th century was largely based on the phrase 
«scientific nation». In one sense the USSR of that time and post-war Ja-
pan are very different – in the sense of how science is perceived. In the 
USSR, Bukharin denied the existence of ‘pure science’. In Japan and other 
capitalist societies, on the other hand, science has to be ‘pure’, at least 
ideologically, and scientific thought has to be independent from politics, 
economics and other social constraints, at least ideally. As I will show later, 
this difference may not have been so decisive. If anything, this diffusion of 
‘sceptical fanaticism’ is exactly why I became interested in the mechanism 
of the phenomenon, and, after I completed my research on the historical 
transformation of nuclear images, it made sense to direct my attention to 
the social dimension of the constructs that ‘pure science’ is embedded in, 
to the conditions enabling this often unquestioned ‘strength’ of scientific 
thought. 
What I am interested in here is not the question of whether or not Japan 
should restart nuclear power plants. Although natural science and tech-
nology coexisted with ‘sceptical fanaticism’ in the ‘advanced’ societies in 
the 20th century, today it would not be enough to merely analyse the pros 
and cons of nuclear power plants. This is why the main aim of this paper 
is to clarify the conditions that allow ‘sceptical fanaticism’ to pass unques-
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tioned. Recent developments have provided us with good material to work 
with, as in the promotion of nuclear technology after Fukushima where 
these tendencies may appear more clearly than ever. 
The following discussion is a rough sketch of my research in this direc-
tion. Strictly speaking, it would be better to conduct an empirical study 
of any one specific science and technology, with nuclear technology as it 
has evolved in post-war Japan being one choice available to me. However, 
research on nuclear technology in Japan has only been active, in the true 
sense of the word, during the short period that has passed since the disas-
ter in Fukushima, which is why it may be too early to draw any conclusions 
just yet. In addition, as my own knowledge in the realm of institutions of 
natural science is largely limited to what I have amassed during my re-
search on nuclear energy, in this paper I will merely try to outline a picture 
of the social institutions surrounding ‘pure science’, making it general by 
listing only the phenomena that are not limited to nuclear technology. And, 
in the long run, an analysis of the general mechanism giving science its 
strength would provide us with suggestions on how to rethink the place of 
Nature in contemporary Japan. 
2 The connections in which ‘pure science’ is embedded 
One view often voiced in various studies on science is that all existence – in-
cluding even the laws of nature – is culturally or socially constructed. I 
would like to start the discussion by suggesting that there are, in fact, 
universal laws of nature independent from the human beings observing 
them. However, scientific knowledge and observation are only treated as 
valuable when the actors and institutions conducting research on the laws 
of nature and applying their findings in practical endeavours operate as 
entities that are relatively independent from all others. We can call such 
actors and institutions the ‘scientific world’, whose relative independency 
is enabled not by its separation from all the other worlds but by its particu-
lar dependency on them. This dependency means that when the scientific 
world comes up with questions of whether particular research into laws 
of nature and the development of technology based on it are good or bad, 
such questions have to be answered by some other world. 
Most commonly, the world responsible for assessing the value of science 
is the political world. Based on its legitimacy (established either democrati-
cally or by force in a tyrannical state), the political world either approves or 
disapproves the activities, both theoretical and practical, conducted in the 
scientific world. In addition, the political world establishes the precedence 
to be given to research on the laws of nature and to the development of 
different kinds of technology. In this sense, knowledge about universal 
laws of nature and the practical application of such knowledge do not ex-
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ist independently. In both theory and in practice, science stands together 
with the political world responsible for evaluating all scientific initiatives, 
approving some and rejecting others. As a result, judgments establishing 
which kind of scientific research is important are externalised beyond the 
political world – in addition to the rationality of research and of applica-
tions of laws of nature per se – becoming the criteria for decisions regard-
ing actions to be made in the scientific world. People who conform to the 
judgments made by the political world tend to occupy high social positions 
in the scientific world. 
The scientific world is thus structured on the basis of this specific rela-
tionship of dependence on the political world, and it is futile when the sci-
entific world attempts to maintain the neutrality of any particular theoreti-
cal inquiry or its application since every such assertion inevitably contains 
a detour for evaluation to the political world. This is the mechanism that 
forms and maintains so-called ‘pure science’ on nature. But even though 
it is highly dependent on the external political authority that, to a great 
extent, forms the research in the first place, the social position of the sci-
entific world is perceived to be a direct consequence of the ‘pure’ value 
of research on the laws of nature. The legitimacy or authority of scientific 
research and its applications are based not only on the internal rationality 
of science but also on the political world external to it. 
So what about the political world? The framework underpinning politi-
cal thought in the 20th century is a concentric circular composition with 
politicians in the centre, the nation-state as the basic unit of operation, and 
other nation-states adding up to an international network. The political 
world based on this concentric circular composition is also interdepend-
ent with other worlds, one of the most influential of which is the economic 
world. 
The economic world has a dual-layered structure: the market itself and 
the academic circles researching it; the market appears as a world of physi-
cal exchanges and the academic circles as if they were trying to unravel 
the law of market just like natural science unraveling the laws of nature. 
The market with its exchanges based on the free price system compris-
ing, at least, private companies that supply goods and the households de-
manding them is perceived as a physical entity following its own universal 
laws, adding a layer of competition for economic growth to the composition 
of the states. However, no matter how natural it appears, the market is but 
a man-made artefact. Therefore, unlike laws of nature, there are no uni-
versal laws of market existing independently of the human beings observ-
ing it. The market exists by virtue of its dependence on the political world 
that establishes and maintains the institutions required for it to function, 
ensuring that actions by companies and households are in conformity with 
the laws of the market. When the system functions well enough, it results 
in the illusion that the law of market is, in fact, universal. 
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The world of the market exists together with the body of knowledge 
regarding the law of the market. Similarly to the world of natural science, 
research on the market is treated as valuable only when the actors and in-
stitutions conducting the research and applying their findings in practical 
endeavors are operating in relative independence from all other worlds. 
Moreover, this relative independence is possible only through dependence 
on the political world. 
Therefore, this dual-layered economic world exists through dependence 
on the political world, to which it externalises the problem of legitimacy or 
authority. The universal laws of the market are regarded to exist just like 
the laws of nature, with bold claims being made regarding the neutrality 
of knowledge on the market. It is the mechanism, by which ‘pure science’ 
regarding the market is established. 
The way the political world thinks and acts is based on the state of the 
market at each particular time and on the scientific knowledge regarding 
the market available. The way it judges scientific research and technology 
to be important or not depends on this context, in which political thought 
operates. That is, one of the pillars sustaining every judgment is the eco-
nomic growth of the nation-state, and every step taken needs to be based 
on a judgement regarding whether it will help or hamper the economic 
growth of the nation-state. Conversely, the economic world that is main-
tained through dependence on the political world influences the way eco-
nomic growth is perceived by the political world. In concrete terms, what 
this means is that scientific knowledge of the market greatly influences 
the judgments made by the political world in choosing the most effective 
of the countless possibilities of support for companies in their production 
and distribution of goods as well as for the stimulation and protection of 
consumers. 
However, it is more difficult for scientific knowledge about the market 
to disguise itself with neutrality or clothe itself with a scientific aura than 
for scientific knowledge about nature to do so, because the market world 
has a greater dependence upon the political world and, therefore, scientific 
knowledge of the market also depends more on the judgments of the politi-
cal world than the scientific knowledge of nature. Therefore, the tendency 
for people and organisations conforming to the judgments made by the 
political world to have higher social positions than those who do not con-
form is even stronger in the world of market science than it is in the world 
of natural sciences. Conformity to the political world becomes an even 
more important criterion of conduct in the world of market science than 
in the world of natural sciences. In spite of this conformity, or maybe even 
because of it, knowledge about the market tends to insist on its neutrality 
or scientificity. At the same time, in the world of market science there is 
more room for doubts about the neutrality of scientific knowledge of the 
market, doubts that are often voiced by the non-conforming. Therefore, the 
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conflict in the world of market science tends to be more intense than in 
the world of natural sciences. This highly unstable scientific knowledge of 
the market serves as the base for the political world to make its decisions 
regarding economic growth of the nation-state. Here we can find a peculiar 
interdependency between the political world and the scientific knowledge 
of the market, interdependency of reciprocal authentication. 
All judgments made by the political world as to the importance or oth-
erwise of scientific research on nature are framed by this reciprocal in-
terdependency with the scientific knowledge of the market. That is, the 
political world thinks about the economic growth of nation-state using sci-
entific knowledge of the market that is regarded as neutral. The scientific 
knowledge of the market is regarded as being effective for the economic 
growth of nation-state as long as it conforms to the market established by 
the political world, on the one hand, and to the judgments that weigh the 
importance of each particular scientific pursuit in terms of its contribu-
tion to economic growth, on the other. And the political world judges what 
kind of scientific research on nature is important in view of its contribution 
to the economic growth of the nation-state. This is how the research and 
application of scientific knowledge on nature was established in the 20th 
century; it was connected in a two-layered way to at least two more entities: 
politics and economy. On the one hand, there is interdependency between 
the scientific and political worlds, and, on the other, interdependency be-
tween the political and economic worlds. 
3 Strength of science in a system of irresponsibility
The scientific world is embedded among a series of connections to other 
entities, but it is the connection to the political world that most directly af-
fects the problem of establishing which kind of research on nature is more 
important. The political world maintains its own independency through 
its reciprocal interdependency with the scientific and economic worlds. 
However, there is one more important agency that strongly affects the 
political world – that of public opinion. And this is especially true for a 
political world that adopts a democratic system. 
Public opinion either consents to or rejects policies proposed by the 
political world. And it does the same regarding judgments on scientific 
knowledge. Needless to say, if a piece of scientific knowledge is supported 
by the political world, and if public opinion is in favour of the political 
world, such knowledge becomes stronger. However, even if there are a 
lot of objections to a certain piece of scientific knowledge, each objection 
has to fight its way on its own. Based on the analysis made in the previous 
section, we can further elaborate on the discussion to forge the following 
understanding of the strength of scientific knowledge on nature. 
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One of the core concepts of this strength of scientific knowledge on 
nature is its neutrality. First of all, the neutrality stems from the universal-
ity of the laws of nature. Of course, the universal law of nature is not the 
only aspect that guarantees the strength of scientific thought in modern 
society. And what adds to this strength is the connection linking scientific 
knowledge of nature and embedding it in other entities. Through this sup-
port supplied by the political world, the interdependency of the political 
and economic worlds orienting the economic growth of the nation-state, 
and the approval of the public given to the political world, scientific knowl-
edge on nature can proudly assert its unselfish neutrality, displaying its 
greatest strength. 
When a specific piece of scientific knowledge becomes the target of 
criticism by the public, the scientific world retorts with this neutrality of 
scientific knowledge. That is why such a critique is often regarded as an 
‘emotional argument’. First of all, in many cases such a critique does not 
meet the criteria for scientificity laid down by the scientific world, because 
it is not backed by professional scientists and lacks the status of science 
established with laboratories, journals, scientific associations, budget, 
educational background and position within the hierarchy of the scientific 
world. But even if a scientifical critique of science by the public is on the 
same level as the discourse on the particular subject carried out in the sci-
entific world, it is still often regarded as an ‘emotional argument’ because 
it problematises issues deviating from the conventional range of objects 
of research in the scientific world, which is conventionally determined by 
judgments made by the political world. 
There is one more reason why a critique of any specific piece of scientific 
knowledge by the public is regarded as ‘emotional arguments’. As I have 
mentioned above, this critique can pose a threat to the political world, to 
the economic growth of the nation-state, and to the consent of the public 
so far. In this sense, the critique is often labelled troublesome if it is per-
ceived as a critique of the economic growth of the nation-state, or of the 
market economy itself. It does not matter whether the critique is made 
with an intention to criticise economic growth or the market. Even if it is 
not made for this purpose, it often is regarded as having critical ends. As 
a result, criticism will be regarded as an ‘emotional argument’ since not 
only is it beyond the bounds of scientific knowledge, but it also forgets the 
many benefits that the critics themselves are getting from the economic 
growth of the nation-state. 
Scientific research and the development of technology are, therefore, 
protected by at least a double firewall. One part of it is the neutrality of 
scientific knowledge, and the other is the principle of economic growth, 
based on the unit of nation-state. As long as this double firewall protects 
scientific research and development of technology, it will be extremely 
difficult for a critique of any specific piece of scientific knowledge to get 
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through. Most commonly, being unable to pass through the firewall, the 
critique ends up being cast aside by the dubious but rock-hard dualism of 
‘scientific thinking’ and ‘emotional argument’. 
The firewall (at least in the case of Japan) is further strengthened by 
yet another wall of defence that might be the most sound protection for 
scientific knowledge to exist – a ‘system of irresponsibility’. This term was 
coined by a Japanese political scientist Maruyama Masao to describe the 
‘ultra-nationalist’ mechanism of promotion of war by Japan during the 
World War II. Describing what he meant by ‘system of irresponsibility’, 
Maruyama wrote that it is a «remarkable state of affairs in which a country 
slithered into war, pushed into the vortex by men who were themselves 
driven by some force that they did not really understand» (Maruyama 1963, 
p. 16). And although today Japan is not in a state of war, the connections 
surrounding the scientific world constitute a state of affairs that is quite 
similar to the object of Maruyama’s research. 
Based on the development of science and technology, the entire country 
is unhesitatingly moving towards economic growth. However, each of the 
agencies promoting this growth is driven by forces that it does not really 
understand. Although in its pursuit of scientific research and its practical 
applications the scientific world tends to insist that scientific progress is 
an autonomous process, ‘pure science’ cannot exist without the justifica-
tions supplied by the political world. The political world promotes science 
for heteronomous, not autonomous reasons, since it is the economic world 
that supplies reasons causing the political world to promote some sciences 
rather than others. Equally, the economic world does not have any autono-
mous foundations justifying the economic growth. Whatever foundations it 
has, are created by the political world that backs up the market, enabling 
market scientists to insist on the universality of the law of market and to 
believe in axioms that authorise the promotion of the economic growth of 
the nation-state. 
In this way, economic growth based on the development of science and 
technology is promoted by each of the agencies involved in a form of cross-
referential outsourcing of authority. None of them has its own language 
enabling an ultimate justification of the actions taken, which is why each 
entity simply borrows the language of the other worlds to bolster its justi-
fications. This borrowed language is of the sort that C.W. Mills called the 
«vocabularies of motive», that is, «accepted justifications for present, 
future, or past programs of acts» (Mills 1967, p. 443). Of course, if the 
interdependency between the academic, political, economic worlds and 
public opinion operated as a decentralised decision-making system mutu-
ally preventing abuse of power, such a system would indeed be useful for 
the control of economic growth based on the development of science and 
technology. In reality, though, the system does not operate like this at all. 
The system of ‘vocabularies of motive’ is set so that each of the worlds has 
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a hierarchically higher one above it similarly to the ‘rock, paper, scissors’ 
game, resulting in a ‘system of irresponsibility’ without any ultimate au-
thority. If we demand the reasons why the scientific world proceeds with 
specific researches, why the political world supports them and supports 
specific policies maintaining the market, why the economic world concen-
trates on competition and on certain scientific research, and why public 
opinion approves specific scientific research and specific policies main-
taining the market, all of the answers we will ultimately be given would be 
external to each of the separate entities. 
If this rough understanding is right, this slightly changes the meaning of 
our previous discussion. As I have mentioned above, scientific research and 
development of technology backed up by the political world are protected 
by a double firewall. One part of it is the neutrality of scientific knowledge, 
and the other is the principle of economic growth based on the unit of 
nation-state. However, if scientific research and development of technology 
are in fact also protected by a ‘system of irresponsibility’, there is no need 
for those involved to take the neutrality of scientific knowledge and the 
principle of economic growth seriously. And the less seriously people con-
sider such issues as the neutrality of scientific knowledge or the principle 
of economic growth, the stronger scientific thought becomes. Conversely, 
if people start to question the problem of the neutrality of science and the 
importance of economic growth, they will be compelled to reflect on the 
connection between the scientific, political, and economic worlds as well 
as public opinion, and reconsider their carefree convictions regarding the 
strength of scientific thought, just as the contemporary studies of Science, 
Technology and Society have been doing. But as long as people just pretend 
to have a great interest in the neutrality of science and economic growth 
based on the unit of nation-state using ‘vocabularies of motive’, without 
actually considering them, this will give unreasonable strength to scientific 
thought backed up by a fully-functional ‘system of irresponsibility’. 
The conditions for strength of scientific thought that appear in the cri-
tique of anti-nuclear movements after Fukushima in Japan may well be 
just this kind of escapist scientificity. Neither public opinion nor a sincere 
critique of nuclear power stations by scientists can easily break the fire-
wall. And this is only to be expected, because many people positioning 
themselves as ‘scientific’, when the debate is about science, and as ‘re-
alistic’, when it is about economic growth, are not genuinely interested 
in the problem of the neutrality of either, so the attack on this front is 
in most cases futile, because the ‘scientific’ or ‘realistic’ parties avoid 
any sincere discussion regarding neutrality. The more sincere the anti-
nuclear movements are about the problem of security of nuclear power 
generation, the more irresponsible the ‘scientific’ and ‘realistic’ critique 
of anti-nuclear movements becomes as regards the problem of security of 
nuclear power generation. This is the situation I would like to call ‘sceptical 
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fanaticism’ – to use Polanyi’s expression. And although Polanyi himself de-
scribed ‘sceptical fanaticism’ as being produced by the fusion of ‘scientific 
scepticism’ and ‘fanatic utopianism’, the above analysis makes it possible 
to say that ‘sceptical fanaticism’ is produced by ‘groundless enthusiasm’ 
for scientific thought in a ‘system of irresponsibility’. 
4 Contingency, conscious purpose and the social
The interdependency between the scientific, political, economic worlds 
and public opinion, or the ‘system of irresponsibility’ encompassing sci-
ence and technology is, of course, not peculiar to contemporary Japan. 
It has been more or less present in at least many, if not all, ‘advanced’ 
capitalist societies, although the concrete ways in which the phenomena 
manifest themselves may differ. It is this system that has made it possible 
to achieve a truly unprecedented development of science and technology 
in the 20th century. 
What is peculiar to contemporary Japan, especially after Fukushima, may 
be the ‘extremity’ of the situation. Since the mid-1980s, in Japan, forms of 
interdependency have become more and more simplified, and have increas-
ingly become a blatant cover-up, quickly losing whatever actual regulatory 
functions they ever had. As in a loud chorus of ‘globalisation’, competition 
is intensified artificially; not only this relative independency, but many 
other protective mechanisms of society also start to be deregulated, and a 
rapid increase of irregular employment is a manifestation of the selfsame 
change. The Tōhoku earthquake and the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, 
which happened right in the middle of the artificially promoted ‘globalising 
trend’, strengthened this direct interdependency more than anything else 
had ever done before. It has shown us that the ‘system of irresponsibil-
ity’ that has sustained the development of science and technology so far 
become so strongly rooted in society that even a nuclear disaster is not 
enough to upset it. 
Of course, this is only one aspect of contemporary Japan. As a result of 
the fact that interdependency between social entities, which ideally should 
protect all aspects of society through mutual control, has now transformed, 
merely authenticating every established power, there is an increasing num-
ber of people and actions that drop out of the framework simply because 
the framework no longer supports them. And one aspect of contemporary 
Japan that just cannot be overlooked concerns the various actions and 
experiences that are thus left out. It includes the various complex experi-
ences of the sufferers of the earthquake and the nuclear disaster – which 
may involve having to stay in the quake-hit areas, or being evacuated 
against one’s will – experiences of people with handicaps, the aged, parents 
with small children, and so on. Although all of these people are left out of 
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the framework of economic growth promoted on the basis of science and 
technology, and although they do live in very severe conditions, they are 
still managing to survive – largely by their own efforts. They are sustain-
ing their lives through various barely noticeable arts – little ways of doing 
little things – and through small collectives, conducting meetings, having 
chance encounters, creating their own narratives, their own humour, their 
own shared memories, or learning how to forget their painful experiences 
instead, establishing their own ways of surviving, always operating in their 
own dialects, one step away from the mainstream official Japan. Compared 
to the flashy political and economic topics, and the great chorus of kizuna 
(ties) and fukkō (reconstruction) appearing in the mass media, these little 
ways and little collectivities sustaining the lives of those outside the Japa-
nese success-story are barely noticeable to the majority. However, their un-
imposing quietness and modesty do not mean a lack of importance. These 
little ways and collectivities are absorbing all those people and experiences 
that are dropping out of the deregulated framework of interdependence 
between the political, economic, scientific, and cultural entities. I would 
like to call these little ways and collectivities the grass-root ‘thick social’, 
an increasing thickness of society that is one aspect of contemporary Ja-
pan appearing not only in the quake-hit areas but also in various places all 
across the country.2
There is no doubt that the increasing thickness of society through the 
various manifestations of this grass-root ‘thick social’ is an important part 
of life in the contemporary Japan. However, whether the present situa-
tion, in which this grass-root thickness compensates for the increasingly 
thinning political, economic, scientific, and cultural frameworks, is good 
or not is yet a different question. Societies in general tend to be highly 
conservative, managing to keep the balance of the whole unchanged, so a 
change in one variable is often merely compensated by a change in another, 
resulting merely in a postponement of a problem and not its solution. And 
surely this increasing thickness of the grass-root sociality to compensate 
for the thinning mechanisms of mutual control in contemporary Japan is, 
in this sense, merely a postponement of the solution. 
2 Here I will mention only a few of such activities. One is JDF (Japan Disability Forum) Hisai-
chi Shōgaisha Shien Center Fukushma (http://jdf787.com/), a centre supporting people with 
disabilities in Fukushima Prefecture. This centre published a report that gives a very rich 
account of the situation entitled «JDF Hisaichi Shōgaisha Shien Center Fukushma Annual 
Report of the Activities in 2011 and 2012» https://gumroad.com/l/rxQY; Another is Hōgen o 
Katari Nokosō Kai ed. Magenetcha: Collected Works of Haiku on A Great Earthquake Disas-
ter, Ginnosuzu Co., Ltd., a book written by a person who experienced the disaster in Miyagi 
Prefecture; the third is Sendai Mediatheque (http://www.smt.jp/), an organisation, which is 
conducting various activities but is most notable for an ongoing archiving project collecting 
movies on the earthquake, thus documenting people’s lives and damages in the quake-hit 
areas right after the earthquake. 
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In the essays included in Steps to an Ecology of Mind, unique thinker 
Gregory Bateson pointed out the limitations of «conscious purpose» (Bate-
son 1987, p. 432). According to Bateson, the ‘consciousness’ oriented to 
‘purpose’ and concentrating only on limited causal relationships cut off 
from the whole matrix, in which the causal relationships are embedded, 
inevitably generates unintended consequences. He maintains that the un-
intended consequences are gaining an excessive influence at an alarming 
speed following the development of science and technology, and recent-
ly acquired an unprecedented ability to upset the balance of the whole. 
Therefore, Bateson insists on the necessity of ‘wisdom’, stating that «It 
may be essential for wisdom that the narrow purposive view be somehow 
corrected». 
In the light of Bateson’s arguments, we can understand the sceptical 
fanaticism and the increasing thickness of the grass-root social in con-
temporary Japan as an upset of balance of society as a whole through the 
excessiveness of conscious purpose. In other words, the phenomena we de-
scribed above may show the limitations of the modern ‘conscious purpose’ 
constructed on a base of science and technology. What this paper tried to 
show are, therefore, some clues about how to deal with this upset balance. 
Although the problem of limitations of ‘conscious purpose’ and the task of 
solving it are not new, they need to be addressed once more. And the quest 
of fighting this ‘conscious purpose’ has been central in Bateson’s research 
throughout his life, no matter which area he was working in. 
Lastly, I would like to say a few words about what Bateson called ‘wis-
dom’ in his research. For him, human ‘wisdom’ is the mechanism that can 
correct the narrow purposive view. It goes without saying that ‘conscious 
purpose’, especially modern ‘conscious purpose’ closely connected with 
humanism and individualism, is one of the most prominent properties of 
human beings, and perhaps it would be simply impossible to eradicate it 
from human society altogether, by means, for example, of a holistic view of 
the world. What we need is to learn how to control it and lessen the dam-
age it brings. And for me, the ‘wisdom’ that can help us here lies in the 
following three endeavours. 
Firstly, to pay more attention to the grass-root social. As the scope of the 
established political, economic, scientific, and cultural frameworks based 
on ‘purposive consciousness’ gradually shrinks, little ways of doing things 
and little collectivities that absorb the people and experiences dropping out 
of the framework will become increasingly important. However, this grass-
root sociality is not at all grand – it is often barely visible. We need many 
people to continuously work on it, pay attention to it, and keep it alive. The 
thickness of society generated through this sustainable development of the 
grass-root social will become the foundation that will enable our society to 
absorb the damage caused by ‘purposive consciousness’ and, in the course 
of time, to correct the narrow purposive view. 
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Secondly, to rectify the system of irresponsibility surrounding science 
and technology. This is the most straightforward approach to correction 
of the narrow purposive view, but it is also one that is highly difficult to 
execute, because the difficulty in rectifying it is one of the most remarkable 
characteristics of the system of irresponsibility. Nevertheless, vigorous ac-
tivities, including various forms of critique, are being conducted even now 
to rectify the system. I believe that one example is that of the anti-nuclear 
movements in Japan, which are surely not only fighting against the nuclear 
power generation but also against the system of irresponsibility itself. And 
what we need most, if we are to break through the firewalls and reform the 
system of irresponsibility that surrounds science and technology, is to ac-
cumulate a description of it. One way to do this is to set up an investigating 
committee that could function as a tool to lay bare the concrete mechanics 
of the system of irresponsibility, and although this will require a lot of time 
and effort, it may well be the shortest way to rectification. 
Thirdly, to learn the reality brought about by the narrow ‘purposive 
consciousness’. As I have mentioned above, a system based on ‘purposive 
consciousness’ inevitably generates random sequences of events, and no 
one can take, or is going to take, full responsibility for any unintended 
consequence. Basically, it is impossible to control any consequence even if 
we act fully expecting the actions based on the ‘purposive consciousness’ 
to lead to unexpected results. The unexpected always appears, it is often 
perceived as (and is) a pressing problem, and that is why we often get ‘new’ 
algorithms and machinery that claim to solve such problems – algorithms 
and machinery, which quickly come into fashion and then just as quickly 
disappear. If it is so, it is better to dispense once and for all with the illusion 
that we can control the results of our ‘purposive consciousness’. Rather, 
we should reconcile ourselves to the fact that unintended consequences 
will occur no matter what, making this understanding the central pillar of 
our planning, of our philosophy; this idea that our intended actions may 
and will generate unintended consequences out of our control will surely 
soften the damages of ‘purposive consciousness’. 
The Tōhoku earthquake and the Fukushima nuclear disaster may again 
show the limitations of our power to control nature. What is more, the state 
of society after the disaster shows how heavily the social balance was up-
set by the ‘conscious purpose’. If we are to rethink nature in Japan as it is 
today, we may need much more than a successful anti-nuclear movement 
or the development of alternative energy resources – we may need changes 
on a far more extensive scale. What we need in order to rethink nature 
and our place in it now is wisdom that could help us correct our ‘conscious 
purpose’ by paying attention to the grass-root social. The grass-root social 
can furnish us with room for ‘play’, making it possible for individuals to 
detach themselves from the ‘conscious purpose’, describing the ‘secular’ 
system of irresponsibility to rectify it, and giving contingency the seat of 
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the ‘sacred’ value that will break the tyranny of ‘conscious purpose’. This 
and nothing else will help us to set right the balance upset by ‘sceptical 
fanaticism’, or ‘system of irresponsibility’. 
And this new kind of wisdom may well be needed for humans to coexist 
in the age of globalisation. Or to exist at all. 
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Rethinking civil society in Japan
Before and after the Fukushima nuclear disaster
Ko¯ichi Hasegawa (Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan)
Abstract  This paper examines civil society issues before and after the Fukushima nuclear dis-
aster. The topics include not only the relative weakness of civil society, but also the activities un-
dertaken at grassroots level to make it stronger. After the accident, however, protests became 
active. The participant structure of public demonstrations has changed. Civil society is changing 
into a society where anyone can participate in a demonstration. 
1 Is a Fukushima-type accident unique to Japan?
1.1 The Fukushima accident reflects the failure of the post-war system
The earthquake and tsunami on 11 March 2011 triggered a severe nuclear 
power accident. Reactors in Units 1, 2 and 3, and the spent fuel pool in 
Unit 4 of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power plant lost their cooling 
capabilities. Explosions occurred in Units 1, 3 and 4 when the hydrogen 
released from the damaged core filled the reactor buildings. The reactor 
core of Unit 2 also seems to have been seriously damaged. A large amount 
of radioactive materials has been released and spread. Japanese society 
has faced real nuclear risks. The author has described the sociological 
characteristics and lessons taught by the incident (Hasegawa 2012). The 
Fukushima nuclear disaster is the second largest nuclear accident after 
the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. The severity of both accidents was rated 7 
on the International Nuclear Event Scale. Even in July 2013, many people 
in Fukushima Prefecture, around 150,000, are still in evacuation by Gov-
ernment order or by their own choice due to the threat of contamination 
from radiation and risk for children’s health. 
Right after the incident, the author published a book on the socio-
logical backgrounds of the Fukushima nuclear accident, and the energy 
policy proposal to shift to denuclearisation (Hasegawa 2011b). Among 
the many topics to be discussed regarding the incident, the author would 
like to start by raising the following question: was the Fukushima ac-
cident unique to Japan or could this type of accident occur anywhere in 
the world? I will discuss the social conditions that induced the accident 
or, at least, allowed this severe accident to occur. The investigation re-
ports on the Fukushima accident have been officially published by the 
Japanese Government, the Investigation Committee on the Accidents at 
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the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company 
(ICANPS 2012), by the Diet, and the National Diet of Japan Fukushima 
Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC 2012). 
But what is lacking in each of the reports is a clear distinction between 
structural issues specific to Japan, and problems common to nuclear 
power plants world-wide.1 Why did each investigator miss this question? 
In explaining a social phenomenon, the most basic task is deciding wheth-
er to focus on its uniqueness or on its commonness. The fact that these 
reports pay little attention to international comparisons seems to show 
their implicitly inward-looking nature. 
In his memoirs, the first and last president of the Soviet Union Mikhail 
Gorbachev (1996, p. 193) perceptively described the problems associated 
with the Chernobyl nuclear accident as follows: 
Chernobyl shed light on many of the sicknesses of our system as a whole. 
Everything that had built up over the years converged in this drama: the 
concealing or hushing up of accidents and other bad news, irresponsibil-
ity and carelessness, slipshod work, wholesale drunkenness. This was 
one more argument in favor of radical reforms. 
He also described the Chernobyl accident as «graphic evidence ... of the 
failure of the old system» (Gorbachev 1996, p. 189). Understanding the ac-
cident in the context of ills unique to the Soviet system, and looking upon 
the accident as a turning point, Gorbachev accelerated efforts towards 
perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness). However, despite 
these efforts, the Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991, five years 
after the Chernobyl accident. 
Doesn’t what Gorbachev described, except for the «wholesale drunken-
ness», apply directly to the present-day Japanese system, too? Doesn’t the 
phrase «the failure of the old system» apply exactly to the entire post-war 
regime of Japan – the mutual links among politics, Government administra-
tion, the economy, scientists, the media, and social movements on which 
the country’s rapid economic growth was founded? Doesn’t the Fukushima 
accident reflect the failure not only of the promotion of nuclear power, 
which was led by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, but also of 
Japan’s post-war system itself? 
The former Prime Minister Kan Naoto stated the following while serv-
ing as a witness at a hearing of the NAIIC: Gorbachev of the former Soviet 
Union said in his memoirs that the Chernobyl accident had shed light on 
the illness in the country’s system; Kan recognized that the Fukushima ac-
1 Although this question was not examined in detail, in the introduction of the final report, 
the Chair of NAIIC, Kurokawa Kiyoshi, attributed the background of the accident to Japan’s 
high economic growth and unique social system (NAIIC 2012, p. 3). 
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cident had in some way shed light on the illness of Japan as a whole (Asahi 
Shinbun [online], 29 May 2012). 
Meanwhile, the German Government clearly shifted its energy policy to 
the post-nuclear phase as described in section 3, significantly considering 
the Fukushima accident as a problem common to nuclear power plants 
worldwide. 
1.2 Similarities among the nuclear village, the nuclear mafia, and the 
atomic circle
The relationships existing between politicians, bureaucrats, the nuclear 
industry, and the mass media, referred to as the «nuclear village», came 
under frequent fire before the Fukushima accident. A fter the accident, 
the media published a self-reflective study, providing a detailed historical 
investigation into the media’s role in such relationships, and its contribu-
tion to forming the nuclear ‘safety myth’ (Jōmaru 2012). 
The NAIIC (2012, ch. 5, p. 48) report discusses the organisational factors 
of the Fukushima accident as follows:
It is not far from the truth to say that [the safety culture] existed in 
name only, and as a result, the notion of safety and security was ‘sold 
off ’, cheaply and irresponsibly, to the whole nation. This then resulted 
in the nation having to pay a disastrously high price. 
The report also criticises the regulatory agencies’ lack of independence, 
transparency, and expertise by using the words «regulatory capture», 
meaning that «regulatory authorities became the ‘captives’ of nuclear 
operators and became devoted to maximising the interest of the nuclear 
operators that are supposedly placed under them» (NAIIC 2012, p. 12). 
As to the lack of expertise, it states as follows (NAIIC 2012, ch. 5, p. 55): 
Another prevailing situation was that personnel in regulatory bodies ac-
quired their technical expertise directly from operators – in other words, 
they were ‘masterminded’ by operators. According to an NISA senior 
official, there were many cases in which operator employees accompa-
nied NISA staff members during NISA hearings with external experts; if 
views inconvenient to the operator were raised by the external experts, 
the company employees intervened, overshadowing NISA’s presence and 
depriving it of opportunities to improve their expertise. Such a practice 
had been considered problematic but nothing was done to correct it. 
Is such a situation unique to Japan? Or can it be seen in other coun-
tries, albeit in slightly varied forms, extents and degrees? We are familiar 
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with the terms «nuclear mafia» in South Korea and «atomic circle» in 
the United States and France. The former French Environment Minister 
Corinne Lepage, who is currently a member of the European Parliament, 
emphasises similarities between the systems promoting nuclear power 
in France and in Japan in her book, La vérité sur le nucléaire (The truth 
about nuclear power), which was published in June 2011, three months af-
ter the Fukushima accident (Lepage 2011). The book criticises the current 
state of France, which is a major nuclear country. The problems afflicting 
France that are so accurately and clearly described in the book resemble 
the problems facing Japan: frequent accidents and problems, both big and 
small; an inadequate nuclear safety regulatory system; a cosy, corrupt re-
lationship between supervisors and supervised; one-sided advertisements 
promoting the myth of nuclear safety; underestimations of risks; covert 
nuclear lobby activities; arrogance of those involved in nuclear power gen-
eration; direct and indirect financial support from governments; nuclear 
exceptionalism; secrecy; concealment; information manipulation; sophism; 
lost trust; resistance to renewable energies; risks associated with old re-
actors; high costs of dismantling decommissioned reactors; difficulties of 
issues surrounding radioactive waste disposal; and biased investment of 
Government funds in nuclear power. 
The nuclear industry worldwide faces similar structural issues, because 
‘sensitive technologies’ are involved (i.e., nuclear technologies that can 
be utilised for military purposes). These issues include secrecy and exclu-
siveness, reliance on national policies, and the fact that the industry is an 
enormous equipment industry where massive investments are provided, 
and where the parties concerned have huge vested interests. In this sense, 
a major nuclear accident can occur at any nuclear power plant in the world. 
2 Civil society and the nuclear power plant
Unique to Japan are the grants provided by the Three Power Source De-
velopment Laws (Dengen Sanpō), a programme initiated in 1974 by the 
Tanaka Cabinet. This programme gives large grants to site areas with a 
power plant fuelled by nuclear, thermal or water power. For a long time, 
prefectures and site areas, including neighbourhood towns, have received 
grants in proportion to the electricity generated by their plants from the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry through the utility companies, 
making them increasingly dependent on their nuclear power plant or fa-
cilities. The author explained the workings of a «vicious chain» resulting 
when nuclear power plants were established: after towns hosted a single 
nuclear facility or unit, additional units were added one by one along 
with the constant expansion of existing nuclear facilities (Hasegawa 2004, 
p. 27). Typical examples are the Fukushima Daiichi (Number 1) nuclear 
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power plant of six units, and the Fukushima Daini (Number 2) nuclear 
power plant of four units, which make a: total of ten units concentrated 
in the site area. 
Taiwan and South Korea introduced similar policies programme in 1988 
and 1989, respectively, but their programmes provide benefits to areas 
with a nuclear power plant that are financed solely by the revenue of the 
power companies, unlike the Japanese programme, which is supported by 
consumers through an earmarked tax for which a special account exists. 
In Europe and the United States, various subsidies financed by govern-
ments with contributions from electric power companies are paid out to 
areas with a nuclear power plant, but there are no programmes like the 
Japanese one. The Three-Law grant programme that allows the Japanese 
Government to channel funds to site areas programme cannot be easily 
accepted in civil society. 
In Japan, in metropolitan areas like Tokyo and Osaka, the Citizen’s Nu-
clear Information Center and other NGOs have been involved in nuclear 
issues. However, since independent voices from civil society are generally 
weak, social regulation of the nuclear industry has not been particularly ef-
fective, and the structure of the nuclear village has so far been maintained. 
Before the Fukushima accident there was a strong tendency to suppress 
such criticisms of nuclear power, in particular, in major regional cities like 
Sapporo, Sendai, and Fukuoka, which are also home to the headquarters 
of electric power companies. 
2.1 Civil society and anti-nuclear and citizens' movements before the 
Fukushima accidents
The author has previously analysed the history of Japan’s anti-nuclear 
movements from the standpoint of the triangular model of social move-
ment (TRIM), focusing on the structure of political opportunity, mobilised 
resources, and cultural framing, based on the work of McAdam (1996), 
see Hasegawa (2011a). Before the Fukushima accidents, I divided these 
movements into four historical stages according to points of issue and or-
ganisers. The first period (1954-1973) is the period of movements for the 
abolition of nuclear weapons. The second period (1973-1986) is the period 
of movements against the construction of nuclear power plants. 1986 was 
the year of the Chernobyl nuclear accident, the event, which greatly en-
ergised Japan’s anti-nuclear movements, bringing about changes within 
them. The third period (1986-1992) is the period when grass-roots activi-
ties in metropolitan areas became active. It was at the end of this period, 
in 1992, that the uranium enrichment plant in the nuclear fuel recycling 
facilities in Rokkasho Village became fully operational. This led to the 
fourth period (1992-March 2011), a period of anti-plutonium movements. 
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I would like to add some information on the civil society in Japan (Hasega-
wa 2005). Japan’s pre-war Imperial Constitution substantially limited civil 
liberties, and there were few civil society activities with the exception of 
those carried out by a handful of political parties, labour movements, and 
religious movements. It was not until 1960 that Japan saw the emergence 
of full-blown civil society activities primarily sustained by citizens. The 
movements for the abolition of nuclear weapons are a part of the peace 
movements closely related to the political movements of class struggle 
with hopes of socialist revolution, centred around labour movements led 
by the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP, current Social Democratic Party) and 
Japanese Communist Party. 
In the latter half of the 1960s, the public became concerned with pollu-
tion and environmental damage, the outward manifestations of the under-
side of Japan’s rapid economic growth. In response, community and local 
citizens’ movements sprang up all around Japan for the first time. The 
issues they addressed ranged from promoting peace to opposing pollution 
and large-scale industrial development. This led to the emergence, in the 
early 1970s, of community movements around the country fighting to stop 
the construction of nuclear power plants. The public saw how community 
movements would allow them to register their objections to projects and 
effectively exercise their civil rights, leading to the rapid spread of such 
movements. Until the end of the 1960s, Japan’s social movements and civil 
society activities were led by labour unions and poor young people with 
nothing to lose. Guided by socialist ideals, they dreamed of revolution, 
which they hoped to achieve through political reform and democratisation. 
From the mid-1970s onwards, though, social movements began to diversify, 
and the media and young people became increasingly ‘apolitical’. 
When the Cold War structures fell, Japan’s social movements rediscov-
ered the United States and West Germany as a country of NGOs and NPOs, 
a land of citizen activism and a democratic civil society. At the same time, 
they lost their long-held illusions considering the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European countries as highly developed welfare societies. In a sense, the 
Berlin Wall had fallen in Japan, too, and the new goal for Japan’s social 
movements and NGOs-NPOs became the building of a vibrant liberal civil 
society that would counter the country’s conservative, authoritarian and 
paternalistic politics. 
On 17 January 1995, Kōbe, one of Japan’s most beautiful cities, was se-
verely damaged by an earthquake that killed more than 6,000 people. In 
the face of official impotence, emergency groups spontaneously formed 
as community members came together to help one another. Furthermore, 
thousands of people from all over Japan rushed to Kōbe to help the vic-
tims in an unprecedented outpouring of public concern. Until then, the 
Japanese had believed that Japan was the safest society in the world, with 
little crime and good public security. Another significant social and politi-
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cal impact of the Kōbe earthquake was the way it dramatically changed 
old attitudes towards NGOs and NPOs among Japanese citizens, business 
and Government, opening the way for new legislation that would promote 
NPOs (Hasegawa, Shinohara and Broadbent 2007). 
Under single-party LDP rule, a powerful system comprised of big busi-
ness, politicians, and bureaucrats, known as the «iron triangle» or «rul-
ing triad» (Broadbent 1998), held Japanese society in sway for over sixty 
years in the post-war period. During this time the public was exposed to 
environmental hazards, but it also enjoyed political, social, and economic 
stability. The public continued to believe that Japan’s chief bureaucrats and 
corporate leaders were upright and capable, and nuclear power plants are 
a symbol of their partnership. 
It was not until 1998 that Japan created a system to provide NGOs with 
corporate status as non-profit organisations, making it the last among the 
industrialised countries to do so. Incredibly, the NPO law is the first and 
only Japanese law to contain the word «citizen». The ruling LDP politi-
cians and Government bureaucrats had previously avoided the word, as 
it implies individuals with a strong sense of independence, and a robust 
capacity for criticism. 
Because the iron triangle of big business, politicians, and bureaucrats 
was so strong, and political opportunities closed to all but a select few, the 
public thought that the basic role of social movements was to criticise the 
errors of those in power – it had no idea that citizens’ and community move-
ments could organise and develop programmes, or make policy proposals. 
Consequently, such movements tended not to progress much beyond the 
point of mounting protests against specific local issues, such as opposing 
environmental damage or the construction of nuclear power plants. Before 
the enactment of the NPO law, they were merely voluntary associations, 
without any legal status, that had little apparent impact on a national level. 
3 Germany's policy shift and civil society
3.1 Merkel's leadership and the role of the ethics commission
The German Government and the Ethics Commission for a Safe Energy Sup-
ply (2011), which published a report at the Government’s request, resulted 
in an important case of recognition of the Fukushima accident as a problem 
common to nuclear power plants worldwide. On 14 March, three days af-
ter the Fukushima accident, German Chancellor Angela Merkel ordered a 
temporary three-month suspension of operations at a total of eight nuclear 
reactors, consisting of seven reactors that had started operating before 1980 
and one trouble-prone reactor that had started operating after 1980. These 
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eight reactors were shut down on 6 August 2011, without resuming opera-
tions. Under the strong leadership of the Chancellor, 17 members were 
selected for this commission, including Ulrich Beck, Miranda Schreurs, 
and two other social scientists. The commission intensively discussed the 
issues over two months, including a public debate of more than 11 hours. 
This report stressed the role of socially responsible decision-making prior 
to technological and economic estimations. The overall approach was very 
democratic as well as ethical. «Sustainability», «human responsibility for 
nature» and «responsibility for future generations» are the key concepts. 
The role and the result of this commission could be regarded as the good 
practice of «taming risks through dialogue» (Eder 2000). 
Eventually, in response to the report issued by the Ethics Commission, 
the cabinet decided to shut down the operations of all 17 of the country’s 
active nuclear reactors by the end of 2022, and on 30 June the Bundestag 
(the Lower House) passed a bill demanding closure with majority support 
from the four major parties, not including the Left Party, which asked for 
the reactors to be closed much earlier than the end of 2022. The Bundesrat 
(the Upper House) also approved the bill on 8 July. Issues involving nuclear 
power are not only among the key issues on which the ruling conservative-
centre coalition (formed by the Christian Democratic Union and the Free 
Democratic Party) and opposition parties (the Social Democratic Party and 
the Greens) disagree, but are also among some of the most contentious 
issues in Germany since the 1970s. However, in less than four months 
after the Fukushima accident, a social consensus was established with 
support from the majority of public opinion. Triggered by the Fukushima 
accident, political and social consensus was finally reached after long years 
of battle between pro and con sides of the nuclear energy debate. Merkel 
revealed her pro position in September 2010, when she decided to add an 
additional eight or fourteen years to the permitted length of operation of 
nuclear plants in Germany. In June 2000, after reaching an agreement with 
the four major power companies, the SPD and Greens’ coalition cabinet 
introduced a new policy establishing that all nuclear reactors would be 
shut down after thirty-two years of operation. For ten years Merkel had 
criticised this policy as being too premature. 
Although the report by the Ethics Commission for a Safe Energy Supply 
focuses only on nuclear power plants in Germany, it is consistent in its view 
that as a most severe accident occurred in Japan, one of the most techno-
logically advanced countries, it could, therefore, also occur in Germany. The 
report does not provide an easy explanation for the Fukushima accident, that 
is, attributing it to earthquake and tsunami disasters of unprecedented scale 
and geological conditions unique to Japan. Rather, it consistently takes the 
view that the same type of accident could occur if the cooling system for a 
nuclear reactor failed due to a prolonged loss of the external power supply 
caused by an airplane crash, terrorist attack, or similar event. 
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3.2 Policy shift, deliberative democracy and civil society in Germany
Germany’s policy shift has been attributed to the effect of discussions on 
nuclear issues over a period of nearly 40 years and to the existence of de-
liberative democracy. The antinuclear movement in Germany is the strong-
est in the world, and antinuclear activities have continued energetically 
since the 1970s. The swift policy shift after the Fukushima accident could 
be achieved because social movements led by the Greens and other groups 
and resistance movements in civil society wield power. In the Netherlands 
and other European countries, antinuclear movements stalled in the 1990s 
as nuclear issues were left in the background. By contrast, in Germany, 
antinuclear protests such as tractor protests against the transportation of 
spent nuclear fuel have continued mainly in Gorleben, a candidate location 
for a final disposal site. In April 2010, a ‘human chain’ demonstration was 
held with 120,000 participants connecting two nuclear power plants near 
Hamburg (120 kilometres apart; one of which was closed in 2007) when it 
was feared that the Merkel administration, which had started in the fall 
of 2009 as a conservative-centrist coalition administration and was now in 
its second-term, might allow an extension of operations for the country’s 
nuclear power plants.2 In September 2010, when Chancellor Merkel actually 
decided to extend it by 8 or 14 years, a large-scale protest was held in Berlin, 
involving 37,000 demonstrators according to the police. On Saturday, 12 
March, the day following the Fukushima accident, a 45-kilometre human 
chain was formed by around 60,000 participants between Stuttgart and the 
nearby Neckarwestheim nuclear power plant. On Monday, 14 March, a total 
of around 110,000 people participated in protests held in more than 450 
municipalities. And the biggest antinuclear demonstrations in the history of 
Germany were held on 26 March, and involved about 260,000 participants 
nationwide, with the slogan «Look at Fukushima, shut down all nuclear pow-
er plants!» In Berlin alone, more than 100,000 people turned out to protest. 
With regard to institutional arrangements, in Germany state govern-
ments have regulatory authority over the issuance of permits to construct 
and start operating nuclear power facilities. The Federal Government has 
authority over the overall nuclear policy, nuclear reactor safety regulations, 
and radiation protection. Since the state governments can make inde-
pendent decisions on the local tax on electricity rates, they hold consider-
able sway in electric power policy. If the Social Democratic Party and the 
Greens control a state government, and have the post of its environmental 
minister, it is likely that construction of a nuclear power facility would be 
stopped or a nuclear facility shut down. 
2 Since the first-term Merkel administration was a coalition administration with the Social 
Democratic Party, nuclear issues were put aside as the ruling parties held different positions. 
Until the Fukushima accident, Merkel was a pro-nuclear politician. 
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We must not forget that Germany has a series of important environmen-
tal NGOs, such as BUND (Friends of the Earth Germany) with 480,000 
members, Greenpeace and the WWF, each with 200,000 members, and 
the so-called green institutes (national-level, state-level, and private re-
search institutes engaged in environmental issues). Well-known institutes 
include the Wuppertal Institute, which was established by the Federal 
Government, and the Eco-Institute, which is the largest private research 
organisation. These institutes have a great influence on policies concerning 
nuclear power, renewable energy, and global warming. 
4 Post-Fukushima civil society
4.1 The 2011 anti-nuclear activities: the Japanese version of the Arab spring 
The impact of the Fukushima accident, the fear of widespread radiation 
contamination, the anger at and disappointment with the Tokyo Electric 
Power Company and the central Government has caused civil society to 
adopt a more critical attitude to nuclear power. As I have already explained 
(Hasegawa 2011a), arguments and protests against nuclear power genera-
tion have been taking place in Japan since the mid-1950s. In 1988, after 
the Chernobyl accident, the antinuclear movement called «the anti-nuclear 
new wave» spread nationwide, mainly among housewives in major cities; 
however, the scale of the protests were limited to a maximum of 20,000 
participants (Hasegawa 2004, ch. 8). In the history of social movements in 
Japan, with the exception of the May Day gathering in celebration of the la-
bour movements, which involves more than 40,000 workers, it is extremely 
rare to see a political protest with 10,000 people or more, whatever the 
main issue is. The fact that the general public and the media tend to re-
gard the antinuclear movement as a particular movement led by particular 
people who have been involved in nuclear issues for many years has long 
been a problem for this movement, making its dissemination in society 
difficult. A fter 2001 especially, when a nuclear renaissance was trumpeted 
throughout the world, and nuclear power generation was emphasised as 
a countermeasure to global warming, the antinuclear movement declined 
year by year, with few new participants joining the protests. 
However the situation changed drastically after the Fukushima acci-
dent. According to the organisers, around 15,000 people participated in a 
demonstration held in Kōenji, Tokyo on 10 April 2011, and in another held 
in Shibuya, Tokyo on 7 May. These numbers were bumped up by the use 
of the social networking site Twitter and other media. On 11 June, demon-
strations were held at approximately 140 locations nationwide, and one 
demonstration in particular, which was held in Shinjuku, Tokyo, attracted 
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around 20,000 people. About 65,000 people gathered for the 50,000-per-
son rally for the abolition of nuclear power held at Meiji Park, Tokyo on 19 
September, which was organised by Ōe Kenzaburō and the Japan Council 
against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. 
By the end of July 2013, the «Anti-nuke Occupy Tent» protest began on 11 
September 2011 at the headquarters of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry, had lasted for 690 days. This can be regarded as the Japanese ver-
sion of the illegal occupation movement – like the Occupy Wall Street Move-
ments in the US – that spread in many countries in 2011. Coincidentally, the 
protest began right before the start of the Occupy Wall Street movement 
on 17 September. Whereas the Japanese Government did not interfere with 
the protest for fear of the strong public reaction had the protesters been 
forced to leave, the occupation of Zuccotti Park by the Occupy Wall Street 
protesters ended after a little less than two months on 15 November when 
the police evicted them from the park. 
In 2011, large-scale anti-government protests – the so-called Arab 
Spring,in which people used smartphones and social media like Twit-
ter – occurred in Tunisia in January, spreading to other Middle Eastern 
countries like Egypt, Yemen, and Libya, and bringing to an end long-lasting 
dictatorships in the four countries. The Arab Spring movement influenced 
people in Greece and Spain, and, in particular, in Spain, where the In-
dignados (or Indignant) led an ‘occupation’ movement in May and June, 
attracting 130,000 to 250,000 protesters nationwide. Through transfer 
of know-how the Spanish movement influenced the Occupy Wall Street 
movement, which began in New York on 17 September, and similar ‘occupa-
tion’ movements spread in around 70 US cities nationwide. Protests also 
spread to Russia, and a large anti-government demonstration was held in 
December 2011 to protest against suspected corruption in a lower-house 
election. Although Time magazine selected The Protester for its 2011 Per-
son of the Year award (http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/
article/0,28804,2101745_2102132,00.html), its featured article did not 
mention either the antinuclear demonstrations in Japan or the Anti-nuke 
Occupy Tent. Nevertheless, Japan’s post-Fukushima protest activities share 
common characteristics with the protests that spread from the Arab world 
to Europe, the United States, and Russia, showing their contemporaneity. 
Some of these characteristics include the use of smartphones and SNS 
like Twitter, YouTube, and Ustream as new tools to mobilise people; the 
mobilisation of people by individuals or small groups on a voluntary basis 
without relying on existing political parties, other political organisations, 
or labour unions; and the opportunities for self-expression provided by 
the protests, in which the protesters focus on expressing their objections 
rather than pursuing the achievement of concrete goals. 
The protest was fuelled by the participants’ anger about the Fukushima 
nuclear accident, their anger and distrust of the responses of the electric 
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power company and the central Government, and their own feelings and 
sense of daily life. In an interview with Asahi Shinbun, Matsumoto Hajime, 
one of the organisers, commented that it is okay to be festive, that it is de-
sirable to have discussions on politics from the viewpoint of daily life, that 
opinions should be expressed by musicians through music, by craftsmen 
through their creations, and by dancers through dance, and that this type of 
protest would not last if it was not fun (Asahi Shinbun, 16 June 2011). Moth-
ers, in particular, are worrying about their children’s safety, and the level of 
contamination in foods, school lunches, water, homes, schools, swimming 
pools, on the paths leading to schools, and playgrounds. No matter where 
we are, whatever we do and whatever we eat, we are always aware of the 
level of radiation. Innocent smiles have disappeared. We can no longer 
trust official Government and media reports on ‘safety’. During the final 
stage of the protest meeting held in Meiji Park on 19 September 2011, Mutō 
Ruiko, a woman from Fukushima, made an appeal (Mutō 2012, pp. 12-13), 
«We have become the ogres of Tōhoku, quietly burning with fury. […] Day 
after day, many inescapable decisions were forced upon us. To flee, or not 
to flee? To eat, or not to eat?... To speak about something, or to remain si-
lent? There were various agonising decisions». She claimed people became 
estranged by these agonising decisions. 
Hirabayashi Yūko conducted surveys on 11 June, distributing question-
naires to about 150 participants at each of the three protests held at the 
Shiba, Yoyogi, and Shinjuku Chūō Park in Tokyo. She lists the following 
three groups as typical participants (Hirabayashi 2013). The first consists 
of people aged 50 or over, who are also interested in protecting the Con-
stitution and peace issues, and who lean toward leftist ideas. The second 
group mainly consists of women in their 30s and 40s, who bring their 
children or families, and who, as mothers, are interested in a policy shift 
toward renewable energies, practicing ecological lifestyles, and foods 
and organic farming. The third group consists of people aged between 20 
and 35 who are interested in anti-poverty activities and job-hopper issues 
as well as nuclear problems. Their approach involves holding a kind of 
‘sound demo’ led by noisy bands or shouting disc jockeys. The third group 
does not trust the existing media and tries to turn itself into a medium of 
information without criticising it. Hirabayashi calls this an approach of 
‘media activism’. 
4.2 The 2012 uprising of the Kantei demonstrations
The protests following the Fukushima accident were expected to fizzle out 
by 2012; however, around 14,000 people participated in the demonstra-
tion at Tokyo’s Hibiya Park and in the human chain surrounding the Diet 
building on 11 March 2012, the one-year anniversary of the earthquake 
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disaster. The protest, known as «the Kantei demonstration», was held in 
front of the Prime Minister’s office and began with about 300 people on 29 
March 2012; the organiser encouraged people to gather every Friday even-
ing from 6 to 8 o’clock starting on 6 April.3 The organiser, the Metropolitan 
Coalition Against Nukes, is a loose network of people without a repre-
sentative or spokesman (Noma 2012). The number of participants shot up 
after the announcement on 8 June by Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko of his 
intention to resume operations of Units 3 and 4 at the Ōi nuclear power 
plant: about 2,700 people participated on 1 June, reaching 4,000 on 8 
June, 12,000 on 16 June, and 45,000 on 22 June. National network TV news 
programmes, which had barely covered the protests in the past months, 
began to dedicate considerable airtime to the event when the number of 
participants exceeded 40,000 on 22 June. Subsequently, the number of 
participants rose dramatically to 200,000 for the protest on 29 June (the 
last protest before Unit 3 resumed operations on 5 July), to 150,000 after 
the resumption, 150,000 on 13 July, and 100,000 on 20 July, the day before 
Unit 4 resumed operations. Approximately 170,000 people gathered for 
the planned 100,000-person rally for «the farewell meeting of nuclear 
power» held at Yoyogi Park, Tokyo, on 16 July. In an antinuclear protest 
held on 29 July, around 200,000 people surrounded the Diet building. Ap-
proximately 40,000 people gathered every week in August and September, 
and 100,000 people participated in the protests held in Nagata-chō and 
Kasumigaseki, Tokyo on 11 November. Large protests were held in cities 
in various regions across the nation for over eighteen months, showing 
heightened enthusiasm among people that had not been observed since 
the protests against the Japan-US Security Treaty in June 1960. 
Eventually, the Government could no longer ignore the protests held in 
front of the Prime Minister’s office. On 22 August, an official meeting was 
held in the Kantei between Prime Minister Noda and the main members 
of organisers, the Metropolitan Coalition against Nukes. It was the first 
time in Japan’s history that representatives of a civil movement had met 
officially with the Prime Minister. 
By the participatory observation of protests, the author could see that 
the protests are not being mobilised by a large organisation like a ma-
jor labour union, but that baby boomers born between 1947 and 1949, 
people with family members, and young people are participating in them 
on a voluntary basis, individually or in small groups. The organiser does 
3 In Japan, street demonstrations are regulated by each Prefecture’s public safety ordinance, 
and require advance authorisation from its public safety commission. In the case of Tokyo 
Prefecture, demonstrators must march on the road. The «Kantei demonstration» (so named 
by the mass media) is a protest conducted on the pavements and is thus not a legal street 
demonstration (Noma 2012, pp. 50-52). The use of megaphones or placards is not permitted 
in the vicinity of the Diet building. 
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not necessarily have a structured programme and relies on participants’ 
voluntary actions. The protesters intentionally refrain from expressing 
political messages other than criticism of the nuclear power plants and 
of the actions of Tokyo Electric Power Company. As a result, opposition 
to the use of Osprey aircraft in Okinawa, tax hikes, and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership is only seen occasionally. Many of the participants seem to be 
new to protesting, and the events are more like peaceful walks than actual 
demonstrations, which makes excessive policing and the sizable presence 
of the police rather conspicuous (http://www.time.com/time/specials/
packages/article/0,28804,2101745_2102132,00.html). 
The following facts are remarkable in the history of civil society and 
social movements in Japan: 1) current protests are based on people’s vol-
untary participation, not on organised mobilisation by major labour unions 
or other organisations; 2) large-scale street protests have taken place in 
the area surrounding the Diet building where strict regulations are in place 
against, for example, the use of megaphones; 3) the Kantei demonstrations 
have resulted in no rock-throwing or violence, and there have been only 
two arrests; 4) the weekly Kantei demonstrations have continued for more 
than sixteen months; and 5) protests have spread not only in Tokyo, but 
also to other cities nationwide. 
4.3 What are the strategies of the post-Fukushima movements?
What are the strategies of the antinuclear movements after the Fukushima 
nuclear accident? The most serious problem is that there is no concrete 
political programme or agenda for the post-protest period. Questions that 
must be asked include what new energy policy should be promoted and 
shared by the protesters, how to take the anti-nuclear movements in new 
directions, what the next step should be, and who are their political part-
ners? 
Ōe Kenzaburō, winner of the Nobel Prize for literature, and other well-
known figures called for 10 million signatures for denuclearisation on 15 
June 2011. One year later, on 15 June 2012, about 7.5 million signatures 
had been collected and passed onto the central Government and the Diet 
(http://sayonara-nukes.org). Although the intention was to put social 
pressure on the Government by means of the signatures gathered, it will 
probably fail like the 1990 movement that collected signatures to demand 
the enactment of a denuclearisation law. 
Nuclear energy was discussed as one of the central issues in the last 
general election in December 2012. At this election, the positions of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (the largest opposition party at that time) and 
of the Kōmei Party (the third largest party) were vague, but they still 
won, giving rise to the new coalition cabinet led by Prime Minister Abe 
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Shinzō. Although the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party 
explicitly supported denuclearisation, the number of seats in the House of 
Representatives for each party is currently single digit, only 8 and 2 seats, 
respectively. The growth of anti-nuclear protests resulted in a smaller 
number of seats than before the election (9 and 5 seats). 
So where are the antinuclear movement and public opinion heading un-
der the current pro-nuclear administration? Will it be possible to maintain 
the number of participants of these demonstrations in the tens of thou-
sands? As time passes, anti-nuclear movements without effective political 
strategies will lose their capacity to mobilise people. A major challenge 
is how to maintain the impetus of the movement at high levels. The lead-
ing anti-nuclear movements at international level are highly specialised, 
large-scale professional environmental NGOs such as the WWF, Friends 
of the Earth, Greenpeace, the World Information Service on Energy, and 
the Union of Concerned Scientists. But the WWF Japan has around 35,000 
members, and Greenpeace Japan has only 4,500 supporters. It is necessary 
to improve the ability of Japan’s NGOs and anti-nuclear movements to make 
policy proposals for the promotion of renewable energy and efficient use of 
energy, collaborating with scholars to re-examine the separation of electric-
ity distribution from electricity generation, liberalisation of the electricity 
market, integration of climate change policy and energy policy, regulation 
for nuclear safety, and reviewing of the nuclear fuel recycling policy. 
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Popularising the nuclear
Mangaesque convergence in post-war Japan
Toshio Miyake (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia)
Abstract In the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster of 3/11, one disputed is-
sue has been the acceptance of precedent nuclear energy policies among the wider population, 
despite Japan being a country of high seismic risk and a nation that experienced atomic bombing 
on its population during World War II. This paper investigates how the transmedia constellation of 
the mangaesque intersecting manga, anime, pop-art, governmental educational characters and 
youth subcultures has been strategic in domesticating contested meanings of nuclear related 
issues, as well as being deeply informed itself in its ground-breaking stages (Astroboy-Tezuka 
Osamu, Barefoot Gen-Nakazawa Keiji, Little Boy-Murakami Takashi) by these issues, contributing 
ultimately to their naturalisation and hegemonic reproduction from ‘below’. 
1 (Post)nuclear Japan: nation, hegemony from ‘below’ and media mix
3/11 marks a date of no return for post-war Japan, not dissimilar to 9/11 for 
the USA. It is a numerical symbol that has united the nation through the 
shared experience of such a catastrophic and tragic event – to the extent 
that the term ‘3/11 Generation’ has been coined – but has also divided it 
due to the many critical voices regarding the founding assumptions of its 
politics, society, and culture.1 In particular, the devastating incident at the 
Fukushima nuclear power plant highlighted an apparent paradox. How 
was it possible to reach hegemonic consensus on nuclear energy policies 
in Japan in the post-war period, when it was the only country in the world 
to have suffered from atomic bombings on its cities? How was it possible 
to build 54 nuclear reactors in a densely populated and small archipelago 
1 See Anais Ginori’s interview with Azuma Hiroki «La guerra contro la natura della ‘Gen-
erazione 11 marzo’» (3.11 Generation’s War against Nature), la Repubblica, 14 March 2011. 
For an overview of critical voices and initiatives regarding the Fukushima accident in Japan 
(translated into German and partially into English), see the website Textinitiative Fukushima 
(http://www.textinitiative-fukushima.de/pages/die-initiative.php). While for the official 
report on the incident that points to responsibilities in the Government and TEPCO (the op-
erator of the Fukushima nuclear power plant), extending its accusation to ‘Japanese culture’, 
see The National Diet of Japan (2012), The Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
Independent Investigation Commission. 
This paper was originally presented at the symposium X Magis Gorizia Filmforum Festival 
with the title «Desiring the Atom: Hegemony and Media Convergence in Japanese Popular 
Cultures» (24 March 2012). It is an integrated translation into English of Introduzione (Intro-
duction) and «Desideri nucleari: convergenze mediatiche nelle culture popolari giapponesi» 
(Nuclear Desires: Media Convergence in Japanese Popular Cultures), both originally published 
in Italian: Miyake 2012 («Introduzione», pp. 118-124; «Desideri nucleari», pp. 162-174).
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with such a high seismic risk? And lastly, how was it possible that even lo-
cal residents living close to the nuclear power plants would perceive them 
as bright and friendly places?2
Until now, the investigation had mainly focused on how nuclear policies 
were institutionalised in different spheres, from the geo-political (USA-
Japan relations), political (energy policies), economical (industrial lob-
bies) to the social (civil society, press) and geographical (marginalisation 
of non-urban areas) spheres.3 However, as Antonio Gramsci reminds us, 
hegemony is not reducible to power imposed from ‘above’ in a unilateral 
way (Gramsci 1975). In order to be effective as a historical bloc of heter-
ogenous social forces, hegemony requires a fluid and polyphonic process 
where both convergent and divergent discursive practices concur jointly 
to articulate each other.4 In other words, the effectiveness of a historically 
constituted hegemony sustaining a given nation-state and its collective 
identity is proportional to its capacity to mobilise an active consent that is 
as diffused as possible among the wider population, intersecting cumula-
tively different levels of experience, from rational to more emotional ones. 
Hence, the utmost relevance of hegemony from ‘below’ in the modern age, 
and particularly of popular cultures as a strategic site for the (re)produc-
tion and negotiation of any established order. 
As convincingly put forward by Utsumi Hirofumi (2012) and Yoshimi 
Shun’ya (2012), discourses on the nuclear in post-war Japan have been 
extensively connected to national issues, popular self-images and dreams, 
making it possible to structure and domesticate most of the divergent 
perceptions. If in the immediate post-war period the prevailing image of 
Japan was that of the tragic victim of the Nuclear Age, symbolised by the 
atomic mushrooms of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, after the end of the USA-
led occupation in 1952, and at the dawn of its first economic ‘miracle’, a 
shift occurred towards a more optimistic representation of the nation as a 
champion of peace, science, and technology. Under the hegemony of the 
US Cold War «Atoms for Peace» programme, Japan renounced, at least 
officially, the detention, production, and employment of nuclear weapons, 
which led to the declaration of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (1971), 
2 The initial research questions for this study are inspired by a personal communication from 
a former resident of the Fukushima area, who defined pre-3/11 perceptions among locals about 
the nuclear power plant as akarui (bright, friendly, cheerful). According to the informant, this 
was due not only to the economic benefits and job opportunities, but in particular for the 
visitors centre, festivals, concerts and other events organized by the Fukushima Daiichi and 
Daini nuclear power plant operator TEPCO (see also Sumihara 2002). 
3 For a first overview of investigations in English after 3/11, see The Asian-Pacific Journal: 
Japan Focus (http://www.japanfocus.org/). 
4 For an interpretation of the so-called ‘nuclear villages’ (genshiryoku mura) as a historical 
bloc, as a system of converging interests including the Government, bureaucracy, energy and 
construction industry, mass media, university, etc., refer to Itō 2011. 
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as well as the enactment of the Law on Atomic Energy (1955) inaugurat-
ing the nation’s ambitious programme that would enable its most brilliant 
scientists to carry out nuclear research, and lead to the construction of the 
country’s first nuclear energy reactors (figs. 1a-c). 
This radical change of direction was also accomplished thanks to the 
strict separation of the two institutionalised discourses on the nuclear 
(Utsumi 2012). The first discourse is the nuclear as Alterity, as a danger-
ous, devastating and evil weapon, the source of mass destruction and 
lethal contamination. This alterity has been largely removed and exor-
cised by projecting it into the past (World War II) or into the Outside, or 
into something of foreign, monstrous or alien origin (the USA, the USSR, 
or Godzilla-like monsters in SF). The second discourse is the nuclear as 
Identity, as a pacific, safe, clean and good energy, directly projected onto 
present-day Japan, and expressing the hope for a bright, technological and 
wealthy future.
In pre-3/11 Japan, it was possible to be against the nuclear as a weapon 
for historical or ideological reasons (Hiroshima and Nagasaki municipali-
ties, hibakusha or victims of the bombings, pacifist movements, labour 
unions, left-wing parties, intellectuals, students, etc.); or, on the contrary, 
to be against the nuclear as an energy for more contingent and local rea-
sons (residents’ associations, farmers, fishermen, mothers’ associations, 
environmentalists, etc.). These two discursive worlds have tended to re-
main largely separate, even in the immediate post-3/11 scenario, to avoid 
risking the revival of the deep-rooted historical contradictions that have 
led post-war Japan towards its economic miracle and social stability, under 
the shadow of the US nuclear umbrella. 
Figures 1a-c. Nuclear nation Japan: Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Fukushima
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However, Japan also holds other, fortunately less tragic records in ad-
dition to the holocaust of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; they include the ex-
traordinary development of its visual and consumer cultures, at least in 
quantitative terms. The film industry in the ‘golden age’ of the late 1950s 
produced more films than the USA, while, in the following decades, the 
baton would be passed to the manga, anime, and videogame industries 
(Desser 2006, p. 25; Storper 1994, p. 209). Since the 1970s, the manga 
market has consistently outperformed the European and North-American 
comics markets put together, and Japan has enjoyed primacy in both its 
videogame industry (ca 50% of world market in 2001) and anime industry, 
with an estimated production of ca. 60% TV series broadcast in the world 
(JETRO 2005). The Japanese films with record attendance are not live-
action movies but anime films; in fact, the most successful films in Japanese 
box office history are all films by Miyazaki Hayao (Spirited Away, Howl’s 
Moving Castle, Princess Mononoke).5
Concurrently, the globalised success of Japanese popular cultures in 
the 1990s has drawn attention to what may be called ‘J-culture’ in relation 
to the wider constellation of multiple media platforms, including manga, 
anime, videogames, graphic design, character goods, pop music, youth sub-
cultures, etc. (Berndt, Richter 2008). It is no surprise that in the past dec-
ade the Government itself has appropriated the cultural contents industry 
as a cornerstone for the Cool Japan strategy in order to brand a new image 
of Japan in the 21st century, and to implement the nation’s soft power on 
the international stage (Daliot-Bul 2009). In other words, popular cultures 
in post-war Japan have developed cumulatively into a transmedial universe 
where the trajectories of hegemony from ‘above’ and from ‘below’ are dis-
seminated and intertwined along the circuits of its increasing media mix: 
The ‘media mix’ is a popular and industry term [in Japan] that refers 
to the practice of releasing interconnected products for a wide range 
of media ‘platforms’ (animation, comics, video games, theatrical films, 
soundtracks) and commodity types (cell phone straps, T-shirts, bags, 
figurines, and so on). It is a state of what we might call the ‘serial in-
terconnection of media-commodities’ – wherein commodities and media 
types do not stand alone as products, but interrelate and communicate, 
generally through the existence of a principal character and narrative 
world. (Steinberg 2009, p. 4) 
Thus in order to investigate the hegemonic range of collective discourses 
on the nuclear, this study relies on the basic assumption about the strategic 
relevance of the mutual relationality between prevailing representations 
5 See http://movie.goo.ne.jp/ranking/boxoffice/20080902.html (2008-10-04).
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of the nuclear, and the increasing transmedial environment of Japanese 
popular cultures. This perspective has been largely unnoticed or limited 
to the examination of single manga or anime works, with particular refer-
ence to the immediate post-war period. Firstly, attention will be paid to 
the specific mangaesque or manga-related media convergence of visual 
cultures in post-war Japan, from the 1950s to the 2000s.6 It is revealing 
that the three works addressed in the following chapter do not only rely 
completely on nuclear related themes, but also mark the relevant stages 
of the mangaesque convergence. 
However, media mix in its extended version as media convergence (Jen-
kins 2006) not only involves cross-cutting old and new media, high art 
and popular cultures, but also blurs the division between producers and 
consumers, generating new intersections between nation-state ideology, 
capitalistic production, ludic entertainment, and participatory appropria-
tion. Accordingly, this paper will explore more recent and less well-known 
developments of the mangaesque convergence related to the cute per-
sonification of the nuclear: from governmental-didactic spheres addressing 
children to the more or less amateur spheres of otaku cultures (hardcore 
appreciators of manga, anime, videogames, figurines, etc.). 
2 Mangaesque convergence of the nuclear: Tetsuwan Atomu,  
Hadashi no Gen, Little Boy 
Manga played a historic paradigmatic role in the formation of media con-
vergence in post-war Japan, transforming it into the so-called ‘paradise 
of comics’. In the 1990s, the period of its greatest diffusion as a printed 
media, manga sales accounted for almost 40% of all items published in 
Japan (Schodt 1996; JETRO 2005). Manga has for decades been the main 
cultural hypotext in Japanese popular cultures, providing the original ref-
erence (narratives, characters, styles, settings, etc.) for an infinite chain 
of adaptations in the form of TV anime series and films, videogames, live 
action films, light novels, character goods, etc.; since its further transfor-
mation in recent decades, this role has been increasingly shared by anime 
and videogames. 
The mangaesque, as well as contributing to some of the distinctive graph-
ic styles displayed by Japanese popular cultures, provides other aspects, 
which are functional to the convergent development of ‘J-culture’: inter-
connection potential (intermedial grammar of comics in terms of reading-
viewing temporality, and specific connection between images, texts, and 
6 I owe the term mangaesque and the definition of its features to Jaqueline Berndt 
(Berndt 2007, 2012). It is used here in a wider sense as ‘manga-like’ or ‘manga-related’, 
focusing on its mutual connection with media convergence. 
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readers), post-critical ascertainment (preference for what is already known 
and emotional identification, such as the case of cute icons), extreme codifi-
cation of signs and readers’ conventions (for instance, high level of charac-
ter artificiality/virtualisation), aesthetic hybridity (intertextual references 
to Euro-American, Asian and Japanese sources) (Berndt 2007, 2012). 
Cute superhero Atom is a Pinocchio-like nuclear energy-driven flying 
robot of the 21st century, with superhuman strength and abilities, per-
petually engaged in saving the earth and humankind from alien invasions, 
giant monsters, natural catastrophes, etc. He is the main protagonist of 
the manga series Tetsuwan Atomu (lit. «Ironfist Atom», English version 
Astroboy, 1951-1958), which represents a turning point in the development 
of modern manga (figs. 2a-b). The birth of Atom in the 1950s is informed 
by the innovations introduced by his author Tezuka Osamu (1928-1989), 
celebrated as the ‘God of manga’, which would strongly affect Japanese 
comics in the following decades: cinematic techniques (dynamic framing, 
editing, tracking shots), story manga (long narratives unfolding through 
thousands of pages, with complex plots, psychological introspection, uni-
versal themes, visionary scenarios), kawaii or ‘cute, adorable’ character 
Figures 2a-b. Japan as nation of Peace, Science, Progress: cute nuclear superhero Tetsuwan Atomu 
(or Astroboy, 1951-1958; 1963-1966) by Tezuka Osamu
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style (disproportionate heads, huge eyes, rounded limbs). They all jointly 
contributed to a kind of ‘visualised narrative’, to the fluid, dynamic and 
visually focussed aspects of mainstream manga, distinguishing it from the 
more static and text ridden ‘illustrated narrative’ informing the majority 
of Euro-American comics (Schodt 1996, p. 26). 
Moreover, Tetsuwan Atomu was the first manga to be adapted to a TV 
anime series format (1963-1966). The concurring transmedial transposi-
tion on an industrial scale marks the pioneering stage of the media mix 
in Japan, inaugurating the local version of media convergence of multiple 
media platforms and serial interconnection of media-commodities (Stein-
berg 2009). More importantly, the series’ 1963 broadcast not only marked 
the entrance of television into children’s hearts, but also promoted Atom 
as the most popular manga/anime character in post-war Japan, as well as 
the cutest imaginable icon capable of exorcising the still vivid memory of 
the nuclear holocaust. In other words, Atom contributed to popularising 
the official post-war representation of the nuclear as Identity, as a symbol 
of the new Japan, as a pacific energy in the nation’s service for a techno-
scientific and wealthy future. 
A further turning point in the following decade is the manga series Ha-
dashi no Gen (1973-1987, Engl. Barefoot Gen) by Nakazawa Keiji (figs. 3a-
b). Together with its full-length anime adaptations in 1983 (dir. Mori Ma-
saki) and 1986 (dir. Hirata Toshio), it arguably represents the most read, 
viewed, or listened-to narrative in Japan on the atomic bombing of Hiro-
shima. The manga is inspired by the author Nakazawa’s childhood experi-
ence in Hiroshima, and describes the sufferings of the protagonist Gen, a 
boy who, together with his family, endures incommensurable pain in order 
to survive within a completely devastated and nuclear-contaminated city. 
Notwithstanding initial difficulties in guaranteeing continuous publica-
tion, due to the crude graphic realism, the widespread critical acclaim, 
especially by peace movements, both national and international, marked 
the entrance of manga as didactic material in school libraries. In other 
words, Hadashi no Gen contributed to the institutionalised legitimation of 
manga to the status of ‘culture’ or ‘serious culture’ in the early 1980s, as a 
medium not necessarily reducible to commercialised or evasive entertain-
ment (Yoshimura, Fukuma 2006, Berndt 2012). 
But more importantly, this extensive approval contributed to further 
popularising the other official discourse of the nuclear in post-war Japan. 
If Atom became the national popular symbol of the nuclear as Identity 
(energy, peace, technology, progress), then Hadashi no Gen had a similar 
role for the complementary representation: that of the nuclear as Alter-
ity (weapon, war, holocaust). Thanks to the projection of collective fears 
induced by the nuclear toward an external origin, both real (the USA) or 
imagined (monsters, aliens), or toward the past, the nation can be evoked 
as a passive victim of some foreign, mysterious or supernatural catastro-
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phe, not as an active and imperialist agent of World War II. Thus, all atten-
tion and affective investment can be retrospectively channelled towards 
internal and individual sufferings, as well to the heroic efforts made by the 
protagonist in order to survive unimaginable hardships and human losses. 
Eventually, a third and more recent post-modern turning point emerged 
regarding the mangaesque convergence of the nuclear. Little Boy, the 
name given by the American pilots to the atomic bomb dropped on Hiro-
shima, is the title chosen by neo-pop artist and curator Murakami Takashi 
(1962-) for his huge multimedia exhibition Little Boy: The arts of Japan’s 
exploding subculture (Murakami 2005; fig. 4). The show, which was inau-
gurated in 2005 in New York, definitively consecrated Murakami to inter-
national stardom status, making him the most acclaimed living Japanese 
artist worldwide. Murakami, together with other Japanese neo-pop artists, 
is accredited with the elaboration in the early 2000s of the so-called su-
perflat aesthetics, a deliberate and ironic crossover between traditional 
fine arts, and more or less commercialised youth subcultures (related to 
manga, anime, videogames, monster toys, figurines). 
For the Little Boy exhibition, Murakami and art theorist Sawaragi Noi, 
argue that in post-war Japan, the Pacific War, or World War II, was most-
Figures 3a-b. Japan as nuclear victim: Hadashi no Gen (or Barefoot Gen, 1973-1987) by Nakazawa  Keiji
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ly visible and elaborated in urban youth cultures, like the male-oriented 
otaku cultures (Sawaragi 2005). They acknowledge the gradual removal 
or repression of public discussion about the Pacific War, especially after 
the defeat of Left-wing radical politics in the early 1970s, in favour of 
an ideology of peace, economic growth, and social stability. According to 
Murakami and Sawaragi, the removal of issues related to Japan’s military 
invasion of Asia, the contradictions of the Peace Constitution and the role 
of the Emperor, and the atomic bombing by the USA have all caused a kind 
of distorted historic condition: a non-historical void capsule called ‘Japan’. 
A fter the 1970s, all the unsettling anxiety, fears, trauma, and sense of 
guilt triggered by the Pacific War were removed from the public field, and 
were shifted and then liberated in the less controlled fields of subcultures 
instead. That is why popular cultures have developed a visual style so full 
of excesses, exaggerations, distortions: hyper-infantilism, hyper-sexuallity, 
hyper-violence. An exploding visual culture nurtured by its suspension 
from historic and empirical reality. In other words, the unresolved issue of 
the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings has become an ambivalent 
energy, crosscutting aesthetic conventions and media platforms of Japa-
nese popular cultures. 
Apart from Murakami’s own works (paintings, sculptures, installations), 
the exhibition includes a wide range of the most popular icons of post-
war Japan, displaying monstrous, kawaii, SF, cyberpunk, post-apocalyptic 
versions of the nuclear: from the radioactive giant dinosaur Godzilla to 
the cute nuclear-robot Doraemon, from the Battleship Yamato to the gi-
ant mushroom cloud over Tokyo in Akira. Despite the parodic and critical 
Figure 4. Japan as post-modern simulacrum: Little Boy: The arts of Japan’s exploding subculture (2005) 
by Murakami Takashi
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intentions of the curator, it may be argued that this exhibition addressing 
a Euro-American audience has further contributed to aestheticising and 
spectacularising not only the transmedial constellation of Japanese popular 
cultures, but also the experience of the atomic holocaust. Representations 
of the nuclear are like post-modern simulacra, becoming light, melting and 
being reconfigured within the increasingly globalised interconnections of 
mangaesque media convergence. In the end, these dispersed images para-
doxically appear to be everywhere and nowhere, almost devoid of concrete 
referentiality and explicit ideologies, and consequently, of critical potential. 
3 Nuclear anthropomorphism: from institutional kawaii to moe parody 
personification 
The ubiquity of the nuclear as a simulacrum may become even more ap-
parent if we turn our attention to the less mainstream and aestheticised 
spheres of the mangaesque convergence. The following examples relating 
to cute character-fication or personification illustrate how hegemony exer-
cised from above by institutional agents of nuclear energy policies has been 
extended to a wider range of transmedial experience, addressing the bot-
tom dimension of consent, in particular the younger part of the population. 
Following the Chernobyl nuclear incident of 1986, which stimulated 
increasingly anti-nuclear media reportage, there was a dramatic shift in 
the approach adopted by ministries and commercial energy producers in 
order to reassure public opinion, and invoke sympathetic responses among 
local residents near nuclear power plants (Aldrich 2008). For instance, 
in 1987, the Tokyo Electronic Power Company (TEPCO) commissioned 
manga and novel author Uchida Shungiku to draw the character Denko 
Girl (Denko-chan), who has since become the official face of the company, 
together with her slogan «Be careful with electricity!» (figs. 5a-c). But 
more relevantly, from the early 1990s onwards, most nuclear power plants 
began to be equipped with futuristic multi-store visitor facilities offering a 
wide range of recreational opportunities: from science museums, exhibi-
tions, and laboratories to cinemas, videogame centres, local product shops, 
swimming pools, baseball courts, etc. While past visitors facilities tended to 
be serious, dark and overtly didactic about the functioning of the reactor, 
and the usefulness and safety of nuclear power, the new ones articulate 
the same rhetoric in a much more engaging way, creating a friendly and 
bright atmosphere (Sumihara 2003). 
A major attraction of the info-tainment tours provided by the new fa-
cilities are multi-media, high-tech, interactive installations, mediated by 
a wide range of mangaesque personifications of the nuclear. These cute 
characters function as official guides and protagonists of the installa-
tions, offering a multi-modal and transmedial experience, both as virtual 
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manga/anime/videogame characters and as material mascots or costumed 
performers (kigurumi) during exhibitions or festivals at the power plant. 
The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has been among the most active 
in designing and employing characters such as Pluto Boy (Pluto-kun), 
Uran Boy (Uran-boya), Natrium Girl (Natrium-chan), displayed at the 
Atom World nuclear exhibition hall at the Tōkaimura nuclear power plant 
(figs. 6a-c).7 And until March 2011, even the Agency of Energy (Ministry 
of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) had an entire 
website on nuclear energy called Atomin dedicated to children from kin-
dergarten to high school. Atomin is a cute teacher character, who uses 
videos and guidebooks to explain what nuclear power and reactors are, 
and why Japan needs nuclear power to contribute to national and inter-
national wealth (fig. 7).8
Currently, the proliferation of character/mascot-based corporate or 
7 For an investigation on nuclear narratives through cute characters, see Occhi 2011. 
8 See http://atomin.go.jp (2011-04-24). At present an image of the homepage is available 
at http://techpr.cocolog-nifty.com/nakamura/images/radioactive/20120210-atomin-top.
png (2014-03-01). 
Figures 5a-c. Corporate character 
branding: Denko Girl by Tokyo Electronic  
Power Company (TEPCO)
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Figures 6a-c. Pluto Boy, Uran Boy, Natrium Girl by Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) for the 
exhibition hall Atom World at the nuclear power plant of To¯kaimura
power plant branding, and cute personification of single atomic elements 
for PR or didactic uses point to a greater shift towards ‘superficial’ de-
narrativisation of the mangaesque media scape that has taken place in 
recent decades. Since Tezuka’s classic elaboration, the cute, or so-called 
kawaii style framed by complex narratives has been a defining paradigm 
of manga and anime in post-war Japan. But since the 1970s, together with 
growing intermedial adaptation, franchising and merchandising of manga 
characters, kawaii characters have become more and more independent of 
their original manga character. The most famous commercialised example 
is Sanrio’s Hello Kitty, the white cat originally designed as a character 
without a story, manga or anime that has since become a globalised icon of 
Japanese cuteness. 
This kind of character-fication of the Japanese media scape has intensi-
fied in the last two decades, and has now entered a new stage. The change 
was pointed out by cultural critic Itō Gō, who declared in a recent book 
that «Tezuka is dead» (Itō 2005). Itō builds on the distinction between 
‘kyarakutā’ and ‘kyara’. Kyarakutā, best symbolised by Tezuka’s manga and 
anime protagonists like Atom, are characters with a context and complex 
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personality that are firmly grounded in a narrative; kyara, on the other 
hand, are independent of any particular context or narrative, thereby be-
coming available for infinite uses beyond their context. A kyara is created 
purely as an icon, without necessarily having a narrative development or 
linkage to an original story. His or her ‘personality’ is revealed through 
the representation of form. This design-driven and visually-led icon has no 
back-story or overarching narrative, so it can be used just like a sticker, 
attached to almost any object, attracting purely on the basis of its appear-
ance (figs. 8a-c). 
Urban youth cultures such as male-oriented otaku, have been indicated 
as one of the main social actors contributing to the shift from kyarakutā 
to kyara. Cultural theorist Azuma Hiroki (Azuma 2001) has focused on the 
generational break introduced by anime and SF fans born in the 1980s, 
whose main activity has moved to the Internet and web surfing. His core 
argument is that these pro-sumers of the digital age employ a new post-
modern mode of reading, consuming, and producing media texts that he 
terms «data base consumption». Instead of relying on modernist grand 
narratives controlling texts through ‘deep’ or hierarchical meanings, these 
Figure 7. Institutional character branding of the nuclear: Atomin for the educational website on nuclear 
energy by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
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users «read up texts» by accessing a heterogeneous database of settings 
and character elements, which can be freely dissected and reassembled. 
For instance, some recurrent elements of the resulting new icons are giant, 
pupil-less eyes, glossy skin, small (or no) breasts, maid outfits, cat ears, a 
sweet voice, and an innocent and pure personality. 
The combination of these apparently bizarre elements, including ironic 
adaptation or parody of known mainstream characters, work together to 
inspire among otaku the ambivalent and complex affect of moe: an intense 
sensation of mingled protectiveness, empathy or yearning («sprouting») 
towards a fictional image or kyara (Galbraith 2009). Moe elements are the 
appealing, codified, recurrent aspects of mangaesque characters, plots 
and settings that evoke such feelings. At first glance, these kyara may ap-
pear to be shaped by conventional cute or kawaii style. But while kawaii 
still refers mostly to a desexualised, pure innocence-inspiring image, moe 
style is more sexualised or eroticised. Moe affect can be considered as a 
conflation of child-like innocence and adult desire, an ambivalent and poly-
morphous stimulation of pure, protecting and nurturing feelings for cute 
and helpless characters (rorikon or Lolita Complex), as well as stimulation 
Figures 8a-c. From kyarakutaø to kyara: Tezuka’s Atom, Sanrio’s Hello Kitty, otaku oriented moe icons
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of desire for eroticised young girls (bishōjo or «beautiful girls» genre) 
(figs. 9a-c).9
Moe-inspired fans developed an even purer expression of sexualised 
cuteness known as moe anthropomorphism (moe gijinka): the personi-
fication of inanimate objects or concepts as girls (Thompson 2009). Op-
erating systems (Os-tan), voice generating softwares (Hatsunemikku), 
war machines (mechamusume), trains, food, convenience stores, history, 
nation-states, everything imaginable has been rearticulated as moe and 
transfigured into cute and beautiful girls among otaku.10 And this process 
eventually incorporated nuclear-related issues and elements. 
An illustrated guide to the Constitution of Japan, jointly authored by 
a lawyer and an illustrator, is characterised by the mangaesque anthro-
pomorphism of all articles as moe-inspiring Constitution Girls (Morita; 
Hōgaku Future Labo 2011; figs. 10a-b). A double page is dedicated to each 
article, personified by a kyara on the left page and quotation of the article 
with textual comments on the right page. For instance, Art. 9 Girl (Kyūjo-
chan) personifies the core article of Japan’s peace constitution, which 
states that the nation will renounce use of military force to resolve interna-
tional conflicts, and will, therefore, not maintain its own army (pp. 26-27). 
Art. 9 Girl stands against the background of a destroyed cityscape (recall-
9 Moe has been widely appropriated also among female-oriented subcultures, like the fujoshi 
(lit. «rotten women»), by combining cute shōnen and preadolescent characters (shotakon 
or Shōtaro Complex), as well as emphasising their intimate male-to-male relationality (Gal-
bratih 2011). 
10 For an investigation into female-oriented nation anthropomorphism in the manga Axis 
Powers Hetalia, see Miyake (2013). 
Figures 9a-c. Moe kyara as polymorphous and sexualised cuteness
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ing Hiroshima or Nagasaki), saying «I hope for eternal peace». The com-
ment on her states that she is a very helpless and pity-inspiring creature, 
with weak legs and bare feet making it hard for her to walk by herself, and 
that like a flower-blossom she is a very gentle creature. 
Element Girls is a similar illustrated guide, where all the chemical ele-
ments in the periodic table are personified as moe inspiring girls (Mitsuda; 
Studio Hard De Luxe 2008; figs. 11a-c). They include Uranium Girl, with 
the curious title caption «Uranium has also been used in the past in glass 
factories»; the only mention of military uses for atomic bombs is in the 
written text below (p. 190). Plutonium Girl is introduced by the title caption 
«Like the king of the land of the dead, a girl with outstanding destructive 
powers». She holds a long sickle and asks, «Who wants to be cut next?», 
while the text comment contains a brief mention of the fact that a pluto-
nium bomb was dropped on Nagasaki (p. 191). Radium Girl is displayed in 
a cat pose saying «Listen all of you... you are all my prey». Her title cap-
tion is: «Be careful of the dark, the radiation girl may be aiming at you» 
(pp. 184-185). 
On the one hand, a year after the Fukushima nuclear incident, most of 
the characters or kyara promoting atomic branding commissioned by gov-
ernmental agencies and nuclear industry had been removed from websites, 
while school tours to the recreational facilities of nuclear power plants 
were temporarily cancelled. On the other hand, it is important to remember 
that kyara, anthropomorphism, and sexualised cuteness, such as those dis-
played for and by moe longing otaku cultures, are not necessarily reducible 
to infantile, escapist, or paedophile fetishes for post-modern consumption 
and entertainment. In contrast to the more unilateral didacticism or info-
Figures 10a-b. Moe anthropomorphism: cover of Constitution Girls (2011) and Article 9 Girl (Kyu�jo-chan)
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tainment of the institutional nuclear kyara directed at children, parody has 
become one of the defining aspects of emergent youth cultures. Parody, in-
cluding its eroticised versions of moe anthropomorphism examined above, 
always introduces a kind of ironic detachment with regard to its hypotext. 
Repetition, adaptation or deliberate transfiguration can refer to a specific 
original text, character, or style, but also to a wider range of conventional 
or hegemonic discourses, narratives, and meanings. 
While in the immediate post-Fukushima scenario it is difficult to find 
mangaesque mainstream works critically addressing nuclear energy poli-
cies, or even addressing them at all, it is in the more amateurish and loosely 
controlled digital network of the Internet that nuclear related works have 
been visible, even in the mostly de-politicised or post-ideological circuits 
of otaku cultures. For instance, on 20 April 2011, just one month after the 
Fukushima incident, an illustrated poster parodying the myth of nuclear 
power safety was posted on the Japanese online art website pixiv, which 
has a total of about 4 million users (fig. 12).11 The title caption «Poster 
Enlightenment of Nuclear Power Safety» rephrases the national contests 
organised over the past twenty years by the governmental Japan Atomic 
Energy Relations Organization for schools to submit posters on nuclear 
energy,with the best works receiving cash prizes (fig. 13). 
The National Poster Contests are the main hypotext of the parody, which 
is interlinked throughout the illustration to many other parodies, like the 
11 See Inono: http://www.pixiv.net/member_illust.php?mode=medium&illust_id=18273983 
(2011-06-24). 
Figures 11a-c. Moe anthropomorphism of the nuclear [from left to right]: cover of Element Girls (2008), 
Plutonium Girl, Radium Girl
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almost invisible phrases repeated on the background: «Japanese nuclear 
power is safe, Japanese nuclear power is safe». In addition, the poster is 
scattered with famous atomic branding mascots, like the JAEA Pluto Boy 
with a speech bubble containing his most controversial catchphrase from 
a 1993 didactic video: «Nuclear power is safe, Plutonium is safe, even if you 
drink it. It is even good for your health». Then the author adds, «Let us all 
submit our illustrations on nuclear power safety and win 5,000,000 yen».12 
On the bottom left is Denko Girl, the official mascot of the Fukushima power 
plant owner TEPCO, saying her most famous phrase, «Be careful with elec-
tricity!», adding «And don’t complain if we raise the cost of your electricity 
bills». And on the bottom right, there is a white deer character saying, «I 
like, I love Denko Girl». But the real protagonist is the gigantic Pluto Girl 
(Puruko-chan) at the centre of the poster, a new entry in nuclear anthropo-
morphism. She is a typical moe kyara, a cute (pre)adolescent wearing lin-
12 The PR video Pluto Boy, the pal you can count on (11 min) was commissioned in 1993 by the 
semi-governmental Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (today JAEO). 
It was projected online and in nuclear power plant visitors facilities until 3/11. See: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q_6yomWh05o (2012-01-10). 
Figure 12. Post-Fukushima subcultural parody of the nuclear: Pluto Girl in the Poster Enlightenment of 
Nuclear Power Safety by Inono (2011)
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Figure 13. The 17th Nuclear Energy Poster Contest 2010 for schools organised by the Japan Atomic  
Energy Relations Organization (JAERO)
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gerie and no trousers, but with a broken cement brick attached to her belt. 
Her only comment is an onomatopoeic «Boom!», indicating her exuberant 
explosion though the cement bricks of the Fukushima nuclear power plant. 
4 Conclusions: towards new frontiers of nuclear desires through 
mangaesque media convergence? 
In this study, the mutually constitutive process between institutionalised 
representations and the growing transmedial environment of Japanese 
popular cultures was the starting point for an investigation of the he-
gemonic effectiveness of collective discourses on the nuclear in post-war 
Japan. The specific focus on the mangaesque aspect of Japanese media 
convergence has shown how some of its most significant stages are deeply 
inspired by nuclear-related issues: the pioneering media mix introduced by 
Tezuka Osamu’s manga series Tetsuwan Atomu (1951-1958), the cultural 
legitimacy acquired by manga as a medium thanks to Nakazawa Keiji’s 
manga series Hadashi no Gen (1973-1987), and the popart appropriation of 
the mangaesque and its international branding by Murakami Takashi’s art 
exhibition Little Boy (2005). In other words, from the 1950s to the 2000s, 
discourses on the nuclear have been constantly reproduced through in-
tersecting trajectories, both from ‘above’ and ‘below’. 
On the one hand, this has contributed to the popularising effect of he-
gemonic consent on the nuclear in relation to the nation, in terms of identi-
ty (peaceful and good energy, scientific progress = the nation as champion 
of the nuclear), alterity (dangerous and evil weapon, the past = the nation 
as victim of the nuclear), or post-modern parody (ambiguous, aestheti-
cised = the nation as simulacrum of the nuclear); on the other hand, this 
study suggests that it is the very mangaesque convergence of nuclear-re-
lated issues, cross-cutting different media and modes of production, repre-
sentation and consumption that cumulatively affects how the nuclear itself 
is perceived and experienced. Mangaesque convergence has activated a 
wide range of signifying practices and emotional mobilisation, which still 
remain unexplored by academic investigation, especially in relation to its 
most recent transformations and implications. 
Thus, this study has addressed new forms of common sense among 
younger generations of the digital age, such as the increasing cutification, 
character-fication, and anthropomorphism of the nuclear. This process is 
arguably functional to the further dissemination of multiple media plat-
forms, and the serial interconnection of media-commodities, and has been 
examined both in the institutional-didactic configuration from ‘above’, as 
well in the more subcultural and amateur pro-sumption from ‘below’. It is, 
in particular, among the latter, such as the otaku cultures, that it is possible 
to observe emergent forms of mangaesque media convergence, which are 
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intertwined with the re-negotiation of prevailing meanings of the nuclear. 
Otaku-like pro-sumers are on the frontline in exploring new technologies 
of desire as well as the protagonists of the wider paradigm shift «from 
medium-specific content toward content that flows across multiple media 
channels, toward the increased interdependence of communications sys-
tems, toward multiple ways of accessing media content, and toward ever 
more complex relations between top-down corporate media and bottom-up 
participatory culture» (Jenkins 2006, p. 243). 
Nevertheless, it is the very parodic intermingling of cute anthropomor-
phism and sexualised info-tainment displayed by these subcultures with 
regard to the nuclear that requires more in-depth examination. Against 
an overreading of single texts, images, and practices, it may be useful to 
remember that parodies can be characterised by a paradoxical relation 
to their founding hypotext: imitative confirmation in terms of pastiche as 
well as satirical impulse or critical inversion (Jameson 1991, pp. 16-19). And 
this refers, in general, also to the ambivalent relationship between youth 
subcultures and their hegemonic society of belonging. 
Finally, one open question in the post-Fukushima scenario is whether 
emergent forms of mangaesque media convergence related to the nuclear 
will move towards conformity and passive reproduction of an established 
order, or, on the contrary, activate more divergent and critical readings 
and practices. 
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From malnutrition to radiation
Reviewing food security and food safety  
in Japan (1945-2013)
Katarzyna J. Cwiertka (Universiteit Leiden, Nederlands)
Abstract This paper looks into three aspects of food security in Japan from the 1940s to the 
present. It starts with the food shortage during the immediate post-war period, then moves on to 
the issue of a dramatically declining food self-sufficiency ratio and the safety of imported food, 
and finally concludes with the 2011 To¯hoku earthquake that led to anxieties about radioactive con-
tamination of domestically-produced food. 
1 Introduction
Since 1918, the year of the Rice Riots (Kome Sōdō), the issue of food se-
curity has remained at the forefront of public concern in Japan. The riots, 
which erupted in major Japanese cities after the outbreak of World War I 
when export restrictions on Southeast Asian rice by the British and French 
colonial authorities caused rice shortages, provided the first incentive for 
structural changes in the pattern of rice imports in Japan. They served as 
a direct stimulus for the Japanese Government to aim to make the Empire 
self-sufficient in food, a goal achieved by the 1930s, with the colonies of 
Taiwan and Korea supplying over 95 per cent of Japanese rice imports 
(Cwiertka 2006, p. 121). 
A decade after reaching a critical point in the late 1940s, the food short-
age disappeared as a problem. The issues that would now haunt Japan were 
food self-sufficiency and food safety. This paper provides an overview of 
these three aspects of food security in Japan from the 1940s to the present. 
It starts with the food shortage during the immediate post-war period, then 
moves on to the issue of a dramatically declining food self-sufficiency ratio, 
and the safety of imported food, and finally concludes with the anxieties 
about radioactive contamination of domestically-produced food following 
the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake led to. 
2 Food shortage
The food shortage is a key factor in the history of the immediate post-war 
period. It features as a backdrop in practically every monograph that deals 
with the second half of the 1940s, regardless of research focus. All but 
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a few studies do not recognise food shortage as the fundamental condi-
tion that affected political and economic strategies of the time, as well as 
leaving a lasting imprint on the social and cultural development of Japan. 
The quest for food stood central to post-war life: from orderly lines at 
rationing points and meal coupon restaurants to rowdy food stalls at the 
black market (yamiichi) and crowded trains carrying city dwellers to the 
countryside to barter their belongings for food (kaidashi). Taking a variety 
of different forms, the 1940s food shortage assumed a prominent place not 
only in the everyday practices of the time, but has also become engraved in 
the public memory of the decade (See Havens 1978; Cook and Cook 1992). 
When describing the food-supply situation in urban Japan between 1945 
and 1947, expressions such as near-starvation, «on the verge of crisis», and 
«narrowly averting famine» are frequently used (Takemae 2002, p. 409). It is 
the clamour associated with the prospect of famine – rather than reliable sta-
tistics sustaining such predictions – that is responsible for leaving a historical 
impression of large-scale starvation among urban Japanese during the early 
years of the Occupation. Following the surrender, the Japanese authorities 
repeatedly issued warnings of mass starvation; one of the first, announced 
on 15 October 1945, predicted that 10 million Japanese might starve to death 
if food imports were not immediately forthcoming. Such announcements, 
along with understatements of crop yields and underestimates of stocks of 
staple crops, were the strategies employed by the Japanese Government to 
ensure sufficient flows of food aid. Warnings about impending famine, as 
Chris Aldous explains, «shaded into declarations of actual starvation, with the 
imminence and scale of the problem perhaps escalating the rhetoric» (2010, 
p. 255). Although the actual food relief had fallen far short of the minimum 
amounts requested, the predicted disasters did not occur. 
While mass starvation did not take place, hunger and malnutrition did 
prevail in the immediate post-war years, especially in the cities. Symptoms 
such as weight loss, anaemia, chronic diarrhoea, delayed menstruation, 
and stunted growth in children were recorded in nutritional surveys con-
ducted by the Welfare Ministry between 1946 and 1948. The urban popula-
tions experienced the severest food shortages. While available food was 
becoming increasingly scarce, over six million Japanese were repatriated 
from the colonies and occupied territories during the first two years follow-
ing the surrender – additional mouths to feed that had thus far relied on the 
food resources produced outside of the four main islands (Cwiertka 2013). 
Taking a variety of different forms, the food shortage of the 1940s not 
only assumed a prominent place in the everyday practices of the time, but 
has also become engraved in the public memory of the decade. During 
the 1950s and 1960s, the return to a rice-based diet served as the symbol 
of economic recovery, while the rising prosperity of the following decades 
was expressed in culinary gentrification and the increasing appreciation 
of foreign culinary trends. 
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3 Food self-sufficiency
As the Japanese economy began to recover after the outbreak of the Korean 
War, the food supply situation stabilised. However, a new problem began 
to emerge. Japan’s food self-sufficiency ratio declined at a steady rate of 
nearly 2 per cent per year, dropping to 55 per cent by 1973 (MAFF 2008, 
p. 88; Kako 2009, p. 2). 
The major reason for this decline was a steadily diminishing consump-
tion of rice combined with a considerable increase in the demand for ani-
mal foods. Livestock production made Japan increasingly dependent on 
imported animal feed – mostly maize and soybeans from the US. The Japa-
nese Government charged low tariff rates on imported animal feed with 
the intention of providing the Japanese livestock industry with a boost by 
using cheap imported animal feed. The same rationale was used to justify 
low tariffs on oilseeds, which enabled production of inexpensive oils and 
fats, which were also in high demand. 
By the first oil crisis of 1973 a shift had already taken place from a grain-
based diet characteristic of low-income societies to a diet relatively high in 
protein (characteristic of high-income countries), accompanied by a slow 
down in the income growth rate. These two developments resulted in a 
stagnating decline of the food self-sufficiency rate; between 1974 and 1984 
it only declined by 2 per cent, from 55% to 53% (Kako 2009, p. 5). 
According to Kako Toshiyuki, who is affiliated with the Department of 
Food and Environmental Economics at Kōbe University, the main cause of 
the further decline of Japan’s food self-sufficiency during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s – 53 to 43 per cent (2009, p. 6) – was the rising value of the yen 
(from 235 yen per US dollar in 1985 to 94 yen per dollar in 1995). The price 
index of imported agricultural products declined by 44% during this period, 
and imports of livestock products, fish, shellfish, and fruits increased due 
to the sharp decline in the prices of these products. The average daily per 
capita supply of calories from rice further declined, as Japanese population 
embraced global culinary trends. 
A fter the burst of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, the rate of 
increase of food imports decelerated due to the loss of the high yen effect. 
Yet, as Kako explains, Japan’s food self-sufficiency ratio continued to fall, 
reaching 42% in 1996 and 40% in 2005 (2009, p. 7). Other factors were 
at play here. While the Japanese agricultural and fishery production in-
creased in the first and second period (1960-1984), it experienced a sharp 
decline after 1986. This decline in agricultural production was intricately 
related to the reduction in rice production, since the demand for rice had 
been continuously falling since the end of the 1950s. The second important 
factor was the rise of food processing and restaurant industry. By 2000, 
pre-prepared foods and eating-out comprised 27% of the total food ex-
penditure of Japanese households. The percentage of imported agricultural 
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products used in the food processing and the food service industry has 
been steadily increasing. A related factor was a worldwide trend towards 
agricultural trade liberalisation, exposing Japanese agriculture to growing 
international competition. 
Japan is not the top net importer of agricultural products in the world 
(it follows the EU, US and China), but it ranks lowest in terms of food self-
sufficiency among countries with a population of more than 100 million 
(MAFF 2013). The Japanese Government has taken various steps to tackle 
the problem. In 1999, it enacted the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture, and 
Rural Areas, followed a year later by the Basic Plan on Food, Agriculture 
and Rural Areas (Kako 2009, p. 11). Since no results were achieved, in 2005 
the Food Self-Sufficiency Ratio Improvement Council was established, 
and the so-called New Basic Plan (Shin Kihonhō) was conceived, setting 
a new target intended to raise food self-sufficiency ratio to 45% by 2015. 
For example, the Basic Plan for Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas, the 
Japanese Government aims to increase feed self-sufficiency to 38% by 2020 
through the production of eco-feed via the implementation of recycling 
loops. Since domestically raised livestock fed on imported feed does not 
count as domestic in origin, the high imports of feed also caused a decline 
in the self-sufficiency rate for livestock products (Marra 2013). 
In 2005 the Government passed the Basic Law on Food Education 
(Shokuiku Kihonhō), which aimed to convince the Japanese public to buy 
local food products, and to develop a greater consciousness for a distinct 
Japanese food culture as part of Japanese national identity, and thus to 
counterbalance the high dependency on food imports by returning to do-
mestic food products (Assman 2009, p. 4). An important tool in this strategy 
was the so-called Food Action Nippon campaign, launched by the Ministry 
of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry (MAFF) in 2008, with the objective 
of promoting the image of the domestic product as ‘safe food’. As Ass-
mann explains, the launch of the campaign coincided with the outbreak 
of a food poisoning scandal over frozen dumplings (gyōza) imported from 
China (2009, p. 6). The scandal involving Chinese dumplings confirmed the 
conviction of many Japanese consumers that domestic products (kokusan) 
were safe, while imported food was not. 
4 Food safety
The Japanese consumers’ trust in the safety of domestic produce did not 
develop overnight, but was the result of a steady process to consolidate 
food safety awareness in Japan. It was inspired by widely publicised food 
poisoning cases in the 1950s and 1960s, such as the Morinaga milk incident 
of 1955 and Kanemi rice-oil case of 1968, all of which involved domes-
tic food processing companies (Jussaume et al. 2000, p. 218). The rising 
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awareness of the issue of food safety led to the phenomenal growth of 
organic farming movement. The key to its success lay in the very diverse 
networks of grassroots organic food distributors, retailers and, above all, 
consumer co-operatives that worked together, jointly attracting a wide 
section of Japanese society. For example, in 1990, the Japan Consumers’ 
Co-operative Union (JCCU, commonly known under the name Seikyō), the 
largest consumer co-operative alone had a national household membership 
of 14.14 million. If the family members of each co-op member are counted, 
this translates into more than 40 per cent of the Japanese population 
(Cwiertka 2006, p. 169). 
The organic farming movement, with its long-standing support across 
Japan, along with new Government initiatives such as the Food Action 
Nippon campaign, contributed to a strong conviction among Japanese con-
sumers that domestic products were safe. This trust was to be challenged 
by the developments following the Tōhoku earthquake of March 2011, the 
most powerful recorded earthquake to ever hit Japan. The earthquake is 
frequently referred to as the worst crisis that Japan has faced since World 
War II. An important aspect contributing to the gravity of the crisis was 
the fact that the tsunami triggered by the earthquake caused a nuclear ac-
cident in one of the world’s biggest nuclear power stations – the Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, Okuma and Futaba, Fukushima Prefecture. 
Radioactive contamination, which has spread though the circulation of air, 
rain, dust, and water has left a lasting impact on Japan’s food system. It 
brought a completely new dimension to the issue of food safety – anxiety 
about radioactive contamination of food. 
As Aya Kimura describes in her detailed analysis of radiation standards 
set up by different organisations in Japan following the Fukushima disas-
ter, reports of contaminated food started to appear just a week after the 
earthquake (2013, p. 12). On 19 March, the Government ordered the gov-
ernors of four prefectures in the direct proximity to Fukushima to suspend 
shipments of spinach and milk. Social anxiety heightened as the media 
began to report on the growing number of food items found to be above 
the provisional food radiation safety levels established by the Government 
on 17 March, less than a week after the disaster. Many consumers started 
to avoid buying produce from north-eastern Japan, causing panic among 
the producers and worry in Government circles. 
The necessity of regulating the risk associated with radioactive sub-
stances in food appeared for the first time after the Chernobyl power plant 
accident in 1986. In addition to a set of guidelines levels for radionuclides 
in foods put together by the Codex Alimentarius Commission of the United 
Nations, each country was allowed to set its own standards, in accordance 
with its own specific consumption patterns. However, Japan had never 
formulated any specific restrictions on radioactive substances in food be-
fore the disaster of 11 March struck. The Food Sanitation Act, the key law 
Rethinking nature in contemporary Japan: Science, economics, politics
100 Cwiertka. From malnutrition to radiation
responsible for regulating food-related risks for human health, does not 
mention radioactive contamination at all. On 17 March the Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare adopted the so-called Provisional Regulatory 
Values for radioactive contamination, following the advice of the Nuclear 
Safety Commission of Japan. The levels were set without any assessment 
of possible effect on human health. They specified 200 Bq/kg of caesium 
for drinking water, milk and dairy products, and 500 Bq/kg for vegetables, 
grain, meat, eggs and fish (Kimura 2013, p. 15). All Government agencies 
began to use this standard to establish whether food was contaminated or 
not. The legitimacy of the Provisional Regulatory Values was tenuous from 
the beginning. The standard was firstly criticised for being too high, and 
for therefore unnecessarily harming food producers in the affected areas. 
Indeed, the new standards for safety of nuclear contamination, which were 
announced in January 2012 and went into effect in April 2012, set the levels 
of contamination for general foodstuffs, such as vegetables, grains, meat 
and fish, at 100 Bq/kg – one fifth of the Provisional Regulatory Values from 
March 2011 (Kimura 2013, pp. 16-17). 
As Bachev and Itō have rightly pointed out in their recently published 
paper, in addition to the short-term radiation effects described above, the 
implications of the Fukushima nuclear disaster include a variety of long-
term, indirect consequences for Japanese agriculture (2013). Research has 
shown that the attitude of consumers toward agricultural products from 
the region affected by the nuclear disaster has changed dramatically. The 
«Fukushima label», which once stood for high quality and safety of organic 
agri-food produce, has lost its market value. Even residents of Fukushima 
seem to be avoiding buying local products (Bache, Itō 2013, p. 26). The 
multiple safety tests and certifications imposed by the authorities or in-
troduced voluntarily by the producers themselves add up to a loss in profit 
(Bachev, Itō 2013, p. 33). On the other hand, experts agree that the nega-
tive impact of the disaster on the food industries in neighbouring regions is 
moderate, and insignificant or nonexistent in other parts of Japan (Bachev, 
Itō 2013, p. 45). Some farmers and agri-businesses from non-contaminated 
regions have even benefitted from rising prices, and from better production 
and sales opportunities in the wake of Fukushima disaster. 
5 Conclusion
While the food shortage disappeared as the chief concern of the Japa-
nese authorities after the 1950s, the dramatically low level of food self-
sufficiency, which surfaced for the first time during the 1918 Rice Riots, 
remains highly relevant even today. With consumers’ trust in the safety 
of domestic produce unexpectedly damaged by the 11 March disaster, the 
problem has become more difficult to solve than ever. 
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As we have observed, over the course of half a century, the transforma-
tion from scarcity to affluence was accompanied by a growing public con-
cern with food safety. As elsewhere, «the age of anxiety» has turned food 
safety into a major channel for articulating public anxiety represented 
by the feeling of losing control (Wallace 1998). This feeling stems from 
the growing realisation that even very mundane aspects of everyday life, 
such as food, have become extremely complex, affected by multifaceted 
factors hidden from public view and beyond the understanding of ordinary 
citizens. 
The promotion of trust in local produce through emphasis on Japanese 
culinary traditions was one of the strategies undertaken by the Japanese 
Government to deal with both problems – food safety and the low food self-
sufficiency ratio – that received particular attention. According to the clip 
produced by the MAFF spin-doctors, a return to consumption practices 
abandoned over the decades, as the Japanese embraced processed foods 
and foreign tastes, could be the solution to both problems (MAFF 2008). It 
remains to be seen whether the inscription of Japanese cuisine (washoku) 
on the UNESCO list of Intangible Human Heritage in December 2013 will 
aid the Government in reaching this objective. 
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Japan at the Summit
Energy, climate change and a ‘Gaggle of Gs’
Hugo Dobson (University of Sheffield, UK)
Abstract This paper focuses on how energy issues and climate change are addressed at the 
multilateral level, specifically by the Group of 8 (G8) and Group of 20 (G20). It will trace the de-
velopment, trajectory, successes and failures of global summitry in addressing these issues. In 
addition, it will explore Japan’s contributions to these processes, as well as its motivations. 
1 Introduction
This paper shifts the focus of our discussion of energy issues and climate 
change to the international and, in particular, multilateral level. It will spe-
cifically highlight the role of the Group of 8 (G8) and Group of 20 (G20), 
alongside a number of other alphanumeric configurations collectively known 
as GX summitry or a ‘Gaggle of Gs’, in shaping and promoting multilat-
eral approaches to these challenges. The G8 and G20 summits may not 
immediately spring to mind as the multilateral mechanisms charged with 
managing and pushing forward the international community’s agenda on 
energy issues and climate change. This is largely because both have been 
written about chiefly in the context of global economic governance, and 
in terms of tectonic shifts in the global order and the latter replacing the 
former. However, in fact both groupings have a great deal in common in 
addressing these issues. Both were, inter alia, originally crisis-triggered 
responses tasked with stabilizing and managing the global economy. Both 
have also experienced a degree of ‘mission creep’ by which energy and the 
environment have found a regular place on the summits’ agenda. Thus, as a 
result of their inherent and shared nature, both groups have over time and 
to varying degrees engaged with these issues either explicitly or implicitly. 
In this light, this paper will trace the development, trajectory, successes 
and failures of GX summitry in addressing these issues. In addition, it will 
explore Japan’s role in and contributions to these processes since the first 
meeting of the G8 leaders – or G6 as it was then1 – in 1975 and the first 
1 The original G6 of France, the US, the UK, Germany, Japan and Italy became a G7 in 1976 
with the addition of Canada. EU representation was added the following year. Russia went 
through a series of different statuses through the 1990s before becoming a full member in 1998 
of what we understand today to be the G8. In March 2014, Russia was removed from the G8 
as a result of the crisis in Ukraine with its future within the group still unclear at the time of 
writing. For the sake of clarity, the alphanumeric term specific to the period under discussion 
will be used, and where appropriate G8 will be used as a blanket term throughout this paper. 
Rethinking nature in contemporary Japan: Science, economics, politics
104 Dobson. Japan at the Summit
meeting of the G20 leaders in 2008, highlighting successes and failures 
along the way. In conclusion, the paper will add to the discussion of what 
Japan has done by explaining why. By its very nature, an exploration of 
global summitry, and particularly the ‘softer’, more informal gatherings 
like the G8 and G20, tends towards the state-centric as a result of the cen-
tral role of leaders and the informal relationships they construct that define 
these groups from more formal and legalistic international organizations. 
However, this analysis seeks to supplement this approach by highlighting 
the norms that Constructivists and English School scholars of International 
Relations would argue lie at the heart of the any state’s motivations and 
resulting behaviour in global summitry. Finally, the conclusion will also 
point to recent and countervailing developments under the current prime 
ministership of Abe Shinzō. 
2 The ‘Gaggle of Gs’ and Japan
The G8 finds its origins in the informal mechanisms established by the 
finance ministers of the developed world in the early 1970s to manage the 
macroeconomic challenges of the time. These informal mechanisms were 
soon upgraded to the leaders’ level at the first meeting of a Group of 6 
(G6) leaders of the leading economies in the Chateau of Rambouillet in 
November 1975. There was no intention to hold a second summit but the 
utility of this forum for discussion amongst like-minded leaders in deciding 
the direction and steering the global economy was clear when a second 
summit was held the following year in San Juan. Thereafter, the summit 
process steadily evolved in terms of membership and agenda items to 
become the forum we know today as the G8, which met most recently in 
Loch Erne, Northern Ireland in June 2013. The G8 was scheduled to meet 
in Sochi, Russia in June 2014 but in reaction to the Ukrainian Crisis the 
G7 boycotted the summit, temporarily removed Russia from the group and 
met as a G7 in Brussels. 
Similarly the G20’s briefer and more recent genesis follows a similar 
trajectory. Originally convened as a meeting of the finance ministers of 
the world’s developed and rapidly developing major economies in the af-
termath of the Asian Financial Crisis of the late-1990s, it went about its 
business from 1999 largely overlooked. However, in reaction to the global 
financial and economic crisis that began in 2008, the G8 was found to be 
both unrepresentative and ineffective. Thus, in its place, the G20 was up-
graded to a meeting of leaders and met for the first time in November 2008 
in Washington. Similarly concerned with predominantly macroeconomic 
issues, its agenda, alongside membership and hosting evolved organically. 
By 2011, the dust had settled to the extent that the G20 met annually and 
a future schedule of hosts had been decided. 
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Initial predictions of the G8’s inevitable decline and the rise of a more 
(supposedly) representative and effective G20 proved to be wide of the 
mark (Bradford and Linn 2004; Foresti and Wild 2009).2 Instead, a settle-
ment of sorts has emerged whereby the G8 has continued to meet (usually 
in the late Spring/early Summer) to deal with security and political issues, 
whereas the G20 meets later in the year and addresses financial and eco-
nomic issues. However, both Gs share a similar format in that these are 
informal bodies with no legal basis to exist and no constitution or charter. 
They rely on the willingness of leaders to come together and forge common 
responses to common challenges and then use their collective moral au-
thority to ensure compliance. Equally, the agenda of both fora are flexible, 
moveable feasts and can be shaped by the demands of the external envi-
ronment or an individual leader. Thus, as will be explored in the following 
two sections, both the G8 and the G20 have over time either explicitly or 
implicitly addressed energy issues and climate change. Before, we turn to 
this, the Japanese perspective on, and role in, these developments in the 
architecture of global governance require some brief explanation. 
The G8 has traditionally mattered to Japan and the reasons for this are 
straightforward and uncontested. In other, more traditional, mechanisms 
of global governance, Japan has been regarded as a ‘latecomer’. This can 
be seen in the case of the United Nations (UN), International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment, in all of which Japan was initially excluded and came to regard 
eventual admission as symbolic of postwar recognition and reintegration 
into international society. In contrast, Japanese prime minister Miki Takeo 
was an original participant in the Rambouillet summit. In addition, Japan is 
the only non-North American, non-European member of this self-appointed 
elite. As a result, Japan has forged two identities and roles in the G8 over 
time – that of bridge (kakehashi) between East and West, in addition to the 
representative of Asia (Ajia no daihyō). 
The rise of the G20 not only places the continued existence of the G8 
under threat (although so far these doubts have been unwarranted), but 
also expands the number of seats at the top table of global summitry avail-
able to Asian countries. Australia, China, India, Indonesia and South Ko-
rea are all now represented alongside Japan, thus diluting the need for 
a regional representative and raising questions of whether Asia should 
caucus to achieve common goals. The Japanese government’s response to 
this has been confused and contradictory at times. On the one hand, the 
Japanese government has sought to secure the success of the G20 as a 
2 The G8 represents roughly 50% of global economic output, two-thirds of international 
trade but only 14% of the world’s population. In contrast, the G20 represents 90% of global 
economic output, 80% of international trade and two-thirds of the world’s population (The 
World Bank 2014). 
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true believer in multilateralism and internationalism, but its efforts have 
been half-hearted insofar as the Japanese government does not want the 
G20 to succeed at the expense of the G8 – a position that alienates Japan 
from some of its G8 colleagues. Equally, the Japanese government has en-
countered difficulties in terms of continuing to play the role of Asian rep-
resentative and instead has at times engaged in competition with the new 
Asian additions to the G20 (Dobson 2012a). So much for Japan’s response 
to the changes in the global balance of power and their impact upon the 
architecture of global governance, a subject to which we shall return in 
the Conclusion. Let us now turn to the G8’s and G20’s treatment of energy 
issues and climate change. 
3 The G8’s role in energy issues and climate change
As mentioned above, the G8 was originally conceived as an informal group-
ing of like-minded leaders with the goal of discussing and reaching a con-
sensus on how to address macroeconomic issues of the day. In the first 
half of the 1970s these discussions were driven by the chaos caused by 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the sudden rise in oil prices 
instigated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Thus, at 
a time of oil shortages and price hikes resulting from the 1973 and 1979 
energy crises, it was not long before the G7’s discussion turned from the 
pressing issues of the day such as promoting free trade and non-inflation-
ary growth, to the issue of oil consumption. The G8 Research Group of 
the University of Toronto has counted the words in G8 summits dedicated 
to the topic of energy and however blunt this bean-counting measure-
ment may be, it does show that energy has been a constant theme in G8 
summits from 1975 (G8 Research Group 2010). This discussion spiked 
for the first time at the 1979 Tokyo Summit, the first to be hosted in Asia, 
when 62% of the summit declaration was given over to the topic. As will 
be discussed in Section 5, this provided an opportunity for Japan to dem-
onstrate leadership. 
The 1979 Tokyo Summit was dubbed the ‘energy summit’ at the time and 
resulted in an eleventh-hour agreement on G7 members’ energy consump-
tion by which the leaders agreed to country-by-country targets through 
to 1985. US levels of consumption would be limited through to 1985 to 
the 1977 levels of 8.5 million barrels per day. The EC was to restrict its 
consumption to the 1978 levels from 1980 through to 1985. In the case of 
Japan its oil consumption would be limited to 1979 levels for 1980 – 5.4 
million barrels per day – and then somewhere in the region of 6.3 to 6.9 mil-
lion barrels of oil per day through to 1985. At the same time, the Japanese 
government pledged to meet a growth rate of 5.7% from 1980 as special 
dispensation for conceding on the oil issue. This momentum continued the 
Dobson. Japan at the Summit 107
Rethinking nature in contemporary Japan: Science, economics, politics
following year at the 1980 Venice Summit where the G7 leaders added a 
number of concrete measures to conserve oil use and sought to «rely on 
fuels other than oil to meet the energy needs of future economic growth» 
(G7 1980). Although these agreements may have created some short-term 
stabilization, these targets were never met. 
Thereafter, energy issues broadly defined appeared annually on the sum-
mit agenda of G8 leaders, although they have not received the same atten-
tion as at the time of the 1979 oil shock (G8 Research Group 2010). Depth in 
GX summitry has also been in evidence over time with ministerial meetings 
supporting the leaders’ discussion. The G7 energy ministers met as early 
as 1979 after the Tokyo Summit of that year, although this has since proved 
to be a one off. In contrast, G8 energy ministers have met since 1998 in Mos-
cow albeit on an irregular basis with the last time being in 2009 in Rome. 
As regards nuclear energy, although it has received treatment at previ-
ous summits, the 2011 Deauville Summit provides a clear demonstration of 
the nature of summitry. Ahead of the summit and in response to Fukushima, 
G7 central banks jointly intervened in the currency markets (the first time 
in a decade) to stabilize the value of the yen and Japan’s exports. At the 
actual summit, the discussion topic of «Solidarity with Japan», which in-
cluded both expressions of sympathy alongside reassurances as regards 
nuclear safety, was shifted to the headline issue on the first day of the sum-
mit. This makes clear not only the sense of fraternity that exists amongst 
the G8 leaders and comes to the fore in a time of crisis (exactly the same 
thing happened in 2005 in response to the London bombings whilst the G8 
leaders met in Gleneagles), but also the flexible nature of summitry that 
allows an immediate issue to be pushed up its agenda. 
As regards the G8’s treatment of climate change, the environment first 
appeared as a topic for summit discussion at the 1985 Bonn Summit at the 
instigation of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The Economic Declaration 
that emerged from the summit dedicated 217 words to the topic by which 
the leaders pledged to coordinate initiatives through existing international 
organizations such as the OECD (G7 1985). Thereafter, the topic appeared 
in summit discussions with enough regularity that it could be regarded as 
a traditional summit subject. As a result of a French initiative at the 1989 
Paris Summit, a 1,700-word section on the environment was included in 
the resulting Economic Declaration by which G7 leaders pledge to explore 
how environmental protection could be inputted into individual govern-
ment policies (G7 1989). The deepening of the summit process was also in 
evidence when the environment ministers of the G7, independent of and 
in addition to its leaders, came together for the first time in Spring 1992 
in Germany and met annually from 1994 onwards. At the 2005 Gleneagles 
Summit, climate change took second place to A frican poverty in the me-
dia’s attention but it was still the focus for much discussion, although little 
progress was made in the face of US intransigence on the Kyoto Protocol. 
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This was obvious to all in UK prime minister Tony Blair’s summary of the 
summit: «[t]hose of us who have ratified the Kyoto Protocol remain com-
mitted to it, and will continue to work to make it a success». The only point 
of agreement amongst the summit leaders was «that climate change is 
happening now, that human activity is contributing to it, and that it could 
affect every part of the globe» (G8 2005). 
Climate change became the dominant and emblematic theme of two 
subsequent summits, the German-hosted Heiligendamm Summit of 2007 
and the Japan-hosted Tōyako Summit of 2008. At the former, German Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel’s first summit as host, the G8 leaders declared that: 
[i]n setting a global goal for emissions reductions in the process we have 
agreed in Heiligendamm involving all major emitters, we will consider 
seriously the decisions made by the European Union, Canada and Japan 
which include at least a halving of global emissions by 2050. We have 
agreed that the UN climate process is the appropriate forum for nego-
tiating future global action on climate change. (G8 2007) 
The momentum created at Heiligendamm was maintained partly a result 
of prime minister Fukuda Yasuo placing it on the agenda of the Tōyako 
Summit at a very early stage when he spoke at the World Economic Forum 
in Davos in January 2008. This was then promoted in the media as the 
«Fukuda Vision» centred on pledging to cut greenhouse gas emissions 
by 60% to 80% by 2050 from current levels, although prospects of having 
this adopted by his fellow summiteers were bleak – even more so as re-
gards the adoption of any mid-term targets for 2020. Inviting a number of 
developing countries and major emitters to participate in the discussions 
at Tōyako was a necessary step but also made the chances of reaching any 
agreement even slimmer. 
Eventually, a commitment was made to achieving at least 50% reduction 
in emissions by 2050: 
We seek to share with all Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) the vision of, and together 
with them to consider and adopt in the UNFCCC negotiations, the goal 
of achieving at least 50% reduction of global emissions by 2050, recog-
nizing that this global challenge can only be met by a global response, 
in particular, by the contributions from all major economies, consistent 
with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. (G8 2008) 
Comparing this with the statement made at Heiligendamm, incremental 
progress is clear from ‘serious consideration’ to actual action and targets. 
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However, the language used in summit statements is notoriously vague and 
tends to be the result of compromise so what ‘seek and share’, ‘consider 
and adopt’ concretely amounted to was unclear. What is more, there was 
some disparity between the English and Japanese translations of the above 
declaration with a stronger and clearer commitment implied in the Japanese 
version (MOFA 2008a). Equally, there was no agreement on mid-term targets 
or consensus on baseline years and it is debatable how committed G8 (or 
whatever forum may still be meeting) leaders will be to agreements made 42 
years previously. On the plus side of the ledger, the US agreed for the first 
time at Tōyako to concrete targets to cut emissions. In addition, the incre-
mental and iterative fashion in which the G8 functions is clear: the leaders 
shifted from agreeing in 2007 to seriously consider a 50% cut by 2050 to 
pledging a year later to promote the initiative within the UNFCCC negotia-
tions. Another important aspect of these statements is the reference to the 
United Nations. The G8 leaders knowing the extent of their influence and 
abilities, instead recognized and reinforced the UNFCCC as the most ap-
propriate and effective mechanism for addressing a global problem of this 
nature. So, all in all, this summit has been dubbed ‘a curate’s egg’ in that 
its outcomes were good in parts (Dobson 2008), but this characterization 
also captures the G8’s treatment of both issues over time. 
4 The G20’s role in energy issues and climate change
Turning to the G20’s engagement with energy issues and climate change, 
it has obviously not benefitted from same length of time as the G8 to 
create momentum and even a legacy in these policy areas. Since its first 
meeting in Washington in November 2008, the G20 has met a further 
seven times at the leaders’ level: London, April 2009; Pittsburgh, Sep-
tember 2009, Toronto, June 2010; Seoul, November 2010; Cannes, Novem-
ber 2011; Los Cabos, June 2012; and Saint Petersburg, September 2013. 
There has been no evidence of institutional depth in terms of creating 
G20 ministerial meetings to address these issues. Nevertheless, even at 
its first gathering, the G20 experienced the mission creep in its agenda 
similar to that experienced by the G8 in its early years. As a result, the 
G20 has been tasked with a range of issues in addition to its original 
financial and macroeconomic focus of which energy issues and climate 
change are but two. 
As regards energy, G20 statements reveal an increasing level of engage-
ment with energy issues starting from minimal discussion at Washington: 
We remain committed to addressing other critical challenges such as 
energy security and climate change, food security, the rule of law, and 
the fight against terrorism, poverty and disease. (G20 2008) 
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At the second London Summit there were no references to energy. How-
ever, at Pittsburgh later that year numerous statements accounting for 
over 10% of summit documentation were given over to highlighting issues 
such as energy efficiency, clean energy and energy security. 
In 2010, the Toronto Summit’s treatment was not so sustained and it 
dedicated a single paragraph to energy: 
We note with appreciation the report on energy subsidies from the Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA), Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), OECD and World Bank. We welcome the work of Fi-
nance and Energy Ministers in delivering implementation strategies and 
timeframes, based on national circumstances, for the rationalization and 
phase out over the medium term of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that 
encourage wasteful consumption, taking into account vulnerable groups 
and their development needs. We also encourage continued and full im-
plementation of country-specific strategies and will continue to review 
progress towards this commitment at upcoming summits. (G20 2010c) 
Later in the same year, the Seoul Summit Leaders Declaration included no 
mention of energy issues but the accompanying Seoul Summit Document 
dedicated a section that covered commitments to phasing out inefficient 
fossil fuel subsidies, strategies to contain volatility in fossil fuel prices, in 
addition to welcoming and encouraging the progress of «the Global Marine 
Environment Protection (GMEP) initiative toward the goal of sharing best 
practices to protect the marine environment, to prevent accidents related 
to offshore exploration and development, as well as marine transportation, 
and to deal with their consequences» (G20 2010b). 
Although the 2011 Cannes Summit was pretty much hijacked by the 
Eurozone crisis, sections in its various declarations and statements were 
dedicated to the promotion of clean energy and the smooth functioning of 
energy markets to avoid price volatility and ensure energy efficiency. It 
tasked the G20 finance ministers to press ahead with reforms and report 
back a year later. A year later and the Los Cabos Summit reiterated the 
declarations made at Cannes and tasked its finance ministers to take con-
crete measures in future discussions. 
The statement issued at Saint Petersburg in 2013 dedicated a section to 
the issue and reiterated pledges to enhance energy cooperation, ensure 
the accuracy of energy market data and promote cleaner and more efficient 
energy technologies. 
To cut a long story short, the G20 has essentially sought to play the role 
that GX summitry can play best, as a steering committee. However, expec-
tations are naturally high ahead of the Australian Presidency of the G20 
in 2014 that it can play a greater leadership role. 
A regards climate change, a number of civil society groups have targeted 
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the G20 in an attempt to shift its attention away from a narrow focus on 
economic growth and ensure that any consensus includes consideration for 
climate change. In addition, it is the richest countries represented at the 
G20 that are responsible for the majority of emissions so there is a rationale 
for the G20 to add climate change to its agenda. However, the G20’s role is 
only ever going to be that of catalyst and ultimately it will be the UN that is 
the legitimate body to deal with the issue. The best a GX summit can do on 
any issue is overcome deadlock and create a consensus that then needs to 
spill over into the more legitimate and legal bodies of global governance. 
At a time when UN negotiations have stalled, this provides an appropriate 
opportunity for the G20 to step in. 
Take, for example, the financial transaction tax (FTT, or more popularly 
the Robin Hood tax) that has been mooted as a measure that could gener-
ate the billions of dollars needed to addres issues such as climate change 
and poverty. These taxes have found their way onto the G20’s agenda and a 
surprising degree of consensus has even emerged with Argentina, France, 
Germany, South A frica, Spain, and the EU all in favour. Statements by 
former foreign ministers Okada Katsuya and Maehara Seiji during 2010 
expressed for the issue and at the 2011 Cannes Summit Japanese prime 
minister Noda Yoshihiko even expressed interest in exploring the measure 
further. However, UK prime minister David Cameron has opposed a meas-
ure that would damage the City of London. 
However, for a number of years, G20 summits were dominated, and their 
agenda hijacked, by the crisis in the Eurozone. Partly as a result, at its most 
recent meeting in Saint Petersburg, the G20 simply repeated the anodyne 
statements that tend to dominate summit documentation by declaring that: 
Climate change will continue to have a significant impact on the world 
economy, and cost will be higher to the extent we delay additional actions. 
We reiterate our commitment to fight climate change and welcome the 
outcome of the 18th conference of the Parties to the UN climate change 
conferences. We are committed to a full implementation of the outcomes 
of Cancun, Durban and Doha and will work with Poland as the incoming 
presidency towards achieving a successful outcome at COP-19. We are com-
mitted to support the full implementation of the agreed outcomes under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its ongoing 
negotiations. We strongly welcome the efforts of the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations to mobilize political will through 2014 towards the 
successful adoption of a protocol, another legal instrument, or an agreed 
outcome with legal force under the convention applicable to all Parties 
by 2015, during COP-21 that France stands ready to host. (G20 2013) 
In effect the G20 was kicking the issue into the long grass and leaving it 
to others to attempt (and fail) to make progress. 
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5 Japan’s role and contribution
As would be expected in these mechanisms of global governance that 
stress the collective leadership that presidents, prime ministers and chan-
cellors provide, it is the Japanese prime minister that has occupied the 
central role. However, he is not alone and the role of the sherpa as personal 
assistant should not be overlooked as well as the contribution of various 
ministries, particularly the Ministry of Foreign A ffairs but also the Ministry 
of Finance and others on occasion. 
With these actors in mind, and despite some of the weaknesses associ-
ated with them in the context of informal summitry, Japan’s contribution to 
these developments has at times been both significant and multifaceted. 
Starting with the 1979 Tokyo Summit, although he described feeling «na-
ked-like a little child» after the summit, prime minister Ōhira Masayoshi 
played a central role in ensuring the success of the summit generally and 
specifically with regard to reaching the agreement outlined above amongst 
fellow summiteers on oil consumption (Putnam and Bayne 1987, p. 257). At 
a relatively early stage, according to an article in Japan Times on 1 June, 
Ōhira placed energy and OPEC’s sudden raising of oil prices at the top of 
the summit agenda. The fact that this would be a divisive issue between the 
United States and Europe was well known and as reported in Japan Times 
on 7 June, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt went as far as to ask Ōhira 
to act as a middle man – a role that Japan has played on occasions through 
the history of GX summitry. The reactions to the summit outcomes and the 
eleventh-hour agreement on oil consumption targets were largely positive 
with the Japan Communist Party the lone voice critical of Ōhira. Accord-
ing to a Yomiuri Shinbun article published on 1 July 1979, the approval 
rating for his administration was in fact bolstered by the summit rising 
from 37.6% beforehand to 39% after the summit. Nicholas Bayne, doyen of 
summit watchers and summit grader, the Tokyo Summit of 1979 received 
one of the more successful G7/8 summits with a grade of B plus. Energy is-
sues featured predominantly on the agenda of the following year’s summit, 
the first Venice Summit. However, Japan was prevented from following up 
on the diplomatic success of the Tokyo Summit when Ōhira passed away 
on 12 June 1980 ten days before the summit was due to begin. 
Moving forward in time to another Japan-hosted summit, the Tōyako 
Summit of 2008, other significant contributions can be seen in the role 
played by the Japanese prime minister of the day, Fukuda Yasuo, aided by 
his sherpa, Kōno Masaharu. Fukuda expressed his desire to work with the 
rising powers not included within the G8 and One of the original develop-
ments of the summit was the creation by the Japanese hosts of space and 
time for the G8 and G5 (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South A frica) to 
meet separately and together before then being joined by Australia, Indo-
nesia and South Korea on the final day of the summit as a Major Economies 
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Forum (MEF), or G16, to discuss climate change. Thereafter, Japan was ac-
tive in creating the consensus that this forum had a role to play and should 
continue, particularly in shaping the debate on climate change within the 
UN and this innovation in global summitry was adopted at the following 
year’s summit in L’Aquila (Dobson 2012a). However, Japan’s contribution 
appears to be largely in the area of global governance architecture and 
as regards the Tōyako Summit’s statement on climate change mentioned 
above in Section 3, the reaction of summit watchers was for the most part 
one of confusion. 
It is worth mentioning that Japan also hosted the Tokyo International 
Conference on A frican Development (TICAD-IV) prior to the Tōyako Sum-
mit and sought to create synergy between the two (although chiefly with 
the goal of ensuring the success of the G8 agenda on climate change rather 
than A frican development (Dobson 2012b). The Yokohama Declaration that 
resulted from TICAD-IV stated that: 
African countries appreciated Japan’s «Cool Earth Promotion Pro-
gramme» and acknowledged Japan’s efforts in seeking to develop an 
international framework looking beyond the first steps taken in the 
current Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions. 
In this regard, the Participants welcomed the announcement by the 
Government of Japan, in January 2008, of its intention to establish a 
«Cool Earth Partnership» with US$10 billion Financial Mechanism on 
the basis of policy consultations between Japan and developing coun-
tries – including A frican countries – to address the effects of climate 
change and to modernize their industries, by way of technology-transfer, 
to render them more energy-efficient and more environment-friendly. 
(MOFA 2008b) 
Considering that original drafts of the declaration had included consider-
ably stronger phrases like ‘lauded’ and ‘supported’, rather than ‘appreci-
ated’ and ‘acknowledged’, this is hardly a ringing endorsement of Japan’s 
initiative. 
Another measure of Japan’s contribution to the G8’s treatment of the 
climate change and energy issues is the level of compliance with commit-
ments made at each summit. The G8 Research Group at the University of 
Toronto has tracked many of these commitments over time. As regards the 
G8’s commitments on climate change between 1987 and 2006, Japan posts 
the highest compliance score of 79% with Germany on 74% and 52% as the 
average level of compliance amongst G8 countries (Kirton 2007, pp. 22-23). 
As regards energy, the average level of G8 compliance with commitments 
made between 1996 and 2005 is 61% but Japan finds itself towards the foot 
of the rankings with a compliance score of 50%. 
As regards the G20’s treatment of the FTT mentioned above, Japan’s 
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response has been vague at best. As reported in Japan Times on 1 No-
vember 2011, Japanese civil society organizations are in favour of the tax 
and petitioned Noda stressing that a 0.005% tax on currency transactions 
could raise more than 600 billion yen a year and be used as part of the 3/11 
recovery. In contrast, business organisations, like Nippon Keidanren, have 
been against it (Nippon Keidanren 2010). Japan had previously scrapped 
a similar tax but as regards the FTT, little consensus within the GOJ has 
existed. However it did appear to have been gaining ground within the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) before its landslide defeat in the 2012 elec-
tion. According to Okubo Tsutomu, head of the committee in charge of fis-
cal and monetary issues within the DPJ’s policy council, in light of the rise 
in the value of the yen, and the chances of the success of strategies such 
as intervention in the currency markets, the possibility of a FTT needed be 
considered. Moreover, if Europe were to introduce such a tax then Japan 
would need to follow suit to avoid the inevitable flight to the yen (Ito 2011). 
Finally, this may appear attractive to Japan as a means of also financing the 
commitment made at the 2008 TICAD-IV to double aid to A frica. 
Finally, the G20 Research Group has also tracked G20 compliance scores 
and in February 2013 was able to report on the G20’s most recent progress 
in reaching its goals on development. Included in these commitments is 
the issue of energy efficiency, for which Japan demonstrated full compli-
ance so far with the 2010 Seoul Summit’s pledge that «we will take steps 
to create, as appropriate, the enabling environments that are conducive 
to the development and deployment of energy efficiency and clean energy 
technologies, including policies and practices in our countries and beyond, 
including technical transfer and capacity building» and the 2011 Cannes 
Summit’s commitment to «support the deployment of clean energy and 
energy efficiency (C3E) technologies». Japan was seen to have taken steps 
to create the enabling environments that are conducive to the development 
and deployment of energy efficiency and clean energy technologies both 
at home and in other countries, specifically in the Asia Pacific and North 
A frica. 
6 Conclusion
So much for what GX summitry and in particular Japan have done, or not 
as the case may be. In conclusion, the paper will discuss the underlying 
motivations behind Japan’s behaviour. A range of different theoretical ap-
proaches will inevitably highlight different pushes and pulls. A traditionally 
Realist approach would explain Fukuda’s various initiatives through the 
lens of undiluted national interest. For example, the creation of the MEF 
would be regarded simply as an attempt on the part of Japan to dilute the 
role of the G5 and the central role of China. Equally, the countries that the 
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MEF initiative embraced – Australia, Indonesia and South Korea – were 
some of the most vocally supportive of Fukuda’s «Cool Earth» initiative to 
halve global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. However, a purely Real-
ist approach lacks nuance and presents an overly unproblematised view 
of Japan’s behaviour. For example, Japan has been conflicted even in its 
support for its own initiatives like the MEF and this requires explanation. 
At the heart of Japan’s response is an impulse based on the norms of 
internationalism and Asianism but also Japan’s self-perception of its sta-
tus in the international system. In this light, the Japanese government has 
been committed to ensuring the success of GX summitry and to this end 
hosting successful summits. This can be seen not only in the various grades 
awarded by the G8 Research Group to Japan-hosted summit, but also in 
Ōhira’s speech to the Diet at the beginning of 1979, the year Japan hosted 
the first Tokyo Summit, which demonstrated the lengths the Japanese hosts 
would go to in order to ensure a successful summit: 
It is most significant that the summit meeting of major industrialized 
countries will be held in Japan this year for the first time in Asia. This 
meeting is a very important forum for the leaders of the nations con-
cerned to discuss frankly their policies and to seek international coop-
eration for the stable expansion of the world economy. We intend to do 
our utmost as host country in preparation for this meeting and to work 
with the other participating countries for its success. (Ōhira 1979, 180) 
This commitment has continued through to the present day and it appears 
that Japan’s behaviour falls within the English School’s particular defini-
tion of ‘great power’ status. To quote Morris (2011, pp. 328-329) and his 
treatment of Hedley Bull’s work, great powers 
are not just unusually powerful states, but collectively constitute an 
institution of international society. Accordingly, great powers must con-
form to certain behavioural expectations and in particular must «man-
age their relationships with one another in the interests of international 
order». (Bull 1977, p. 202) 
In Bull’s classic formulation, great powers have «a special mission [as] ... 
custodian[s] or trustees[s] of the interests of international society» and are 
required to «accept the duty, and are thought by others to have the duty, 
of modifying their policies in the light of the managerial responsibilities 
they bear» (Bull 1977, p. 202). 
In other words, by playing a number of ‘recognition games’ (usually 
played by rising powers to assert their increasing influence) that seek to 
reinforce its status as a great power of the day, Japan has exhibited the 
sense of responsibility that the English School identifies as one of the de-
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fining qualities of great power status. Even if it is evidently a great power 
in relative decline, certain responsibilities remain that are constitutive of 
this status and thereby shape behaviour. To risk banality for a moment, this 
is the Spiderman adage that «with great power comes great responsibil-
ity». The Japanese government has demonstrated a belief that it should act 
not only as a Great Power but also as a ‘Great Responsible’ (Morris 2011, 
p. 329, in reference to the coalition government led by UK prime minister 
David Cameron). 
However, this internationalist impulse has come directly into conflict 
with the hard-nosed Realism outlined above. The result has been con-
tradictory and unpredictable behaviour at times over recent years and 
even paralysis on other occasions. For example, Japan has worked for the 
success of new mechanisms of global governance such as the G20 and 
demonstrates innovation in creating bodies such as the MEF. However, its 
enthusiasm has clear limits: the success of these new and more representa-
tive bodies should never be at the expense of Japan’s preferred central 
mechanism of global governance, the G8. This has resulted in a more quali-
fied internationalism than has traditionally been on display in Japan’s G8 
summitry. The strategy by which successive Japanese governments have 
recently sought to pursue these apparently contradictory objectives has 
been to stress the democratic values at the heart of the declaration that 
came out of the first Rambouillet Summit, and which are so much harder to 
discern in the G20. Although for a time this strategy dovetailed nicely with 
prime minister Asō Tarō’s values-oriented diplomacy, it has generally been 
regarded as a hollow and retrograde approach. Equally, a surprising lack of 
coordination between policymakers has come to the fore on occasion, one 
example being prime minister Kan Naoto’s idea of inviting China to future 
G8 summits mooted at the 2010 G8 Summit without prior consultation with 
MOFA officials (Dobson 2012a). 
These are dilemmas that Japanese leaders have struggled to overcome 
not only in the way they manage the changing world order and the insti-
tutional architecture of global governance but also in terms of the global 
issues with which they grapple. However, the return to power of the Liberal 
Democratic Party in December 2012 suggests a possible resolution of this 
impasse, although not one that ardent supporters of global governance 
might welcome. Since returning to power prime minister Abe has dem-
onstrated a more coherent approach to the mechanisms of global govern-
ance than his DPJ predecessors. With one eye on the domestic reception, 
he has explicitly and consistently used these mechanisms to promote and 
secure international support for his three-pronged economic policies popu-
larly known as «Abenomics» as well as his more robust (some would say 
‘nationalistic’, whereas some would say ‘normal’) initiatives in foreign 
and security policy. The resulting behaviour across the calendar of global 
governance from the World Economic Forum in January through to the 
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UN General Assembly in September is certainly more joined up, strategic 
even. However, it focuses on national interest to the exclusion of any vision 
of global governance, normative impulse or sense of leadership that have 
previously been the hallmark of Japanese participation in global summitry 
(Dobson 2014). As Abe’s position appears to be relative secure with no up-
coming election or intra-party threat, more of the same is to be expected. 
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Top down versus bottom up
Post-crisis Japanese nuclear policy
Daniel P. Aldrich (Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA)
Abstract While the Japanese Government successfully created one of the most advanced com-
mercial nuclear power programs in the world through a mix of top-down directives and well-fund-
ed policy tools, the compounded disaster of 11 March 2011 drastically altered the political and so-
cial landscape for atomic energy there and abroad. Local residents throughout Japan along with 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have seized the opportunity to carry out bottom-up re-
sponses to the accident, including radiation monitoring, challenges to bureaucrats’ authority, and 
mass protest. Where other scholars have looked more closely at the activities of private-sector 
actors and political parties, this chapter briefly reviews the past five decades of Japan’s nuclear 
power program with a focus on the interaction between state and civil society and the ways in 
which the disaster has induced grassroots citizen science and activism. 
1 Introduction
Until the tragic events on 11 March 2011, the long-term trajectory of Ja-
pan’s energy policy seemed crystal clear. The central Government had 
long supported atomic energy as a way of achieving a modicum of energy 
independence and pumped millions of dollars a year in incentives to rural 
host communities. Opinion polls showed that roughly two-thirds of the 
general public supported the expansion of Japan’s nuclear reactor program 
and Government white papers envisioned enlarging the amount of energy 
generated by atomic reactors from 30% to 50%. The long-dominant Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) and large businesses along with their lobbying or-
ganizations such as the Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) supported 
nuclear power. Electric utilities had plans to construct new nuclear power 
plants along Japan’s coast. The 9.0 magnitude earthquake, accompanying 
tsunami, and nuclear meltdowns at three reactors of the Fukushima Dai-
ichi complex on 3/11 altered the political landscape in Japan and abroad. 
Among other countries, Germany, Belgium, and Italy decided to either shut 
down or scale back their nuclear plans. Even China, a strong proponent 
of nuclear power, placed a six month moratorium on new nuclear plant 
An earlier version of this piece originally appeared as «Post-crisis Japanese nuclear policy: 
From top-down directives to bottom-up activism», Daniel P. Aldrich, AsiaPacific Issues, 103, 
January, 2012. The author thanks Elisa Johnston and the East West Center for permission to 
reprint this modified version and Andrea Revelant for his work in organizing the conference 
which created this edited volume. 
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construction. Within Japan, the accident reversed public opinion on nu-
clear power and created doubts among many residents about the safety 
of nuclear power plants. 
This chapter traces public opinion and civil society activities in the field 
of nuclear power from the creation of Japan’s nuclear program immedi-
ately following World War II until its recent sea-change following the 3/11 
disasters. It seeks to understand precisely how average citizens across 
the country have understood their political roles vis-à-vis energy policy 
following the Fukushima tragedy. Using primary and secondary literature 
along with extensive fieldwork in affected communities I look closely at the 
interaction between the Government agencies responsible for the regula-
tion and promotion of nuclear power and the broader public in the country. 
Given the existing studies of interactions between the state and business 
in the field of nuclear power (Samuels 1987; Lesbirel 1998; Scalise 2013), I 
limit my attention to Tokyo-based central Government bureaucrats and the 
citizenry. While recent events have clouded the future of nuclear power in 
Japan, the new channels and approaches used by citizens interacting with 
the state are far clearer. 
This chapter begins with a review of Japan’s nuclear power program 
since the mid-1950s, proceeds to illuminate the events of 3/11 along with 
responses from civil society to the disaster. I closely trace the institutional 
changes on the Japanese Government side along with the ways that ordi-
nary people engaged state decisions. The chapter moves through various 
ways that citizens have engaged the state following the Fukushima ac-
cident and ends with a discussion of the changes among decision makers 
and citizens alike. 
2 Japan’s ‘Nuclear Allergy’ and Top Down Directives
Japan’s unique history at the end of World War II created what was known 
as a kaku arerugi (nuclear allergy) among the broader population. The 
atomic bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki created a strong anti-nuclear 
weapons sentiment in Japan, as did the Lucky Dragon incident less than a 
decade later. In March 1954, the 23 fishermen onboard the Daigo Fukuryū 
Maru (Lucky Dragon N. 5) boat passed through the fallout created by a 
Pacific Ocean test of the American hydrogen bomb. Soon after returning 
to Japan, Aikichi Kuboyama, the radio operator, succumbed to the acute 
radiation contamination and became the first victim of the hydrogen bomb. 
Newspapers covered the incident and monitored his deteriorating health, 
detailing the health effects of radiation in front-page stories which cap-
tured the public’s attention. Motivated by this tragedy, residents of the 
Suginami Ward in Tokyo began a petition drive to ban hydrogen bombs, 
and by August of 1955 they had secured more than 30 million signatures. 
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Put another way, roughly one-third of Japan expressed their support for 
the banning of nuclear weapons; many respondents envisioned nuclear 
power as equally unwanted. The two longest standing anti-nuclear organi-
zations in Japan – Gensuikyō and Gensuikin – emerged from these events 
and continue to hold rallies and disseminate information on nuclear issues 
(cf. Yoshioka 1999). 
The wide scale distrust of radiation and nuclear issues among Japanese 
civilians following the bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki has allowed 
Japan to remain free of nuclear weapons, an outcome explained by some as 
a function of Japan’s new postwar pacifist norms and by others as the out-
come of institutional design (cf. Hymans 2011). At the same time, though, 
Japan built up one of the most advanced commercial nuclear power frame-
works in the world. Where the United States and France abandoned ex-
perimental technologies such as fast breeder reactors, mixed oxide (MOX) 
fuel, and plans for a closed fuel cycle (Hecht 1998), Japanese decision mak-
ers stuck with these schemes (Campbell 1988; Pickett 2002). Even recent 
events have not brought about a major challenge to the Government’s drive 
to reach indigenous and self-contained energy production. 
Japan’s nuclear power program is not the outcome solely of market forc-
es, a lack of access points for anti-nuclear groups, or a top-down hierarchi-
cal political culture, as past scholars have argued; instead, the Government 
has designed and refined a broad repertoire of policy instruments to further 
its goals. In the same year as the Lucky Dragon accident, the young politi-
cian Yasuhiro Nakasone (who eventually became prime minister) proposed 
that the central Government allocate money to nuclear research. The Diet 
passed the Atomic Energy Basic Law and developed Japan’s own Atomic 
Energy Commission to mirror institutional developments in the United 
States. Soon, however, Japan departed from America’s primarily market-
based approach to energy policy (although the 1957 Price-Anderson Act 
remains a clear example of the US Government amortizing the industry’s 
risks). Rather than allowing private energy utilities throughout the nation 
to handle the issue of siting and public acceptance on their own, the Japa-
nese Government developed an extensive repertoire of policy instruments 
and soft social control techniques designed to bring public opinion in line 
with national energy goals. Authorities and regulators overcame opposition 
and concerns among the broader population and in specific demographic 
groups, such as coastal fishermen and students, through focused policy 
instruments intent on manipulating public support. 
The Government provided a number of different types of support to Tokyo 
Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and other regional power monopolies in 
the early years of nuclear power; one form of help involved logistical and 
financial support in mapping out potential host communities throughout 
Japan. Government bureaucrats assisted the utilities both in the physical 
charting of potential locations – to ensure that they met certain technocratic 
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criteria, such as having access to cooling water, and location near existing 
power grid lines, and relatively aseismic rock, and so forth – and in mapping 
the social characteristics of nearby communities. Internal documents from 
the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF) industry group showed that plan-
ners of the late 1960s and early 1970s were very cognizant of the dangers 
posed by well organized horizontal associations, especially fishermen’s coop-
eratives (gyogyō rōdō kumiai). Analyses of the siting of nuclear power plants 
in Japan have demonstrated that planners placed these projects in rural 
communities which were less coordinated and more fragmented, and hence 
less likely to successfully mount anti-nuclear campaigns (Aldrich 2008). To 
overcome any remaining opposition in such localities the Government often 
offered jobs and assistance to fishermen to ensure that the nuclear power 
plant would not be seen as curtailing their livelihoods. 
Initially, the Government agency known as MITI (the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry, or Tsūshō Sangyō Shō) popularized by the work of 
Chalmers Johnson (1982) had only a handful of techniques to induce public 
support for nuclear energy. Yet it needed little leverage as protests were 
scattered and sporadic. Some communities rallied against planned nuclear 
complexes in their backyard – fishermen at the Tōkaimura nuclear complex, 
for example, expressed their opposition through boat rallies and marches, 
and others stopped a planned teaching reactor for Kansai University in a 
densely populated urban area near Uji City – but large scale opposition was 
yet to develop through the 1960s and early 1970s. By the late 1970s several 
national anti-nuclear umbrella organizations sprang up and began to organ-
ize protests across the country. The oil shocks of the 1970s pushed Japan’s 
energy bureaucracy into high gear as its nominal price skyrocketed upwards 
and the market price quadrupled, so a barrel which had been $3 became $12. 
The high and unstable price of oil – critical for Japan’s large scale petro-
chemical industries as well as a host of other fields, including automobiles 
and oil refining – created a new goal for Japanese planners: energy secu-
rity. The Government hoped that between hydroelectric dams and nuclear 
power plants Japan would be able to wean itself off of oil from the Middle 
East. This would require the consent of citizens in Japan on a large scale. 
As a result of this new push, the system of benefits for actual and poten-
tial nuclear power plant host communities became so complex that the 
central Government created a new agency, the ANRE (Agency for Natural 
Resources and Energy, Shigen Enerugī Chō) which in turn spun off the Ja-
pan Atomic Energy Relations Organization (see http://www.jaero.or.jp/ 
for the institution’s website), the Japan Industrial Location Center (Nihon 
Ricchi Sentā, see http://www.jilc.or.jp/index.html), and the Center 
for the Development of Power Supply Regions over the following decade. 
The personnel and budget of these agencies focused primarily to assisting 
with the placement of new nuclear power plants throughout the country. 
Where governmental and quasi-governmental agencies had previously only 
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a handful of tools for interacting with and persuading the public, the Oil 
Shocks and increasing resistance brought about the creation of many new 
ones. Policy instruments for improving nuclear power’s image included pep 
talks from central Government bureaucrats, the development of science 
curricula for school aged children, Nuclear Power Day, and annual fairs 
where local fishermen and farmers could sell their products. 
ANRE bureaucrats listened closely to the concerns of these demographic 
groups, who often feared ‘nuclear blight’ – that is, the inability to sell their 
fishing and agricultural products because of fears of radioactivity – more 
than they feared health risks or environmental damage. In response, the 
various Government agencies worked to set up an annual, large scale exhi-
bition outside Tokyo called the Electricity Hometown Fair where fishermen 
and farmers from nuclear power plant host communities would be ensured 
a profit thanks to the hundreds of thousands of tourists and consumers 
who descended on the convention center Makuhari Messe outside Tokyo. 
Similarly, local Government officials began to worry about recall elections 
which ended the political careers of several pro-nuclear mayors, so the 
central Government organized workshops where local elected officials 
could learn what had worked – and what had failed – at past attempts to 
boost nuclear plants in localities around the country. Mayors and governors 
who supported attempts by local chambers of commerce and businesses 
to bring in atomic reactors would find themselves invited to the prime 
minister’s residence in Tokyo for a public recognition ceremony of their 
assistance of national energy goals. These hortatory tools sought to cre-
ate pro-nuclear agents at the local level who would help rally support for 
nuclear power plants and overcome any opposition (Aldrich 2010). 
The Government provided up to 20 million dollars a year to acquiescent 
communities through the Three Power Source Development Laws (known 
by their abbreviation Dengen Sanpō). What had initially been a series of 
ad hoc measures designed to win public support for nuclear power com-
plexes became a tremendously well funded policy instrument which fun-
neled hidden taxes on electricity use into a pooled account. Bureaucrats 
then distributed these funds to host communities throughout rural, coastal 
Japan. Through this institutionalized redistributive system and a variety of 
other measures designed to convince local residents that nuclear power 
was both safe and necessary, the Japanese Government created many host 
community volunteers among the rural, depopulating towns and villages 
in the nation. For these small communities, such as Futaba in Fukushima 
and Tomari in Hokkaidō, the promise of a nuclear power plant meant po-
tential jobs, millions of dollars in grants and loans, new infrastructure, 
and the prospect of survival. Commentators have argued that the flow 
of money into often older, impoverished rural communities has created a 
«culture of dependence» and a «cycle of addiction» (Fackler and Ōnishi 
2011; Hasegawa 2004, p. 26). 
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The body of policy instruments designed to manipulate public opinion has 
not guaranteed success at siting, however. Research has shown that of the 
roughly 95 attempts to site nuclear power plants over the postwar period, 
only 54 were actually completed. With well organized and informed oppo-
sition groups, including the Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC, 
Genshiryoku Shiryō Jōhō Shitsu) and the Anti-Nuclear Newspaper (Hangen-
patsu Shinbun) leading the charge since the early 1980s, many communities 
fought back in well publicized battles. The accidents at Three Mile Island 
and Chernobyl worried many Japanese residents, but authorities reassured 
them that these would not be possible in Japan, given its strong engineer-
ing credentials, defense in depth, and highly educated and motivated staff. 
In response to mounting opposition, the Government deepened the field of 
projects to which the Dengen Sanpō funds could be applied, lengthened 
the period for which they would be available, and increased the pot of fund-
ing provided to local communities. Overall, the Government and regional 
energy monopolies saw few reasons to worry about the future; one white 
paper envisioned the construction of an additional 17 nuclear power plants 
in Japan by 2024 which would enable the nation to move from one-third of 
its electricity generated by nuclear power plants to roughly one-half. These 
optimistic visions of nuclear power’s future, however, were not to be.
3 The Final Straw? The Ongoing 3/11 Disaster
By the late 1990s, siting planners encountered serious bottlenecks in the 
system of constructing new nuclear power plants. The time between the 
proposal of the plant and its activation stretched from less than a decade 
in the early 1970s to more than three decades by the late 1990s (cf. Lesbi-
rel 1998). Citizen opposition to nuclear power because of potential health 
effects, a lack of a long-term storage facility for nuclear waste, and poten-
tial proliferation concerns grew steadily. The CNIC and the Hangenpatsu 
Shinbun publicized ongoing fights against siting attempts and sought to 
provide advice to would-be opposition groups. Across the industrialized 
democracies, residents began to demand more from their governments 
and moved beyond materialist concerns to a focus on the environment, 
sustainability, and health (Inglehart 2008). In addition, a series of large 
and small-scale accidents and cover ups in the industry, including three 
fatalities at a nuclear facility in Tōkaimura, chipped away at public support 
for the industry in the mid-1990s. 
On 8 December 1995, the experimental sodium-cooled fast breeder re-
actor known as the Monju experienced a large scale sodium leak and re-
sulting fire which was hot enough to melt various steel structures in the 
chamber. The Japanese agency in charge of the Monju, however, decided to 
suppress details of the accident and to doctor a publicly released videotape 
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of the leak and its aftermath. Local residents fought attempts to restart the 
experimental reactor all the way to the Supreme Court, which eventually 
(in the summer of 2005) allowed it to do so (as of the summer of 2014 it 
seems that the project may finally be dead). Some four years later Japan 
experienced its worst nuclear accident until that point. On 30 September 
1999, three workers at the nuclear fuel cycle company known as JCO lo-
cated in Tōkaimura were preparing fuel for one of Japan’s experimental 
fast breeder reactors when they set off a criticality which exposed them to 
tremendously high levels of radiation. Two of the three passed away due 
to extreme radiation exposure and local residents in the nearby town were 
told to remain indoors to avoid contamination. These were not the only 
events which began to break apart public support and faith in the industry. 
TEPCO – the Tokyo Electric Power Company – itself has covered ups 
numerous accidents, leaks, and cracks since the 1980s. Engineers came 
forward in the early 2000s to admit that over the past decades there had 
been at least 30 serious incidents which were hidden by the company’s 
management. In response, several upper management executives lost their 
jobs and the central Government ordered the shutdown of TEPCO’s 17 
nuclear reactors in 2002. These events further undermined the industry’s 
credibility, and the recent (and ongoing) accident in the spring of 2011 may 
have been the straw which broke the camel’s back. 
On 11 March 2011 a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck off Japan’s north-
eastern coast, but by itself caused very few fatalities (as data now show 
than fewer than 6% of all deaths were caused by the collapse of buildings). 
The earthquake set off a tsunami as high as 50 feet in some places which 
swamped existing seawalls along the shore and devastated communities, 
causing at least 20,000 deaths, primarily in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima 
prefectures. Estimates of the damage go beyond 220 billion dollars. The 
highly touted back-up systems at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex 
operated by TEPCO – namely the diesel generators and batteries – went 
offline soon after the earthquake and tsunami, although research has yet 
to pin down which event was primarily responsible for their failure. As a 
result, even though the reactors which had been in operation automatically 
shut down with the earthquake, residual heat caused fuel meltdowns in 
three of the six reactors at the site. The temperatures rose tremendously 
in the first day after the tsunami, soaring above 2000 degrees Fahrenheit 
and melting the zircaloy tubes containing the fuel pellets in the reactors. 
Engineers sought to reduce the growing pressure inside the containment 
units by deliberately venting the reactors to the atmosphere (thus releas-
ing radioactive elements into the air), and then tried to cool the reactors 
and ensure that the spent fuel rods would remain underwater by pumping 
in hundreds of thousands of gallons of seawater. This procedure which en-
gineers refer to as a «feed and bleed» resulted in approximately 100,000 
tons of contaminated water accumulating in the basements of the reactors, 
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flowing into the ground and water table nearby, and being dumped into the 
ocean. Adding to the chaos, hydrogen explosions blew the tops off three 
of the buildings containing the reactors when the gas was released by the 
interaction of zircaloy and water. 
Japanese authorities eventually categorized the incident as a 7 («major 
accident») on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) due to the 
amount of radiation released; the 26 April 1986 Chernobyl disaster is the 
only other atomic disaster to date in this category. Then prime minister 
Naoto Kan initially set up a 12 mile evacuation zone around the Fukushima 
Daiichi plant, and moved to expand the radius of the evacuation over the 
next two weeks. As of April 2014, more than 40,000 residents of the area 
remain unable to return to their homes in Fukushima Prefecture because 
of high levels of radioactivity. Foreign governments, including the United 
States, strongly encouraged their citizens in Japan to evacuate the imme-
diate area (and, in some cases, the country) when details of the accident 
began to circulate in mid-March 2011. Since the accident began, a number 
of agricultural companies were forced to stop exporting food from the area 
due to radioactive contamination of tea, beef, rice, and citrus products. 
Fish production from Fukushima has all but disappeared due to a lack of 
demand for such products. 
Many Japanese parents have shown increasing anger over reassurances 
from the central Government that their children are safe despite tests of 
blood and urine showing high levels of exposure even in areas far removed 
from the Fukushima area, such as northern Tokyo, Yokohama, and Saitama. 
As the Japanese Government struggled to deal with a rising death toll from 
the tsunami, a slow release of information about the accident from TEPCO, 
and rising citizen distrust, governments around the world have begun to 
reevaluate their own commitments to nuclear power. The event’s political 
fallout has spread well beyond Japan’s borders. Italy, Germany, and Swit-
zerland, among other industrialized nations, used the Fukushima nuclear 
crisis as a focal point for a policy shift away from nuclear power towards 
less potentially catastrophic sources. 
To add fuel to the fire, managers at the Kyūshū Electric Power Company 
tampered with a public opinion poll on 26 June 2011 focused on the restart 
of the nearby Saga nuclear power plant complex evidently at the sugges-
tion of Saga prefectural governor Yasushi Furukawa (Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 
July 2011). The scandal, known as the Yarase Mēru (staged mail) scandal, 
involved employees at the utility sending 140 supportive comments into the 
station, which were enough to tip the balance of opinions in favour of restart-
ing (Dawson 2011). When the media first reported the problem, the company 
denied having done anything wrong, but later apologized for its actions. 
Public opinion polls done by the Roper organization in early August 
2011 of some 1,000 Japanese residents across Japan reported that nearly 
60% of the respondents had either little or no confidence in the safety of 
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Japan’s nuclear power plants. Regular polls since the 3/11 disasters have 
confirmed that some 70% of Japanese citizens would prefer that Japan not 
restart its nuclear power plants. Gaffes from Government ministers have 
not improved matters; Yoshio Hachiro, at the time the new trade minister, 
called the village near the Fukushima Daiichi complex a «town of death» 
and then had to apologize after tremendous criticism. He soon stepped 
down from the post (Japan Times, 10 September 2011). Then prime minister 
Yoshihiko Noda has apologized to Fukushima governor Yūhei Satō for the 
Government’s «inadequate response» to the disaster. A fter years of ma-
nipulation and incentives from the central Government, the recent actions 
of the regional monopoly to alter public opinion has pushed many citizens 
to step up and mobilize in the wake of the crisis (cf. Cooley and Marten 
2006; Kiminori, Ken’ichi and Masafumi 2009). 
4 Molding the Future
Along with altering the decision making calculus on nuclear power for 
Japan and other nations, the events of 11 March have opened a window for 
bottom up initiatives and boldness which give hope that the event will not 
merely result in ‘business as usual’. Only a handful of Japan’s 50 remain-
ing reactors have been restarted in any capacity since the disasters, and 
restarting and reintegrating them into plans for meeting Japan’s national 
energy demand will require tremendous public relations work. Despite the 
prevalence of anti-nuclear sentiment among the public, business groups 
have regularly argued in public forums that Japan’s industries require the 
cheap, consistent electricity from nuclear power. Japan’s major financial 
newspaper, the Nikkei Shinbun, published a series of surveys showing that 
many corporations plan on relocating their manufacturing to offshore loca-
tions – including India, China, and Malaysia – if the Japanese Government 
cannot create a plan to ensure stability in electricity supply over the next 
three years. One Japanese business analyst argued that «If we completely 
abandon nuclear power generation … I think most industries would lose 
competitiveness and go out of Japan» (quoted in Business Day, 27 July 
2011). Many observers have underscored that firms dislike uncertainty, 
and uncertainty about disruptions in Japan’s power supplies (or a spike in 
costs for electricity) have made many firms in Japan anxious. 
Given the two decades of economic difficulties the nation has faced, 
new threats of hollowing out are being taken quite seriously. Some private 
firms, such as the energy utility KEPCO, have stepped forward with new 
plans for safer alternative energy sources, such as a new 10,000-kilowatt 
solar facility in Osaka Prefecture. Tōhoku Electric Power Company has 
stated its intent to double the capacity of its wind farms by 2020 (Reuters, 
30 September 2011). Popular entrepreneur Masayoshi Sun, creator of Soft-
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Bank, pledged an investment of a billion yen in the new Japan Renewable 
Energy Foundation which is centered around solar energy. Nonetheless 
the actual impact of these non-nuclear renewable energy systems will be 
only a drop of the bucket in terms of overall energy need. 
Beyond economic concerns from the business community, several new 
initiatives show how Japan’s civil society has been energized by this tre-
mendous tragedy. The new Safecast project embodies a new focus on citi-
zen science – that is, the participation of everyday residents as volunteers 
in data collection, technical measurement and analysis in fields such as 
ecology, biodiversity, and astronomy (Smith, Lintott and the Citizen Alli-
ance 2010; Dickinson, Zuckerberg, Bonter 2011; Devictor, Whittaker, Bel-
trame 2010). Participants in such collaborative projects work together, 
often using web-based platforms along with affordable instrumentation, to 
achieve results that lone researchers in highly funded laboratories would 
not be able to accomplish. Safecast.org provides an example of the new 
citizen activism and citizen science which has emerged in the environment 
of mistrust among the Japanese people towards both TEPCO and the cen-
tral Government itself. 
The full map available on the project website is made up of more than 4 
million data points collected by Japanese citizens – not TEPCO engineers, 
central Government bureaucrats, or sub contractors from the nuclear in-
dustry. Instead, citizens and foreign residents who own Geiger counters 
have traveled throughout Japan (including areas in Fukushima), measured 
radiation levels, and electronically uploaded the data that they collected 
to a central website. Volunteers have turned the data into a map which 
illustrates the amount of detected radiation in each spot. In doing so, 
Safecast has created a public source repository generated through trans-
parent methodology in real time. This trumps the data released by the 
Government and TEPCO, whose collection methodology has been opaque 
and whose release has been slow. At a time when many survivors of the 
tsunami have fled their homes in Fukushima seeking what they see as safer 
shelter in Tokyo, this kind of data can shed some light in an otherwise dark 
time. Japanese Government bureaucrats have taken notice of the surge in 
citizen science. Minister of Education and Science Masaharu Nakagawa 
told reporters that «Citizen’s groups have played a very important role in 
examining their neighbors closely. I really appreciate their contribution, 
as it’s most important to eliminate as many hot spots as possible» (quoted 
in Wall Street Journal, 19 October 2011). 
Citizen activism has raised its profile quite visibly at public meetings 
hosted by central Government bureaucrats since the Fukushima melt-
downs. These meetings have typically been ‘rituals of assent’ where 
bureaucrats make statements and the audience says little in response 
(Gusterson 2000). Many citizens in nuclear plant host communities re-
ported that Government-sponsored citizens regularly lectured to them on 
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the necessity and safety of nuclear power plants beginning in the 1990s. 
Following Fukushima, many citizens have not been willing to accept state-
ments from the Government or industry at face value. Several videos of 
Fukushima citizens challenging grim-faced bureaucrats on YouTube have 
garnered nearly a quarter of a million views so far. One video shows a 
number of clearly angry citizens facing down bureaucrats with statements 
such as, «People in Fukushima have a right to avoid radiation exposure 
and live healthy lives, don’t they?».Residents forced from their homes in 
Fukushima have similarly shouted down Government representatives try-
ing to justify 60 page applications for Government assistance. Observers 
saw citizens yelling «We don’t know who we can trust! Can we actually 
go back home? And if not, can you guarantee our livelihoods?» (quoted 
in Reuters, 18 October 2011). While past large scale polling, such as the 
World Values Survey, have shown that Japanese residents are less likely 
to participate in large scale demonstrations, the Fukushima disaster has 
brought out a new type of activism. 
A Wall Street Journal article quoted Tokyo resident Taichi Hirano who 
said that while in the past he had shied away from protest rallies, «I wanted 
to go somewhere where I could say loudly that I was scared and not be 
ashamed» (C12, 11 September 2011). He and many other previously unin-
volved residents have used social media platforms such as Twitter to seek 
out other participants for marches in the capital. Organizers across the 
country carried out a Sayonara Nuclear Power rally in Tokyo’s Meiji Park 
in mid-September 2011 which drew in roughly 40,000 participants. Holding 
placards and chanting «End nuclear power!» the large crowd listened to 
talks from celebrities such as popular author Kenzaburō Ōe and musician 
Ryūichi Sakamoto (AP News, 19 September 2011). These coordinated anti-
nuclear protests were significant not only because they are relatively rare 
and indicate new levels of activism, but also because the very act of par-
ticipation in public protest deepens Japan’s democracy and enhances the 
capacity of often unrepresented demographics, such as urban workers and 
youth, in the public sphere (Haddad 2010, 2010a). Weekly protests at the 
home of the prime minister against nuclear power have continued since the 
accident with reduced numbers of participants (usually in the hundreds). 
5 Conclusions
A number of changes to institutions and procedures in the field of nuclear 
energy indicate the Government’s desire to at least publicly demonstrate 
a move away from decades of top-down, technocratic decision making 
processes to ones which take seriously the will of the people. While the 
pre-Fukushima plans for national energy strategy involved the siting of 
up to 15 more nuclear power plants over the next few decades to increase 
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nuclear power’s share of production to 50%, the Government has clearly 
taken a new direction. The new basic energy plan from the Government 
names nuclear power as one of a number of different types of electricity-
producing approaches but does not seek to build new reactors or name 
a target percentage of production through atomic energy. Further, the 
Government has moved to separate nuclear regulators from nuclear pro-
moters – given that MITI (now METI) had the unsustainable tasks of both 
ensuring that the industry cut no corners and encouraging firms to create 
new plants with Government subsidies to host communities. 
The new institution – called the Nuclear Regulation Agency (NRA) – has 
taken over the position of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) 
and absorbed radiation monitoring activities carried out by bureaucrats 
within the Ministry for Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology 
(often known as MEXT). To avoid criticisms that the same bureaucrats will 
simply be reshuffled into the new agency, the Government drew on person-
nel from the Ministry of Environment to staff it. Further, the NRA itself 
has been located far from the ‘beltway’ of downtown Tokyo, using physical 
distance from the Kasumigaseki and Nagatachō areas to emphasize the 
supposed independence of this new agency. 
Former prime minister Naoto Kan spoke of moving Japan away from 
nuclear power, and while many companies may be wary and skeptical of 
the Government’s ability to fill in the gap with renewable energy sources, 
the public is convinced that Japan needs a new energy policy. Local mayors 
and governors, who in the past could be counted on to support restarts of 
nuclear power in their communities, seem unwilling to move forward even 
half a year after the accident. Surveys in March 2014 showed that only one 
in five local host communities would be willing to allow nuclear restarts 
in their backyards (Japan Times, 3 March 2014). Former prime minister 
Noda called plans for building new reactors ‘unrealistic’ but sought to 
temper their reduction with recognition of the tremendous financial costs 
it will entail (New York Times, 2 September 2011). Further, Noda and the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) sought out alternative cost estimates for 
maintaining Japan’s extensive nuclear program beyond those provided by 
the ‘nuclear village’ (that is, the firms, bureaucrats, and politicians deeply 
committed to the field). Initial reports indicated that they saw costs as 
far higher than the costs typically stated by the industry and its support-
ers, and this could strengthen Government support for solar, geothermal, 
and wind power (Asahi Shinbun, 14 and 16 September 2011). While there 
are now political and social challenges to the Iron Triangle of the nuclear 
industry, there has been no public discussion of any potential changes to 
the elaborate Dengen Sanpō system or to begin eliminating subsidies to 
rural host communities. Only time will tell if this large scale catastrophe 
will break the cycles of addiction created by more than thirty years of re-
distribution to the periphery of Japan. 
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Japan’s tragedy has taken more than 18,000 lives, destroyed homes and 
communities, and slowed down an already underperforming economy. But 
it has also awakened a civil society that for decades has been seen as weak 
and nonparticipatory. Citizens have stepped forward to engage in commu-
nity-based science, challenge the information and explanations given to 
them by Government officials and other authorities, and protest existing 
policies. In the spring of 2014, Japan’s formerly pro-nuclear Government 
had been forced to move away from business as usual, alter political institu-
tions in the field, and recognize the anger of the population over the issue. 
Even the conservative judicial system has recognized that Fukushima has 
ended ‘business as usual’ in the country. One district court has ordered a 
Japanese nuclear utility not to restart its reactors because it «could pose 
a risk of harming personal rights» (Jiji Press, 21 May 2014). Decision mak-
ers in Japan’s energy field seem suspended in time, and the NRA has not 
hurried to restart reactors. Intense pressure from the Keidanren, large 
businesses, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) may force decision 
makers to begin restarts within the next five years. Nevertheless, at the 
crossroads of the future of energy and politics, Japanese citizens may have 
the chance to help guide the nation as it moves into the future. 
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Can Japan build resilience in the face  
of climate change?
Andrew DeWit (Rikkyo University, Tokyo, Japan)
Abstract This chapter asks whether the Japanese Central Government’s energy policies are 
likely to build resilience in the face of rapidly climate change as well as paradigmatic shifts centred 
in the power economy. As with many of its counterparts elsewhere, Japan’s Abe Shinzo¯ govern-
ment – in office from December of 2012 – is powerfully influenced by vested energy interests. Ja-
pan’s nuclear village in fact wrested firm control of energy policy in the early 2000s. It remains 
committed to an ambitious programme of restarts and new nuclear build as a way to increase 
domestic energy self-reliance as well as ramp down greenhouse gas emissions. Japan has since 
evolved an increasingly ambitious ICT-centred growth strategy that could lead it to develop 
and deploy the smart city infrastructure (including distributed renewable power and radical ef-
ficiency) essential to mitigating and adapting to accelerating climate change as well as achieving 
energy independence. Japan apparently cannot have it both ways, because the more political, 
financial and other capital it invests in nuclear power, the lower the incentives to develop and 
deploy radical efficiency and renewables. In other words, the country confronts an inexpressibly 
profound and historic choice.
1 Introduction
Through the economic policy of Abenomics, in 2013 Japan entered in-
to perhaps the world’s most risky and ambitious economic experiment, 
aimed at raising inflation to 2% and boosting real economic growth to 3% 
by 2020. As part of this experiment, the cabinet of prime minister Abe 
Shinzō passed Japan’s information and communications technology (ICT) 
growth strategy (ICT growth strategy) on 14 June 2013. The ICT growth 
strategy ostensibly aims at the evolution of a new model of efficient, resil-
ient and green urban and rural infrastructures, and is rooted in a rapidly 
emergent set of technological revolutions. These revolutions include the 
renewable-centred ‘electricity revolution’ outlined by Brookings energy se-
curity specialists (Ebinger, Banks 2013), the ‘resource revolution’ detailed 
by McKinsey analysts (Heck, Rogers 2014), and ‘the second machine age’ 
described by MIT economists (Brynjolfsson, McAfee 2014). Among global 
firms, General Electric is a leader in applying ICT, which it depicts as the 
‘Industrial Internet’, to its power systems. General Electric’s application 
of ICT in enhancing efficiency and ‘predictivity’ shows that what one can 
measure and monitor in real time, one can manage in real time, and thus 
realize significant efficiencies as well as innovate other capacities such as 
rapidly updated forecasting (DeWit 2013b). Together with domestic busi-
nesses, Japan’s central agencies, associations of local governments, and 
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the Abe regime’s regulatory and fiscal initiatives have been working to 
deploy cutting-edge innovation in a swath of smart city initiatives as well 
as special zones. Some observers deride these initiatives as comparable to 
the failed technopolis policies of the 1980s. But this chapter argues that if 
Japan’s initiatives are properly managed and coordinated, they may aid the 
global community in addressing the very real 21st century challenges of 
increasing urbanization, expensive and depleting conventional energy, as 
well as the enormous threat from climate change and the sobering ‘death’ 
of stationarity (wherein past hydrologic and other data can no longer be 
used to predict the future; Milly 2008). 
This combination of threats is of deep concern to energy experts in 
the US Department of Energy (US Department of Energy 2013), the US 
military,1 as well as planners of waterworks, power and other crucial infra-
structures. Globally, these infrastructures represent trillions of US dollars 
of sunk costs and annual new investment. Japanese infrastructure stock, 
for example, is worth roughly 800 trillion yen, and confronts increasing 
costs due to ageing of the assets as well as the ravages of a rapidly chang-
ing climate (Ishikawa 2014). These issues take on added urgency in light 
of climate denial whose effect has been to conceal the scale and speed of 
the crisis from the academic community and attentive public. The loss of 
stationarity means the global community are essentially in uncharted wa-
ters concerning the stressors that water, power, transportation, and other 
urban infrastructures need to be resilient against, now and increasingly 
over time. So a critical question is whether Japan’s Abenomics initiative, 
particularly the ICT growth strategy, can deal with the death of station-
arity and help answer the global community’s urgent collective need for 
sustainability. 
2 Climate change and its accelerating risks
The mainstream democratic discourse on climate change realities and 
risks has not kept pace with the science and the activism of military and 
other actors. That lack of engagement could be very costly in pecuniary 
and human terms, even in the short run, because of the acceleration of 
climate change and the ongoing investment in infrastructure that is prob-
ably not resilient to climate change. The awareness deficit concerning 
climate change was seen in the run-up to, and aftermath of, the 27 Sep-
tember 2013 release of the International Panel on Climate Change’s 
(IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report’s first instalment and summary report. 
1 The Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, like its 2010 predecessor and many other US military 
publications, emphasizes the threat from climate change and the need to respond by renew-
able energy, efficiency and other elements of resilience (US Department of Defense 2014). 
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The release was preceded by a sadly effective ‘denialist’ media campaign 
that positioned the IPCC report as alarmist while also claiming that it 
showed the previous decade and a half had seen a ‘pause’ in climate 
change (Fischer 2013). This disinformation campaign continued after 
the report’s release. 
The global public debate’s incredible disconnect with the reality of in-
creasingly frequent extreme weather and other phenomena is dispiriting. 
Because of the widely held belief that climate change is only a catastrophe 
for coming generations (in itself, a morally odious complacency), this chap-
ter reviews solid evidence that climate change is very much a present and 
rapidly worsening peril. 
Geographically, the Global Climate Risk Index 2013 shows that the 
countries most affected in 2011 were Thailand, Cambodia, Pakistan, El 
Salvador and the Philippines (Harmeling, Eckstein 2012). A more com-
prehensive and nearly real-time accounting of climate risk and adaptive 
capacity has been pioneered since 2011 by the Alliance Development 
Works/Bündnis Entwicklung hilft, a coalition of German development 
and relief agencies.2 Working in conjunction with the United Nations 
University’s Institute for Environment and Human Security,3 the Nature 
Conservatory,4 and others, they have compiled the World Risk Report. In 
addition to the worsening effects of climate change, the Report’s risk-
weighting takes into account social and economic factors relevant to 
adaptation and disaster response. 
2 On the composition of Alliance Development Works, see their organizational overview at: 
http://www.entwicklung-hilft.de/About-us.180.0.html. 
3 The United Nations University’s Institute for Environment and Human Security has its own 
Expert Working Group on Measuring Vulnerability: http://www.ehs.unu.edu/article/read/
measuring-vulnerability. 
4 The Nature Conservatory was founded in 1951, and is primarily a science-driven (employ-
ing 550 scientists) ‘conservation by design’ programme that is active in all US states as 
well as 35 countries. They describe ‘conservation by design’ as «a systematic approach that 
determines where to work, what to conserve, what strategies we should use and how effec-
tive we have been»: http://www.nature.org/ourscience/conservationbydesign/index.htm. 
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Table 1. World Risk Index
Rank Country Risk (%)
1 Vanuatu 36.43
2 Tonga 28.23
3 Philippines 27.52
4 Guatemala 20.88
5 Bangladesh 19.81
6 Solomon Islands 18.11
7 Costa Rica 16.94
8 El Salvador 16.90
9 Cambodia 16.90
10 Timor Leste 16.85
11 Papua New Guinea 15.90
12 Brunei Darussalam 15.80
13 Mauritius 15.18
14 Nicaragua 14.89
15 Japan 14.10
Source: WeltRisikoBericht 2013 p 9
As is evident from Table 1, the World Risk Report 2013, released (in 
German)5 in September of 2013, indicated that the countries most at risk 
from the impacts of climate change were concentrated overwhelmingly 
in the Asia-Pacific (Alliance Development Works, Bundnis Entwichlung 
Hilft’s 2013). 
Incredibly, Japan’s immense wealth – second only to that of the US – was 
not enough to offset its exposure, and its risk assessment placed it 15th. 
This is in sharp contrast with the other developed states, as the US is 
ranked at 127th (3.99%) and Germany is 146th (3.24%). 
The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) satel-
lite measurements of trends in sea surface levels provide another arresting 
indication of the threat level in the Asia-Pacific. The NOAA work shows that 
sea-level rise from 1992 to 2010 was not uniform across the world ocean, 
but rather varied greatly by region. Sea levels in the mid-oceanic area of 
the Pacific decreased over the relevant period, whereas the Western Pacific 
and South Asian regions saw dramatic increases. These regions’ trends in 
5 The nature conservancy was not a party to the 2013 Report. The English version of the 
Report is slated for publication in October of 2013. 
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sea-level rise exceed those recorded elsewhere, and lead to greater vulner-
ability to storm surges, coastal erosion, and similar threats (NOAA 2012). 
Moreover, the NOAA work is part of a December 2012 report compiled by 
the NOAA in conjunction with the United States Geological Survey, the US 
Army Corps of Engineers and the US Department of Defense Strategic En-
vironmental Research and Development Program (SERDP). The SERDP is 
co-managed by the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy and 
the Environmental Protection Agency, serving to bond these agencies, and 
is thus a key institution in the American military-centred green industrial 
policy initiative (DeWit 2013c).6 These federal agencies continue to expand 
their collaboration, including the above-noted December 2012 report. This 
research was background material for America’s 2014 National Climate 
Assessment, which was released on 6 May 2014 Especially relevant to our 
purposes here, the SERPD et al. report warns that: 
[a] wide range of estimates for future global mean SLR [sea level rise] 
are scattered throughout the scientific literature and other high profile 
assessments, such as previous reports of the NCA [National Climate As-
sessment] and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
Aside from this report, there is currently no coordinated, interagency 
effort in the US to identify agreed upon global mean SLR estimates for 
the purpose of coastal planning, policy, and management. This is an im-
portant gap because identifying global mean SLR estimates is a critical 
step in assessing coastal impacts and vulnerabilities. 
In short, the key scientific-military agencies of the US state are collaborat-
ing in order to make up for the shortcomings of the IPCC. 
The IPCC report’s findings were labeled as alarmist by denialists bent on 
defining the limits of debate. Would that the IPCC were indeed an exagger-
ated account of what we collectively confront. But in fact the IPCC process 
omits from its purview such significant feedback effects as methane release 
from thawing permafrost,7 the dramatic increase in ‘anthropogenic’ forest 
and bushfires, and other factors (Glikson 2013). 
6 See the SERDP’s introduction at: http://www.serdp.org/About-SERDP-and-ESTCP 
7 On this omission, see the UN Environmental Programme’s (UNEP) call for the IPCC to 
«consider preparing a special assessment report on how CO2 and methane emissions from 
thawing permafrost would influence global climate to support climate change policy discus-
sions and treaty negotiations. All climate projections in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, due 
for release in 2013-2014, are likely to be biased on the low side relative to global temperature 
because the models did not include the permafrost carbon feedback». The UNEP warn that 
the failure to include this source of greenhouse gas emissions may lead to overshoot of the 
globally agreed 2C limit on warming, and that nations with significant permafrost (especially 
Russia, Canada, China and the US) risk being unprepared for the effect of permafrost degra-
dation on critical infrastructure (UNEP [Schaefer, Kevin et al.] 2012). 
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The IPCC is also not able to incorporate the flood of recent and robust 
research results. For example, the IPCC report omits the 18 February 2014 
news release from the NOAA that its satellites have detected significant 
reduction of the Arctic albedo. Satellite measurements were used to calcu-
late that the reduction in the reflectivity of the Arctic had gone from 52% 
in 1979 to 48% in 2011, a magnitude roughly twice that determined in 
previous studies. The NOAA scientists’ new calculation of albedo change 
in the Arctic estimates that the effect of the phenomenon is about one-
quarter that caused by increased levels of CO2 in the atmosphere (Monroe, 
Viñas 2014). That level of influence is a massive addition to the other posi-
tive feedback effects noted earlier. 
Yet another very pertinent oversight is detailed by urban planning expert 
Brian Stone in his 2012 book The City and the Coming Climate. He warns 
that climate scientists rely on about 6,000 weather stations globally, and 
that scientists deliberately adjust the temperatures recorded at the urban-
area stations in order to have them conform to temperature readings in 
nearby rural areas. Yet this adjustment of the data means that «climate 
scientists are effectively removing the known effects of land-use changes 
from the global temperature record». As a result, their data do not reflect 
the absolute warming of the planet, but only that due to greenhouse gases. 
Stone points out that cities comprise only about 3% of the Earth’s surface, 
so this practice of adjusting the data does not mean that surveys miss 
much of the big picture of warming per se. Rather, they overlook what is 
happening in cities: «global-scale climate trend analyses carried out by 
GISS [NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies] and other global climate 
research groups provide little insight into the pace and extent of climate 
change underway in urban environments». 
This particular oversight, in conjunction with under-estimates of albedo 
change and other feedback effects, seems likely to be of enormous signifi-
cance over the coming years. The Military Advisory Board of the US Center 
for Naval Analysis, in its May 2014 report on National Security and the 
Accelerating Risks of Climate Change, warns that 15 of the world’s largest 
urban areas are near coasts, and that 14 of the 20 largest urban areas are 
in Asia (US Center for Naval Analysis 2014). Over 50% of the 7 billion global 
population now live in cities. This share is expected to increase to 60% 
urban by 2030 and 70% by 2050, the latter number representing some 6.4 
billion people (World Health Organization 2013). Thus, under business as 
usual, most of humanity will be in heat islands close to increasingly dan-
gerous shores. In spite of these sobering statistics, there are no regular 
surveys of urban-area warming being undertaken to fill in the gap left by 
the cautious smoothing of the weather-station data. Considering the peril 
implied by this state of affairs, Stone appears correct in depicting this 
«approach to climate change monitoring that effectively ignores the most 
heavily populated regions of the planet» as «an irony seeming worthy of 
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a Seinfeld skit: ask a climate scientist how rapidly the climate is warming 
and you will get an answer; ask a climate scientist how rapidly your city is 
warming and you will get a shrug» (Stone 2012, pp. 80-81). 
As of 13 October 2013, that shrug can be replaced with a sobering cita-
tion. In the wake of the IPCC Report’s release, a meta-analysis, or overview, 
of climate trends sought to calculate «[t]he projected timing of climate 
departure from recent variability» (Mora et al. 2013). The analyses used 
historical (1860 to 2005) temperature data for areas of the terrestrial sur-
face, and then ran a meta-analysis of climate models to determine when 
any given area’s coolest monthly temperature would exceed the historical 
average for its hottest year. The study determined that on average, with no 
mitigation of current emissions of greenhouse gases, temperatures across 
the world’s cities are likely to exceed their historical norms by about mid-
century. As figure 1 reveals, the Indonesian city of Manokwari is expected 
to exceed its historic temperature norms by 2020, and Tokyo will follow 
roughly two decades later. 
Figure 1. Hot spots: global temperature rise
Source: Nature. Graphic: Leonard Bernstein; Gene Thorp, The Washington Post, 9 October  2013
And contrary to the dangerously distracting denialist claims, there has 
been no pause in climate change. Atmospheric temperatures plateaued 
at the 1998 peak, but the heat content of the world ocean did not. The 
world ocean is roughly 800 times the density of air at sea level, covers just 
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over 70% of the terrestrial surface, and comprises 98% of the 1.4 billion 
cubic kilometres of water on Earth («Ocean Stratification» in Schlosser et 
al. 2007). This immensity makes the world ocean the biggest element of 
the climate system, an element that absorbs well over 90% of the roughly 4 
Hiroshima bombs per second of excess heat trapped by anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions (the calculation in terms of Hiroshima bombs 
is in Church et al. 2011). The percentages are depicted in figure 2 below, 
which illustrates heat absorption by major climate system components 
over the period 1993 to 2003, as calculated by the IPCC’s 2007 report 
(AR4, Section 5.2.2.3. IPCC 2007). 
Figure 2. Heat absorption by terrestrial climate systems
Source: http://www.skepticalscience.com/no-warming-in-16-years.htm
The role of the ocean in absorbing heat over time – since 1960 – is por-
trayed in figure 3. The colossal absorptive role of the world ocean in the 
climate system is due to the fact that water is roughly 800 times the density 
of air at sea level and there is so much of it. Waves have 1,000 times the 
kinetic energy of wind (Ocean Energy Council 2014), which is the reason 
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intense storm activity in the UK during early 2014 saw years of average 
rates of coastal erosion take place in a few hours in some locations (Bea-
ment 2014). These facts are just a few clues as to why the US Navy is a 
leader on climate change and renewable energy. The Navy works in the 
water, and hence is compelled to understand climate change as an empiri-
cal fact. Indeed, it is painfully aware that its – and the world’s – largest 
naval base in Norfolk, Virginia (Naval Station Norfolk) is vulnerable to 
flooding and that all infrastructure investments and planning must be 
made with that in mind lest they be expensive waste years or decades 
later (Cahn 2013). 
Figure 3. Trends in climate system heat absorption, 1960-2008
Source: http://www.skepticalscience.com/docs/Comment_on_DK12.pdf
Figure 4 from the US National Oceanographic Data Center gives an indica-
tion of trends in oceanic heat content, together with disturbing evidence 
of recent acceleration. These data are also confirmed by the European 
Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts’ Ocean Reanalysis System 4 
(ORAS4), using buoy and other data inputted into a highly sophisticated 
model. The ORAS4 assessment cautions that «recent warming rates of 
the waters below 700 m appear to be unprecedented» (Nuccitelli 2013). 
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Figure 4. Five decades of global ocean heat content, 0 to 2,000 meters
Source: http://www.nodc.noaa.gov/OC5/3M_HEAT_CONTENT/
With this evidence in mind, the IPCC hardly seems alarmist. Indeed, in a 
startling demonstration of – to be frank – how hobbled the IPCC’s inherently 
conservative reporting process has become, its scenarios are generally ig-
nored by SERPD and other agencies that require comprehensive and real-
time assessments.8 The IPCC certainly deserves high praise as humanity’s 
biggest-ever collaborative scientific endeavor, and justly received the 2007 
Nobel Peace Prize for its work. But the IPCC compiles its roughly septen-
nial reports from already published research, often several years old. It also 
has to reach a consensus. Worse yet, the IPCC’s April 2014 summary report, 
a 33-pages overview for policymakers that is what most people actually read, 
was «gutted at the insistence of government officials» according to report 
co-author Harvard University Professor Robert Stavins (Clark 2014). 
8 One indicator of how urgent such assessments are is seen in the draft version of the 
US 2013 National Climate Assessment. The assessment’s chapter 29 lists research goals, and 
prioritizes – as «Research Goal 1» – «understanding the role of feedbacks, thresholds, extreme 
events, and abrupt changes that may disrupt natural and socioeconomic systems, as well as 
the implications of more gradual changes and also the degree and effectiveness of response 
actions» (US Global Change Research Program 2013, p. 1035). 
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These and other problems leave the IPCC well behind the curve of scien-
tific discovery and disabled in the public debate. Hence, military and other 
institutions that see the world in terms of risk, confront the fallout from 
that risk in their operations, and are thus compelled to act have turned 
elsewhere. The global insurance industry, for one, has been emphasizing 
catastrophe modeling for over a decade, and is moving towards an «open 
modeling platform» (Clark 2013a). And as SERPD reveals:«In coordination 
with the efforts of the other federal science providers, SERDP’s goal is to 
ensure DoD [Department of Defense] has the necessary science and tools to 
support climate change-related vulnerability and impact assessment. A suite 
of SERDP projects are developing the methodologies and tools [emphasis 
added] needed to assess the physical effects of sea level rise and storm surge 
and the impacts to mission-essential infrastructure over a broad range of 
both geophysical settings and extant climate conditions» (SERDP [no date]). 
That point deserves to be underlined. These US federal agencies, with 
the military at their core, are constructing analytical mechanisms to ap-
praise and adapt to a multifaceted phenomenon of unprecedented speed 
and scale. They have good reason to: the current pace of climate change 
has recently been authoritatively assessed as «at least 10 times faster than 
any climate shift in the past 65 million years» (Carey 2013; Diffenbaugh, 
Field 2013). Most of the institutions of civil society and public govern-
ance – 19th century institutions using 20th century policy to address 21st 
century crises – are distracted by the well-funded denialist politics of cli-
mate change (the best analysis of the denialist strategy and campaign is 
Oreskes, Conway 2010). An additional hurdle appears to be human beings’ 
socio-psychological predisposition to ignore a comparatively gradual but 
increasingly costly, and potentially catastrophic, phenomenon like climate 
change (one of the most instructive explorations of this fact is Kari Marie 
Norgaard’s study of well-educated and aware Norwegians’ complacency; 
cf. Norgaard 2011). But climate change’s already quantifiable impacts 
on energy, water and other infrastructure have forced military and other 
institutions sensitive to atmospheric and oceanic signals to respond. Most 
national governments are too beholden to vested interests in large swathes 
of the economy, leaving militaries, many cities9 and other actors to imple-
ment wide-ranging programs to strengthen vulnerable infrastructure, re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions, and otherwise respond to environmental 
disasters globally. 
9 On the role of cities, see the detailed and well-designed visual presentation from the 
C-40 cities Global Leadership on Climate Change group: http://www.c40cities.org/ending-
climate-change-begins-in-the-city. The Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network 
(ACCCRN) is also focused on the threat to the Asian region: http://www.rockefellerfoun-
dation.org/our-work/current-work/climate-change-resilience/asian-cities-climate-
change-resilience. 
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3 Sayonara stationarity
The OECD has provided a glimpse of the scale of the threat posed by the 
failure of national governments and their international agencies to pre-
pare. Roughly co-incident with the September 2013 release of the IPCC 
summary report, the OECD published their survey of Water and Climate 
Change Adaptation: Policies to Navigate Uncharted Waters. The OECD 
study examined all 34 member countries and the European Commission’s 
policies on water and climate change adaptation. These surveys are usu-
ally quite dry and of interest only to a very few specialists. But fortunately 
the OECD framed the survey with a concise and cogent argument that 
«climate change is to a large extent water change. Climate change affects 
all aspects of the water cycle and water is the main way through which 
the impacts of climate change will be felt». The OECD also advises that 
there is a «growing recognition that climate change presents a singular 
challenge for water systems by rendering the historical assumption of 
stationarity increasingly irrelevant». The best short definition of «station-
arity» is «the idea that natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging 
envelope of variability» (Milly et al. 2008). In the OECD’s view, the end 
of stationarity «means that a fundamental assumption upon which water 
management, infrastructure design and planning, and ultimately many 
economic and resource management decisions are founded will no longer 
be a reliable basis for future planning and management» (OECD 2013). 
This observation is profound in its implications. It not only backs up the 
meta-analysis of temperature shifts described above; it also details some 
of the implications. The end of stationarity means that expensive, multi-
decadal infrastructure decisions lack reliable measures for how hardened 
they should be to contend with water, the biggest element of the climate 
system. Urban managers and others can have no confidence in future 
levels of precipitation as well as how rapidly to try and adapt. The loss of 
stationarity also means that past investments in roadways, waterworks, 
energy systems, and the like may be vulnerable. 
One concrete example is that in Tokyo, between 23 July and 15 Au-
gust of 2013, there were 77 recorded ‘guerrilla rain’ (intense rainfall) 
events, roughly 6 times the level of the year previously. Wary of these 
realities, the Japanese Ministry of the Environment set up a committee 
to study the effects of climate change, which first met in August of 2013. 
The committee is slated to produce a report on countermeasures by the 
spring of 2015, and then refer the report to the Japanese cabinet for ap-
proval. Yet there is already concern that the accelerating pace of extreme 
weather events may mean that it is going to take too long to study extreme 
weather, arrive at some assessment of risk, and then start building or 
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bolstering infrastructure to cope with it.10 The global community saw a 
startling display of what the end of stationarity means when Hurricane 
Sandy hit New York City in late October of 2012, knocking out its power grid 
and turning sections of its subway system into a sewer (Metcalfe 2012). In 
late August of 2013, 60% of the Philippine capital Manila was flooded by 
torrential rains that unleashed more than a month’s worth of precipitation 
in a single day (Hranjski 2013). And then on 8 November of the same year, 
Typhoon Haiyan struck the central region of the Philippines as perhaps 
the strongest-ever storm to make landfall (Lum, Margesson 2014). Much 
of the urban infrastructure that has been built and is being built could 
become death-traps, particularly for children and the elderly, in the midst 
of natural disasters. 
The enormity of the disaster threat makes it difficult to exaggerate the 
degree of urgency when it comes to water. But on top of that, water has a 
huge and largely irreplaceable role in all aspects of conventional energy. 
Studies of water stress and interrelated resource crises in Asia highlight 
the vulnerability of China and India. These studies include work from 
such international agencies as the World Bank (Rodriguez et al. 2013) 
and the IEA (Morales 2012), General Electric11 and other multinational 
firms, military think tanks, and national governments. The US Woodrow 
Wilson Center was among the first to caution that business as usual will 
see China’s northern provinces, the source of 70% of its coal and 20% of 
its grain, run out of water by the end of the present decade (Liu 2013). 
The flip side is the growing vulnerability of conventional-energy infra-
structure to water crises, even in very developed countries. For example, 
the US Department of Energy’s 16 July 2013 report on US energy sector 
vulnerabilities to climate change and extreme weather details the impact 
that more frequent and severe floods, droughts, heat waves and other 
phenomena are delivering to America’s energy infrastructure and other 
aspects of its built environment (US Department of Energy 2013). The 
July 2013 edition of Public Utilities Fortnightly also outlines America’s ever 
more visible and costly problem in a lengthy article on «The growing foot-
print of climate change» (Kintner-Meyer, Kraucunas 2013). The denialist 
campaign, along with socio-psychological complacency, has diverted and 
impeded governments and their publics from paying attention and acting, 
but the evidence of dire and increasingly costly crises is visible even in 
trade publications. 
10 See (in Japanese) «Build an escape route for floods: The city explores underground», 
Nikkei Ecology, March 2014. 
11 General Electric has built 270 gas turbines, 70 steam turbines, 40 gasification turbines, and 
well over 1000 wind turbines in China. The company’s China Technology Center in Shanghai 
is one of GE’s four top global research centres. See «China», General Electric, Energy, 2013: 
http://www.ge-energy.com/solutions/regions/china.jsp. 
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In short, the rapidly unfolding reality of climate change is expressed 
most palpably and dangerously through the hydrologic cycle. That unfold-
ing is pressing on the urban and other infrastructures that were not de-
signed with such stressors in mind. And the loss of stationarity means that 
it is unclear what to do, save to maximize resilience as rapidly as possible. 
4 Is abenomics up to this challenge?
Japan’s Abe regime is not especially interested in the above facts. Like 
many of its counterparts elsewhere, the Abe cabinet is powerfully influ-
enced by vested energy interests. In Japan, the nuclear village gained firm 
control of energy policy in the early 2000s, and was bent on an ambitious 
programme of new nuclear build as a way to increase domestic self-reli-
ance as well as ramp down greenhouse gas emissions. Abe has repeatedly 
made it clear that he wants to restart as many as possible, and as fast as 
possible, of the 48 reactors shut down due to the 11 March 2011 disaster 
at Fukushima Daiichi and its fallout. 
For its part, the nuclear village is desperate not merely for restarts of 
idled plant, but is openly pursuing a commitment to new nuclear build 
(«Genpatsu no shin zōsetsu o» 2013). So this is a crucial time for the 
Japanese energy economy in particular as well as the overall economy per 
se. As noted in the introduction, Japan has an ICT-centred growth strat-
egy that could lead it to develop and deploy the smart city infrastructure 
(including distributed renewable power and radical efficiency) essential 
to mitigating and adapting to accelerating climate change. But the more 
political, financial and other capital Japan invests in nuclear restarts as 
well as new nuclear build, the lower the demand for radical efficiency and 
renewables. As we see from figure 5 below, the IEA’s 2012 World Energy 
Outlook suggests that Japan is not going to grow as a power economy over 
the ensuing two and a half decades. And note that the IEA’s figures are 
perhaps conservative, in that they do not reflect the possible shrinkage of 
the power economy overall through radical efficiency, especially in captur-
ing waste heat. 
DeWit. Can Japan build resilience in the face of climate change?  147
Rethinking nature in contemporary Japan: Science, economics, politics
Figure 5. Change in power generation: 2010-2035
Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2012
Figure 5 suggests that unlike the United States, where ‘all of the above’ 
is the ostensible strategy of the Obama regime, Japan does not have the 
luxury of obfuscating choices. Japan’s energy politics is largely a zero-
sum game, wherein turning back to nuclear will reduce the country’s 
incentives to deploy radical efficiency and renewables as well as further 
innovate new technologies and business models in these crucial areas of 
the smart-city paradigm. 
It would likely be unwise to weaken those incentives. Diffusion of effi-
ciency and renewables are key to the ICT growth strategy as well as ramp-
ing down demand and emissions. And the simultaneous development of 
new technologies and deployment of competitive business models are key 
to leadership in the global contest to innovate robust mitigation and ad-
aptation models. The IEA Energy Efficiency Market Report 2013, released 
on 16 October of 2013 strikingly demonstrates how potent efficiency has 
become in an era of high energy prices. Figure 6 shows that efficiency has 
led to avoided energy use for 2010 in 11 IEA member countries12 that greatly 
exceeds even the consumption of oil. And the IEA stresses that there is a 
lot more efficiency potential to be exploited. 
12 The countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Neth-
erlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Rethinking nature in contemporary Japan: Science, economics, politics
148 DeWit. Can Japan build resilience in the face of climate change? 
Figure 6. The ‘first fuel’: contribution of energy efficiency compared to other energy resources 
consumed in 2010 in 11 IEA member countries 
Source: IEA Energy Efficiency Market Report 2013, Figure 3.4
Figure 7 shows us that Japan’s performance in achieving efficiency gains 
between 1990 to 2010 was respectable. Japan achieved greater efficiency 
gains than Spain and Italy, but it was not a leader comparable to the UK 
or Germany. Just as Japan’s renewable deployment was held back by poor 
policies, over the past decade and a half the country has also lacked robust 
policies for efficiency. 
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Figure 7. Changes in aggregate intensities of 15 member IEA countries, decomposed into structure and 
efficiency effects, 1990-2010 
Source: IEA Energy Efficiency Market Report 2013, Figure 3.10
Japan’s middling performance in increasing efficiency is not due to being 
the ‘wrung-out sponge’ claimed by the business lobby Keidanren (De-
Wit 2013a). Keidanren routinely makes this argument in insisting that 
Japan’s efficiency, especially its industrial energy efficiency, is number one 
in the world. Its rhetoric is aimed at fostering overseas sales as well as 
avoiding more stringent targets than its member firms decide via the vol-
untary action initiatives. Their efforts are to be lauded, but it would appear 
that more stringent, better-coordinated policies are in order. Japan needs 
to remain competitive in the core areas of energy, the world’s largest and 
most strategic business sector. But figure 8 demonstrates that Japanese 
efficiency in industrial energy use per unit of value-added is matched or 
exceeded by a growing number of competitors. 
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Figure 8. Industrial energy use per unit of value-added for 20 IEA member countries, 1990 and 2010 
Source: IEA Energy Efficiency Market Report 2013, Figure 3.11
Notwithstanding drawing-board fantasies of small-modular reactors,13 it 
seems very unlikely that a nuclear-powered model will become core to 
the smart city. Like other centralized power in an era of climate change, 
nuclear is threatened by its reliance on lots of water as well as the effects 
of water and temperature on its critical infrastructure. Moreover, there 
is no nuclear that is not reliant on extensive and far more generous gov-
ernment subsidies than those directed to renewables, which in fact are 
already competitive – even against natural gas and coal – in parts of the 
United States, Australia, and elsewhere.14
At this critical juncture, for Japan to choose restarts, let alone more nu-
clear build, would likely see it evolve into a high cost, uncompetitive and 
environmentally unsustainable Galapagos. It would undermine its incen-
tives to move ahead in renewables and efficiency. But were Japan to choose 
radical efficiency and renewables, with its ambitious ICT growth strategy 
at the core, and coordinated by a focused cabinet and prime minister, it 
could become the model for a sustainable and resilient 21st century urban 
and rural economy. 
13 Dr. Mark Cooper, senior fellow for economic analysis at the Institute for Energy and the 
Environment at Vermont Law School, has calculated that these reactors would be even more 
costly than conventional nuclear as well as distract from the development and deployment of 
renewables power and radical efficiency (Cooper 2014). 
14 These facts have even been recognized by the Financial Times (Clark 2013b). 
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5 Grounds for optimism 
In spite of the Abe cabinet’s limitations, there are grounds for expecting 
results from Japan. The cabinet is distracted by geopolitics and historical 
revisionism, to the extent that in mid-May of 2014 famed Wall Street hedge 
fund investor Jim Chanos came out and gave voice to the growing concern 
that Abe is an ultranationalist and the most dangerous figure in Asia (Cope-
land 2014). A distracted cabinet increasingly finds it difficult to dominate 
the energy-policy outcome, allowing alternatives to proceed. It would be 
better to have the prime minister focused on the ICT growth strategy, of 
course, but at least his distraction precludes him from meddling. 
Contrary to Abe’s preference for the nuclear village, the shock of the 
Fukushima meltdowns in March of 2011 destabilized and delegitimated 
it in the public eye. A 18 March 2014 poll by the Asahi Shinbun indicates 
that 59% of the Japanese public hence oppose restarts of any nuclear 
capacity, whereas only 28% support restarts. The poll’s results not only 
confirm that the opposition to nuclear is holding; it also shows a great sen-
sitivity to risk. According to the poll, only 12% of the Japanese public have 
either no or only minimal concern regarding the risk of further nuclear 
accidents at facilities other than the infamous Fukushima Daiichi plant. 
By contrast, 50% have a fair degree of concern, and 36% have a very high 
degree of concern. In addition, the poll shows that only 4% of respond-
ents regard the lack of nuclear waste disposal facilities as of no or only 
minimal concern. By contrast, 19% believe it is to some extent a problem. 
And a massive 76% regard it as a serious problem («Genpatsu sai kadō 
‘hantai’ 59%...» 2014). 
Moreover, at the end of 2013, Japan’s 16 trillion yen power market fea-
tured 192 independent power producers, including such new entrants as 
Toyota. That number was 79 at the end of 2012, and there has thus been 
a 240% increase in the number of firms («Shin denryoku, kōri kyōkyū wa 2 
wari domari...» 2014). Japan’s ‘feed in tariff ’ policy support for diffusing 
renewables, effective from July of 2012, saw over four gigawatts (roughly 
four large nuclear reactors worth) of new renewable capacity deployed in 
the initial year. And the Pew Research 3 April 2014 publication of Who’s 
Winning the Clean Energy Race? 2013 argues that «Japan experienced the 
fastest investment growth in the world, increasing 80%, to almost $29 bil-
lion» (Pew Environmental Initiatives 2014). 
Most important perhaps, Japan’s local governments exhibit increasing 
eagerness to seize the opportunity for economic development and local 
resilience in the emergence of alternatives to highly centralized and con-
centrated nuclear power. Centralized power, such as nuclear reactors, led 
to concentrated economic benefits for a few communities whereas the risks 
of accident were distributed among a much broader range of communities. 
Fukushima Prefecture’s post-3-11 commitment to 100% renewable energy 
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by 2040 encouraged other prefectures and cities, including Tokyo, Kyoto, 
and Osaka, to adopt ambitious targets (DeWit 2014). 
In short, the context of Japan’s energy policy has been dramatically 
altered by Fukushima and subsequent developments. New ideas and in-
fluence in power and energy policymaking continue to spread out among 
a larger range of actors within the central government and among the 
regional governments. In the wake of 3-11 many of these actors used re-
gional blocs and other vehicles to collaborate and apply pressure to central 
government agencies for accelerated rollout of distributed generation and 
other key elements for modernizing the power- and energy-economy. This 
collaboration has also focused on the smart cities and smart grids and other 
ICT-centered infrastructure that the nuclear village has always been wary 
of as a threat to its business model. The nuclear village recognized the 
threat to their paradigm of centralized power production and highly con-
centrated income streams. But the rebuild of Japan’s devastated Northeast 
region provided a significant foothold to expand the rather constrained 
smart city projects that had been under way since the late 2000s and in-
crease their diversity as well as their deployment of renewables and more 
radical efficiency. 
As to scale of the opportunity, the Japanese Ministry of Internal A ffairs 
and Communications (MIC) indicates that the role of ICT in the Japanese 
economy is already large. Its 2013 White Paper on Communications indi-
cates that nominal output by the various sectors of the Japanese economy 
totaled 918.6 trillion yen in 2011. The ICT industry represented 9% of that 
output, or 82.7 trillion yen. This total was considerably larger than such 
sectors as wholesale, which accounted for 6.5% of economic activity or 
59.4 trillion yen. Construction, once the key sector in Japan’s domestic 
economy, accounted for 5.6% of economic activity or 51.2 trillion yen. 
The MIC data also suggest that a strategic focus on ICT can help coun-
tries grow their economies by consuming less. The data also demonstrate 
that investment in ICT has a significantly larger multiplier effect than gen-
eral investment. The ‘multiplier effect’ refers to the amount of economic 
activity generated as a result of a given volume of investment. Drawing on 
a growing body of work suggesting that investment in software and other 
such ‘intangibles’ (as opposed to such ‘tangibles’ as plant and equipment) 
is very productive, the MIC project that the multiplier effect of ICT invest-
ment in 2015 may be as high as 1.98 versus 1.19 for general investment. 
The ICT-centred growth strategy was approved by the Abe Cabinet on 
14 June 2013. The growth strategy is also very powerfully informed by the 
disruptive potential opened up by the rebuild of the devastated regions on 
the basis of renewable and distributed energy. As with the ICT-centered ‘in-
dustrial Internet’, ‘machine to machine’, ‘big data’, and related emergent 
paradigms, the growth strategy is aimed at a profound restructuring of 
the energy economy as well as much of the rest of the infrastructures that 
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make up the modern urban community and the exchange of resources and 
information among citizens, businesses and their governments. This emer-
gent paradigm is not peculiar to Japan. The smart city model had begun to 
accrete, as idea and practice, in the early 2000s. But from the beginning 
of the 2010s, worsening resource, economic, and climate crises were par-
alleled by such technical advances as the diffusion of ‘big data’ analytics 
via the cheapening and miniaturization of sensors. Enabled by the rapid 
diffusion of increasingly inexpensive ICT, distributed energy, smart public 
policy, and such vendors as Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi, Toyota, IBM, GE, 
Bechtel, Siemens, AT&T and others desperate to deploy the most competi-
tive business models, there are now thousands of projects and a market 
whose scale and growth defy calculation (Smart Cities Council 2013). 
As Anthony Townsend, Research Director at the Institute for the Future 
and Senior Research Fellow at New York University’s Rudin Center for 
Transportation, illustrates very well (Townsend 2013),15 these trends are 
already reshaping urbanization. These developments increasingly point to 
the disruption not just of centralized power generation and transmission 
but also of a resource-intensive growth dynamic that has characterized the 
developed economies over the past six decades. 
We have seen that Japan itself is threatened by climate change, along 
with its region overall, so building resilience into all infrastructures is truly 
in its own existential self–interest as well as its enlightened self-interest 
as an exporter. This argument has not yet gained the status of common 
sense in the overall policy debate. Even so, ideas do change and interests 
alter their strategies. Consider how in Japan the nuclear-centred power 
economy was the reigning common sense of just a few years ago. Its del-
egitimation among the public and among local governments suggests how 
rapidly the structure of incentives and ideas can shift. Japan is in the midst 
of an unprecedented economic experiment, in the midst of accelerating cri-
ses. Japan may fail to grasp hold of the opportunity it confronts, consigning 
itself to escalating costs and plunging competitiveness. On the other hand, 
Japan may yet deploy a distributed, resource-lite, and resilience-focused 
paradigm that increases its competitiveness as a political economy and 
also enhances the sustainability options of the emerging economies that 
are going to add 2 billion new urban residents over the next 15 to 20 years. 
15 An excerpt from this important and timely book can be found here: http://www.ssireview.
org/articles/entry/smart_cities_big_data_civic_hackers_and_the_quest_for_a_new_utopia. 
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